

PUBLIC DOMAIN NON-FICTION

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THE NEGRO VOTE IN THE STATES WHOSE CONSTITUTIONS HAVE NOT BEEN SPECIFICALLY REVISED,

by John Hope

from: Project Gutenberg's e-text of *The Negro and the elective franchise. A Series Of Papers And A Sermon* by Cook et al.

So much has been said about almost every phase of the so-called "Race Problem," so many good things and so many bad things, that we are apt to believe all has been said that can be said and to wish that if there is anything that has not yet been said, it may remain unsaid. Certainly little that is new can be said on the franchise until we have some new developments. You will get nothing new from me. I am to speak on a current topic that is as well known to you as to me. Yet it is sometimes helpful to hear your own thoughts expressed by some one else. With this possibility of doing a service, I apologize for having consented to write on the subject of "Negro Suffrage in the States whose Constitutions have not been Specifically Revised." But even here I feel unable to speak about all these States and prefer to confine myself to my own state, for of this I may speak with the assurance that comes from contact.

The State of Georgia probably shows as little revulsion and reversion of sentiment and law as any distinctly Southern state, except perhaps Texas, since the Reconstruction period. Republican rule was short lived and, while it remained, was less aggressive and revolutionary than in other states. The population has been fairly evenly divided between the two races with a majority always on the white side. The agrarian class has been less powerful than in some Southern states and the ignorance of both races has been rather mitigated and softened by centres of information, towns and cities, less remotely distant from one another than is the case in several other Southern states, railroads and factories exerting a great influence in this respect. So Georgia may be taken as a type of those states in which the best things have happened or rather the worst things have not happened for Colored people.

Of course, in Reconstruction times Georgia Democrats did act harshly, but my remarks rather have to do with the period after that. For instance, more than thirty Colored Republicans were expelled from the Georgia legislature and the state had to have a sort of second reconstruction before it was finally recognized by the United States Government.

Georgia had only one Republican governor, and sent to the National House of Representatives at least one Colored Representative. But for many years, even this has been a thing of the past. White men have held all offices, occasionally having the monotony of complexion broken by a Colored representative from Camden, McIntosh or Liberty county in the state legislature.

The passing of the Republican party in the state as an aggressive elective organization has been due to several causes, but so hidden and studied have two of them been, so free from shotguns, leaving out, of course, the Ku Klux and Patrollers of the '60's and '70's, that you cannot lay your hands on these causes so easily as in some other states where the change has been revolutionary and sudden rather than gradual. You will notice that I say Republican party, for when the Colored vote was most effective it was organized by the Republican party. One of the causes of this passing of the Republican vote was intimidation at the polls on election day, threats and intimidation before the day in communities of Colored people, and official rascality in the counting of ballots actually cast. Probably, as a result of these a third cause came—the indifference of the state and municipal Republican organizations to making a canvass for the state and city officers.

Then the Colored vote began to divide on Democratic candidates and was exceedingly effective, holding the balance of power, as it did, in choosing white Democratic governors, congressmen, state legislators, city and county officers. This went well for awhile, but white office-seekers soon began to fear this Colored balance of power. They wanted their certainty of a majority of the white vote to guarantee their

office; so the Georgia legislature passed a law making it legal to have primaries to nominate candidates for office and also throwing such safeguards about the management of primaries as aimed to secure lawful practices on these occasions. Here was a perfectly harmless movement, apparently harmless. The next step was made by the Democratic party assembled in State Convention when it decided that candidates for state and county officers on the Democratic ticket should be nominated by a primary, but leaving the conduct of the primary to the community in which it might be held, provided this should not run counter to the primary law as passed by the State. Here too, was a perfectly fair and harmless provision, apparently fair and apparently harmless. But the way was then open for the primary to take on a local coloring. In communities where the colored vote was an embarrassment, the Democratic party there decided to have a white primary. In one of these communities a colored man that I know went to vote at the primary. He was a "good Negro" a very good Negro, his goodness dating back to the time when the "Yankees" were about to confiscate his master's cotton and he claimed the cotton as his. Even this transaction did not enlarge his cranium, and after saving his master thousands of dollars and gradually amassing a fortune for himself, he still knew how to approach his former master from the kitchen door. Well, this good Negro went to cast his ballot. The courteous man at the polls said: "George, this is a Democratic primary." "Yes," said George, "but I am a Democrat." "Well," said the courteous gentleman, "but George, this is a white primary." This colored man found himself without a Republican for whom he might vote, and was informed that the Democratic party was a close corporation so far as the Colored man was concerned. This is quite interesting when I tell you that white Republicans, avowedly Republicans, have not only been permitted but even requested to participate in the primaries of the Democratic and Populist parties.

The reason for the elasticity of the primary is quite evident, that is, why Colored people are allowed to take part in the primary in one community and not in another, or why they are allowed at one time to vote and at another time in that same community are not allowed to vote. The purpose is to have the Colored voters as a harmless balance of power between the Democrats and any other party that may show strength, that is, to have the Colored man to settle disputes among white people without becoming obstreperous because of this valuable assistance. There were some communities where the Populists used the Colored voter to defeat Democrats and others where the Democrats used this vote to defeat Populists. Of the State as a whole, it may be said that Populism was defeated by the Colored voters espousing the Democratic side. And be it said to the common sense and good reason of many Democrats that this fact is acknowledged and to an extent appreciated by the party now in power—to the extent at least of staving off any further disfranchisement measures thus far.

But the most flagrant high-handedness and palpable confession of purpose on the part of white people with reference to our citizenship rights is to be found in a state legislative enactment that looks to the municipal management of two Georgia towns where the Colored voters are so overwhelmingly in the majority that ordinary subterfuges would not fulfill the requirement. Darien and St. Mary's are two coast towns with a large Colored population. The mayor and aldermen are not elected by the voters in these towns; but, instead, these towns enjoy the unique distinction of being managed by officials appointed by the governor of the State. What is more simple; what more high-handed; what more un-Democratic and subversive of national principles of government than this?

Now let us ask the question: Can the Colored man cast his ballot in Georgia?

In the first place, any party of any race may hold a primary.

Second, any man of any party or race may vote in the general election for any candidate he may wish.

Let us ask next, whether these ballots will be counted? That depends entirely upon whether the need is to count them or destroy them; or furthermore, to count them as ballots for some one for whom they

were not cast. The election boards and the management at the polls are not bipartisan and the party in power may do what it chooses.

We raise the question now whether it is for our best interest economically to exercise the franchise? Do men vote to help their economic interests? Are not taxation and other fiscal policies settled by the ballot? May not property be enhanced or lessened in value by voters? Colored people have some real estate and securities, but their practical capital is their labor; yet they have not the least power, the real power, of influencing legislation in reference to a single labor measure that may arise, although in Georgia nearly half the population is colored and in the laboring class the colored people are in the majority. Now suppose, as white union labor in the South grows stronger, it should influence such legislation as would eliminate colored labor where it came into competition with white labor, the colored laborer would be politically powerless to resist this legislation. Now is this a mere idle dream when we reflect that within the past few months a Texas legislator introduced a bill to confine Colored labor to the farm whenever it was found in city and town communities to be competing with white labor.

Then there is another side that really has its argument, effective, though perhaps not very logical. The fact that we are, as a people, laborers and not capitalists, makes us, as any other people similarly placed would be, under obligation to the capitalist who, in our case, are white. The point is made that to enter politics against the wishes of this people would raise such antagonism as to lower our earning power. Hence we are told to keep out of politics until we get a better money basis. Here we stand between two difficulties, staying out of politics might jeopard our earning and entering politics might jeopard our earnings. Many honest and thoughtful white and colored men stand on both sides of this question.

Now, is it educationally best for us to vote? This question requires some amplifying. Do we mean what educational value comes from this training in citizenship? If so, then certainly the value is great. There was a time when we knew conditions in our state and town, but so little influence does a Colored man have in politics now that I do not even know the name of the alderman in my ward, although I am a registered voter, have paid my poll tax and voted for President Roosevelt. I know of nothing more benumbing to us as citizens than this deprivation. Men who are philosophic may consider matters that are not of material concern, but the average person does not load his mind and spend his time with things that, for one reason or another, have no concern for him. Any discussion as to the fitness and honesty of municipal and state candidates hardly touches me, as I know I cannot lift a finger to promote the interests of any one of them. I have no voice.

There is another position from which this question may be viewed and that is whether the advantages from schools would be lessened or increased from participation in politics. It is quite evident that without the ballot any people are suppliant and must beg rather than make a manly demand. But, assuming that the lack of the ballot has become a condition with us, would a demand or threat about our ballot result in a counter threat that if we forced the issue, we should not only be denied our ballot, but that for our arrogance the appropriation for Colored public schools would be cut down and we should receive only what we paid in as our share of the school tax? This too, is no dream; but has actually been considered by colored men as a possible reason for not causing such antagonism as would arise from Colored men endeavoring to enter aggressively into politics again.

What now about fears for disfranchisement such as has been compassed by the revised constitutions in many Southern states? Some one may say that there is no difference between constitutional disfranchisement and that quasi disfranchisement effective for all practical purposes such as we have spoken of as now obtaining in Georgia. There is a tremendous difference. If a wave of civic righteousness should sweep over those states still without constitutional disfranchisement, the primaries would be a very slight embarrassment to those willing to do right by all races alike; while in the states possessing constitutional disfranchisement, the reactionaries would have such means of stopping fair play and

honest elections free for all, that they could easily check the purpose of the fair-minded citizens for a long while.

Now, do we really have to fear disfranchisement? I say disfranchisement must at all times be feared and be guarded against as far as it lies within our power in an honorable and manly way to hold it off. Just at the time North Carolina and Maryland seemed most secure to us we found ourselves deprived of our rights; and it may be safely stated that whenever on a specific occasion the Colored vote exerts the balance of power over any considerable area, there disfranchisement may be feared. We need to fear disfranchisement because it is founded upon the spirit of injustice and that same spirit fosters it. So palpable is this, that the South bewails the fact. Governor Warfield in speaking about the repeal of the Fifteenth amendment says: "The privilege to vote could then be bestowed without respect to the expedient of unwise constitutional amendments that strain the conscience of our best people and arouse criticism." Yet the repeal of the Fifteenth amendment would not relieve those apostles of disfranchisement of the odium of violating the spirit of truly American democracy and of setting at naught that mighty decision on human rights that was rendered by the bloody arbitrament of war—Disfranchisement of whatever sort, if designed to embarrass a citizen because of his race, must always "strain the conscience of our best people."

Does Georgia show any signs of the disfranchising spirit? We fear it does. The State Legislature now expects some measure of this sort at each session, and in recent years has not been disappointed, although good sense has thus far triumphed. Then again men in high places, congressmen and at least one of our U. S. Senators from Georgia have begun to say some things that may easily be construed as an advocacy of disfranchisement. It occurs to me that the marked difference between the condition in my boyhood and to-day is this: then the opposition was to Republicans, to-day it is to Negroes. It is not a party line, but a race line.

Now the white primary has not done all that was claimed for it. In the first place it has not purified elections. Far from doing away with the purchase and sale of votes, it has, by lowering the supply, relatively increased the demand and brought up the price to a really fancy figure. In the second place it has failed to do that for which it was ostensibly introduced especially to do, namely; to put into office those men most eminently fitted by ability and character to administer the office to which they might be chosen. On the contrary, primary elections have been questioned on the ground of fraud; and the mayor of one very prominent Georgia city has been arrested for drunkenness. Then why is the primary kept? Well, the "fixers" for instance, can more easily fix things. With the Colored man's vote eliminated, the work becomes simplified and even though the amount of money spent illegally may now be more than the total amount in the days when colored as well as white were in the market yet those interested in "fixing" elections can now work with more assurance; and promises may more easily be carried out in the matter of delivering the goods.

For instance, I know of a city election where the voters in one ward were so evenly divided and the candidates had calculated their strength so accurately, that one candidate felt safe in buying three white votes at the rate of one hundred ten dollars. Large corporations may now operate easily in state and city; and some of the most flagrant cases of political jobbery that have been charged against Reconstruction rule are easily equalled by the bare-faced graft and bribery by which large business interests win their way through the assistance of white voters.

What are the possibilities of white aspirants bolting the primary? It is my impression that they are fewer than they were twenty years ago. Judge Gartrell once ran independently against Alexander Stephens for Governor and Judge Emory Speer in his younger days ran on an independent ticket; but such a step on the part of a candidate means outlawry for life. Speer was read into the Republican party, Thomas Watson into the Populist; and since the exile of such giants, the small fry find it easy to be good and not

to lift their heads in rebellion, no matter what rascality has compassed their defeat at the Primary. No. It is my impression that the primary is more firmly established to-day than when it was first started. White unity has become white slavery; and while the yoke galls, the white aspirant prefers the yoke to extermination.

But, suppose there should be a general Democratic "rough house" and the colored vote should be called in to quell the disturbance, the Colored voter would have no guarantee that such would mean his return to political standing. On the contrary, it might, as in several states, cause the passage of constitutional disfranchisement that would make his last state worse than the former. Our status is truly unenviable, and the ground on which we stand is exceedingly uncertain.

I desire now to treat more fully what has already been touched upon: Why do the Republicans not nominate candidates for state, county and city offices and make a general canvass? There are two classes of Colored men, those who think the party should and those who think it should not. Unfortunately each of these classes makes severe charges against the other with reference to this matter. I much prefer to accept the explanations of both as honest. The following are at least some of the reasons for not making a canvass: first, it is difficult to get desirable men to accept the nomination; second, it would be still more difficult to secure sufficient funds to pay the ordinary and perfectly legitimate expenses of a campaign; third, the injustice of the party in power would make a fair election an impossibility. Hence a candidate would be doomed to defeat from the moment of his nomination and the fact that he and the party would know this, would make the campaign lifeless, futile and perfunctory. Fourth, the prominence of Colored people in politics and the extra trouble to which they would put the ascendant party might result in still further curtailment of the few rights still left to us.

To all of this the side that clamors or appears to clamor for a ticket says: You assume too much, you see ghosts. Yet supposing the worst, it is far better to keep Colored voters organized for several reasons: first, because the organization gives a valuable training in citizenship that cannot be gained by standing aloof and waiting for better things; second, because if an opening should come suddenly, the Colored people would be better able to decide quickly and intelligently where to throw their strength solidly on one side or another for their own best interests and the interests of the government; thirdly, because a show of opposition to existing political injustice and repression would relieve us of the charge of indifference to our condition and would strengthen the courage of those who might champion our cause—our efficient, powerful champions, who have grown doubtful about our real manhood. I believe in the honesty of both these classes of colored men; and it is exceedingly difficult for a man, living in the midst of these conditions and knowing the temperament, attitude and unlimited power of the white people, to say which one of these two courses is the more rational and helpful to pursue.

What have the Colored people lost through disfranchisement? They have lost the privilege of influencing legislation, since the legislator feels under no obligation to them. The "Jim Crow" car law, the separate tax bill and almost any other bill may be passed so far as pressure from Colored people is concerned. A very clear case is the public library in Atlanta which is supported by the taxes of all citizens, yet not a single Colored person may enter that library to read or borrow a book. Some months ago Mr. Carnegie offered the city ten thousand dollars for a library for the Colored people on the condition that the city furnish a lot and agree to appropriate one thousand dollars per annum for the maintenance of the library. The whole matter has been tabled and the Colored people have no redress, since their mayor and aldermen were elected without the Colored vote. Do you suppose the city of Atlanta would have refused so paltry a favor, if its city council were dependent upon our vote?

Not only have we lost influence among the law makers but among those who interpret the law and administer justice. Neither judge nor jury has to consult the Colored man's wish. This independence of us makes the court a place of injustice as frequently as of justice, and policemen may be cruel with impunity.

Then too, the chain-gang with its revolting influences on men and women, boys and girls; the lack of Negro reformatories in some places where they do exist for white boys find much of their meaning in the fact that the Colored voter cannot make sentiment and bring things to pass through the ballot. We have had the "Jim Crow" law forced upon us, our public schools have become poorer in equipment and teaching force, and the salary of teachers has been lowered.

In a word, the loss of the franchise has changed our status to such a degree that we no longer demand, but beg and supplicate even for those fundamental needs, without which education and general improvement would be very doubtful.

Now are there some things to be effected that are regarded as of more vital interest to Colored people at present than the ballot? In the face of what has already been said, this seems almost an unnecessary question, since the ballot is no abstract thing, no merely academic theory, but a vital agent in the promotion of improvement and happiness. Yet as obvious as all this seems, when people have already lost the ballot they may ask this question: Are there some things to be effected that are of more vital interest to Colored people at present than the ballot?

I heard a sweet-spirited Colored man say at the conclusion of his remarks one day—he was a college president and is now in Heaven away from this turmoil—well I heard him say: "I have come to the conclusion that all we can do in this country is to take what the white man gives us." An eminent Colored preacher said recently in my hearing: "You can't drive these white folks, you must knuckle to them and you can get anything you want." Within the last two months an interesting white southern clergyman in his exhortation to Colored people to be good Negroes, told them not to get mad about "Jim Crow" cars and to be slow to urge their rights. Said he: "You Colored people are undertaking a heavy task when you attempt to reform the Anglo-Saxon." Now our present needs are numerous and vital, many growing out of the curtailment of privileges, a condition made possible through our lack of the ballot. Many Colored men believe that we can get these needs supplied most quickly and surely by begging and not resorting to a futile ballot; many, moreover, think that the voting would retard the granting of these much needed privileges. On the other hand, others say our condition grows steadily worse and our only redress, our only hope, is in the ballot.

Now what do I believe about all this? I believe that we ought to vote, and I vote on every public question when the privilege is accorded me. I believe that our leaders ought to give us the opportunity to vote and let us stand forth as men, whether successful or not, willing to do all within our power to be full-fledged citizens. Certainly our attitude ought never to allow the white people to say: the Negro cares nothing for the franchise and does not exercise it when he does have the opportunity. What are we waiting for? Not more education, I hope. And here I must remind you that one thing is much over-talked: the forwardness of the Colored child and the backwardness of the white child in the matter of getting an education. Colored children are not being fitted as are white for their responsibilities. A real intellectual awakening is going on among the whites of the South—more and better school houses, better teachers and longer school terms; and the white children are learning with avidity. The Colored children are getting poor school houses, poorer teachers, more poorly paid teachers and shorter school terms; and we cannot change this disparity by begging the state and city. Unless we force better things for ourselves by the ballot or go into our own pockets, the next generation of colored voters will be relatively less prepared for the educational qualification in comparison with the white voter than the Colored voters of to-day. Oh! you say: "Pessimist, looking on the dark side." Away with that contemptible sentimentality and aversion to ugly facts that make some of my people call a man a pessimist every time he lifts a warning voice. I know the white country school house and the Colored country school house. There is a tremendous difference.

Now I believe in education, but I also believe in manhood; and any education bought at the price of manhood is worthless and a mill-stone about the neck. I believe in the ballot as a developer of manhood and as it procures the right of men. I believe in the ballot in spite of threats of disfranchisement, if we use this ballot. I see no difference in purpose between the states that have outrightly disfranchised us and those states that do it stealthily or by indirection.

I believe that the purpose of all is the same: a hatred for Colored people and a determination to have white supremacy at any cost of life and honor. I do not think Northern sentiment is a deterring force, though I think Northern sentiment could become a deterring force to disfranchisement. In the face of all this, why delay voting in the hope of better things; better welcome disfranchisement as men than suffer from it as cowards.



LORENZO DE' MEDICI RULES IN FLORENCE
ZENITH OF FLORENTINE GLORY
A.D. 1469

By Oliphant Smeaton
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8, by Editor-in-Chief: Rossiter Johnson

During the twelfth century several of the Italian cities--especially Florence and Venice--rose to great wealth and power. Venice, through her favorable situation, became preeminent in commerce, while Florence was coming to be the most important industrial centre of Europe. In the thirteenth century Florence was the scene of continual strife between the Guelfs and Ghibellines, but she not only continued to develop in material prosperity, but also attained to intellectual activities whereby in the next century she gained a higher distinction. She took the foremost part in the Renaissance, and was the birthplace or the home of Dante, Boccaccio, and other leaders of the modern movement.

In the fifteenth century Florence reached a still loftier eminence under the Medici, a family celebrated for the statesmen which it produced and for its patronage of letters and art. Its most illustrious members were Cosmo (1389-1464) and his grandson Lorenzo, surnamed the "Magnificent." Lorenzo was born January 1, 1449, when the second great period of the Renaissance was nearing its close. That was the "period of arrangement and translation; the epoch of the formation of the great Italian libraries; the age when, in Florence around his grandfather Cosmo, in Rome around Pope Nicholas V, and in Naples around Alfonso the Magnanimous, coteries of the leading humanists were gathered, engaged in labors which have made posterity eternally their debtors."

Conjointly with his younger brother Giuliano, Lorenzo, on the death of his father Piero, in 1469, succeeded to the vast wealth and political

power of the family. In 1478 the death of Giuliano left Lorenzo sole ruler of Florence.

To few men has either the power or the opportunity been given to influence their epoch, intellectually and politically, to a degree so marked as was the lot of Lorenzo de' Medici. One of the most marvellously many-sided of the many-sided men who adorned the Italy of the fifteenth century, he did more to place Florence in the forefront of the world's culture than any other citizen who claimed Val d'Arno[1] as his birthplace. His influence was great because he was in sympathy so catholic with all the varied life of his age and circle. While during the one hour he would be found learnedly discussing the rival claims of the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophers with Ficino and Landino, the next might witness him the foremost reveller in the Florentine carnival, crowned with flowers and with the winecup in his hand, gayly carolling the *ballate* he had composed for the occasion; while the third might behold him surrounded by the leading painters and sculptors of Tuscany, discoursing profoundly on the aims and mission of art. Truly a unique personality, at one and the same time the glorious creation and the splendid epitome of the spirit of the Renaissance!

When Lorenzo de' Medici consented to assume the "position" occupied by his father Piero and his grandfather Cosmo, he was not the raw youth his immature years would lead one to suppose. Although intellectual maturity is reached at an earlier age in the sunny South than in the fog-haunted lands of Northern Europe, Lorenzo had enjoyed a long apprenticeship before being called to undertake the duties devolving on him as the uncrowned king of Florence. From his thirteenth year he had been the companion and shared the counsels, first of his grandfather and father, and subsequently of his father alone. From the former especially he learned many important lessons in statecraft. The matter is open to question, however, if any advice had more far-reaching results or was laid more carefully to heart than this which is contained in more than one of Cosmo's letters: "Never stint your favors to the cause of learning, and cultivate sedulously the friendship of scholars and humanists." Toward such a course Lorenzo's inclinations, as well as his interests, pointed, and during his life Florence was the Athens not only of Italy but of Europe as a whole. Here, among many others, were to be found such "epoch-makers" as Poliziano, Ficino, and Landino, Pico della Mirandola, Leo Battista Alberti, Michelangelo, Luigi Pulci--men who glorified their age by crowning it with the nimbus of their genius.

The literary and artistic greatness of Florence was not due, however, to the comparative intellectual poverty of the other states in Italy. Florence was only *primus inter pares*--greatest among many that were great. When the fact is recalled that such contemporaries as Pomponius Laetus, Bartolommeo Sacchi, Molza, Alessandro Farnese (Paul III), Platina, Sabellicus at Rome; Pontanus, Sannazaro, and Porcello in Naples; and Pomponasso and Boiardo at Ferrara, were then at or nearing their prime, the position of Florence as the acknowledged centre of European culture was conceded by sense of right alone. Than this nothing proves

more emphatically the strides learning had been making. It was no longer the prerogative of the few, but the privilege of the many. From the first, Lorenzo recognized what a strong card he held in the affection and respect of the Italian as well as of the Florentine humanists.

The great secret of Lorenzo's preëminence in European and Italian, as well as in Tuscan, politics lies in the fact that he was able to unite the sources of administrative, legislative, and judicial power in himself. All the public offices in Florence were held by his dependents, and so entirely was the state machinery controlled by him that we find such men as Louis XI and the emperor Maximilian, Alfonso of Naples, and Pope Innocent VIII recognizing his authority and appealing to him personally, in place of to the signiory, to effect the ends they desired. Such power enabled him to avoid the risks his grandfather Cosmo had been compelled to run to maintain his authority. The Medicean faction was better in hand than in his grandfather's days, and Lorenzo, therefore, in playing the rôle of the peacemaker of Italy, at the time when he held the "balance of power" through his treaties with Milan, Naples, and Ferrara, could speak with a decision that carried weight when he found it necessary to threaten a restless "despot" with a political combination that might depose him.

Lorenzo's services to learning were inspired by feelings infinitely more noble than those actuating his political plans. A patriotism as lofty as it was beneficent led him to desire that his country should be in the van of Italian progress in Renaissance studies. His sagacious prevision enabled him to proportion the nature and extent of the benefit he conferred to the need it was intended to supply. Many statesmen do more harm than good by failing to appreciate this law of supply and demand. They grant more than is required, and that which should have been a boon becomes a burden. Charles V, at the time of the Reformation, on more than one occasion committed this error, as also did Wolsey and Mazarin. Lorenzo, like Richelieu, recognized the value of moderation in giving, and caused every favor to be regarded as a possible earnest of others to come.

The earlier years of his power were associated with many stirring events which exercised no inconsiderable influence on the state of learning. For example, his skilful playing off of Duke Galeazzo Maria Sforza of Milan against Ferrante, King of Naples, led to greater attention being directed by the Florentines to Neapolitan and Milanese affairs, with the result that humanists and artists from both these places paid frequent visits to Florence, where they were welcomed by Lorenzo as his guests. Then when the revolt of the small city of Volterra from Florentine rule was suppressed by Lorenzo's agents, with a rigorous severity that cast a stain on their master's name, owing to many unoffending scholars having suffered to the extent of losing their all, Lorenzo made noble amends. Not only did he generously assist the inhabitants to repair their losses, not only did he make grants to the local scholars and send them copies of many of the codices in his own library to supply the loss of their books which had been burned by the soldiery, but he purchased large estates in

the neighborhood, that the citizens might benefit by his residence among them. In this way, too, he brought the Volterranean scholars into more intimate relations with the Florentine humanists, and thus contributed to the further diffusion of the benefits of the Renaissance.

All was not plain sailing, however, as regards the progress of the "New Learning." Despite his efforts, Lorenzo could not prevent its development being checked during the papal-Neapolitan quarrel with Florence. That war originated in a dispute with Pope Sixtus IV, who kept Italy in a ferment during the whole duration of his pontificate, 1471-1484. Were no other proof forthcoming of Lorenzo's marvellous diplomatic genius than this one fact, that he checkmated the political schemes of Sixtus, and finally so neutralized his influence as to render him wellnigh impotent for evil-doing, such an achievement was sufficient to stamp him one of the greatest masters of statecraft Europe has known. In any estimate of his ability we must take into account the unsatisfactory character of many of the instruments wherewith he had to achieve his purposes, and also the fact that he had neither a great army at his back with which to enforce the fulfilment of treaty obligations--for Florence never was a city of soldiers--nor had he the prestige of an official position to lend weight to his words. To all intents and purposes he was a private citizen of the Florentine republic. Yet such was the dynamic power of the man's marvellous personality, and the reputation he had earned, even in his early years, for supreme prescience and far-reaching diplomatic subtlety, that far and wide he was regarded as the greatest force in Italian politics. Sixtus sallied forth to crush; he returned to the Vatican a crushed and a discredited man, to die of sheer chagrin over his defeat by Lorenzo in his designs upon Ferrara.

Then followed the memorable dispute, in 1472-1473, over the bishopric of Pisa, when the Pope's nominee, Francesco Salviati, was refused possession of his see, Pisa being one of the Tuscan towns under the control of Florence. To this Sixtus retaliated by seeking the friendship of Ferrante of Naples, a move Lorenzo anticipated by forming the league between Florence, Milan, and Venice. This league thoroughly alarmed both the Pope and Ferrante, and on the latter visiting Rome in 1475 a papal-Neapolitan alliance was formed.

Even then hostilities might not have broken out had the young Duke of Milan not been assassinated in 1476, leaving an infant heir. This entailed a long minority, with all its dangers, and the apprehensions regarding these were not fanciful, inasmuch as Lodovico Sforza, uncle of the baby Duke, usurped the position under pretext of acting as regent. These crimes were plainly responsible for the Pazzi conspiracy in 1478 against the Medici themselves, a conspiracy which resulted in Giuliano, the younger brother of Lorenzo, being murdered in the cathedral, during mass, on the Sunday before Ascension, while Lorenzo himself was slightly wounded. That Sixtus and his nephew were accessories before the fact is now regarded as unquestionable. The vengeance taken by the enraged Florentines on the conspirators, their relatives, friends, and property, was terrible; the innocent, alas! being sacrificed indiscriminately with

the guilty.

The Archbishop of Pisa, Francesco Salviati, had entered eagerly into the scheme, and, although his sacred office prevented him from actually assisting in the deed, he was present in the cathedral until the signal was given for the perpetration of the deed, when he left the building to secure the Palazzo Publico. He was therefore summarily hanged with the others from the windows of the civic buildings. Sixtus made the execution, or the "murder" as he called it, of Salviati, his pretext for calling on his allies to make war on Florence. When he saw, however, that this action was only throwing the city more completely than ever into the arms of the Medici, he changed his tactics and said he had no quarrel with "his well-beloved children of Florence," but only with "that son of iniquity and child of perdition, Lorenzo de' Medici," and those who had aided and abetted him, among whom the humanists were expressly mentioned. Against Lorenzo and his associates a brief of excommunication was launched, and the city was urged to regain the papal favor by surrendering the offenders.

The result might have been predicted. The "brief" only tended to knit the bonds of association closer between Lorenzo and the "City of the Flower," while the humanists to a man rallied round their patron. Even the choleric Filelfo, now a very old man, who had been on anything but friendly terms with the Medici, addressed two bitter satires to Sixtus, in which the Pope was styled the real aggressor, while the great humanist offered to write a history of the whole transaction, that posterity might know the true facts. The only power which gave its adhesion to Sixtus was Naples, while Venice, Ferrara, and Milan declared for Florence.

Thus commenced that tedious war which not only ruined so many Florentine merchants, but retarded the cause of learning so materially. When the people were groaning under heavy taxes, when all coin which Lorenzo could scrape together had to be poured out to pay the *_condottieri_*, or soldiers of fortune, by whom the battles of Florence were fought, there was of course but short commons for the humanists who had made Florence their home. Many of those adapted themselves to circumstances, but others, to whom money was their god, left the banks of the Arno for those southern cities where the pinch of scarcity did not prevail.

In this campaign the Florentines gained but little prestige. The larger share of the cost was quietly suffered by their allies to fall on the city of bankers. The Milanese were occupied with their own affairs, owing to the *_coup d'état_* accomplished by Lodovico Sforza. The Duke of Ferrara withdrew owing to some disagreement with the *_condottieri_* engaged by Lorenzo. The Venetians only despatched a small contingent under Carlo Montone and Diefego d'Anguillari; accordingly, in the end, the whole burden of the struggle fell on Florence. The Magnifico's position gradually became precarious, inasmuch as many persons declared the war to be in reality a personal quarrel between Pope Sixtus and the Medici. Complaints began to be heard that the public treasury was exhausted and the commerce of the city ruined, while the citizens were

burdened with oppressive taxes. Lorenzo had the mortification of being told that sufficient blood had been shed, and that it would be expedient for him rather to devise some means of effecting a peace than of making further preparations for the war.

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In these circumstances, and confronted by one of the most dangerous crises of his whole life, Lorenzo rose to the occasion and effected a solution of the difficulty by daring to perform what was undoubtedly one of the bravest acts ever achieved by a diplomatist. By some statesmen it might be condemned as foolhardy, by others as quixotic. Its very foolhardiness and quixotry fascinated the man it was intended to influence, the blood-thirsty, cruel, and pitiless Ferrante of Naples, who was restrained from crime by the fear neither of God nor man, and who had actually slain the condottiere Piccinino when he visited him under a safe-conduct from the monarch's best ally. But the Renaissance annals are filled with the records of men and women whose natures are marvellous studies of contrasted and contradictory traits. Such was the Neapolitan tyrant. While a monster in much, he had his vulnerable points. He was ambitious to pose as a friend of the "New Learning," and he knew that Lorenzo was not only the most munificent patron, but also one of the most illustrious exponents, of the Renaissance principles.

Although his enemy, Ferrante received Lorenzo with every demonstration of respect and satisfaction. He lost sight of the hostile diplomatist in the great humanist. Two Neapolitan galleys were sent to conduct him to Naples, and he was welcomed on landing with much pomp. Never did Lorenzo's supreme diplomatic genius, never did his versatile powers as a statesman, as a scholar, as a patron of letters, and as a brilliant man of the world, blaze forth in more splendid effulgence than during his three-months' stay in Naples. Though opposed by all the papal authority and resources; though Sixtus by turns threatened, cajoled, entreated, promised, in order to prevent Lorenzo having any success, the successor of St. Peter was beaten all along the line, and the Magnifico carried away with him a treaty, signed and sealed, which practically meant that henceforth Naples and the papacy would be in antagonistic camps.

It was the Renaissance card which won the trick. With startling boldness, yet with consummate art, Lorenzo played the game of flattering Ferrante. No ordinary adulation, however, would have had success with the Neapolitan Phalaris. He was too strong-minded a man for anything of that kind. But to be hailed by the great Renaissance patron of the period, by one also who was himself one of the leading humanists, as a brother-humanist and a fellow-patron of learning, was a delicate incense to his vanity which he could not resist. He liked to be consulted on matters of literary moment, and, when he blundered, Lorenzo was too shrewd a student of human nature to correct him.

Another fact in Lorenzo's favor was that he had the warm support not only of the beautiful Ippolyta Maria, daughter of Cosmo's friend, Francesco Sforza of Milan, and now wife of Alfonso, Duke of Calabria, King

Ferrante's heir, as well as of Don Federigo, the monarch's younger son, who, along with Ippolyta, was a friend to the "New Learning," but he also had the whole body of Neapolitan humanists on his side, scarce one of whom but had experienced in some form or another the Medicean bounty. Such powerful advocacy was not without its influence in bringing about the result; while Ferrante more and more realized that if the Florentine Medici were crushed he would have no ally to whom to look for help when the inevitable shuffle of the political cards took place on the death of Sixtus.

In February, 1480, therefore, Lorenzo returned in triumph to Florence, to be received with rapture by his fellow-citizens. Had he delayed a few months longer, his visit and his *_ad-miseri-cordiam_* appeals would not have been needed. In August of that year Kuduk Achmed, one of the Turkish Sultan's (Mahomet II) ablest generals, besieged and took the city of Otranto. In face of the common danger to all Italy, Sixtus was compelled to accept the treaty made by Ferrante with Lorenzo, and a general peace ensued. The decade accordingly closed with an absolution for all offences granted by the Pope to Florence, conditional on the Tuscan republic contributing its share to the expenses of the military preparations to resist the invasion of the Turk.

Notwithstanding the war, the progress of the Renaissance during the first decade of Lorenzo's rule was very marked. To the rapid diffusion of printing this was largely due. Lorenzo had not imbibed the prejudices against the new art entertained by Cosmo and Federigo of Montefeltro. He looked at the practical, not the sentimental, side of the question as regards the new invention. Having seen that the press could throw off, in a few days, scores of copies of any work, of which it took an amanuensis months to produce one; also that the scholars of all Italy could be furnished almost immediately, and at a low price, with the texts of any manuscript they desired, while they had to wait months for a limited number of copies whose cost was wellnigh prohibitive, he supported the new invention from the outset. Having resolved to further his father's efforts to establish printing in Florence, he stimulated the local goldsmith, Bernardo Cennini, to turn his attention to type-casting in metal, and even agreed to pay him an annual grant from the year 1471 until he had fairly settled himself in business. Nor did he confine his favors to him. John of Mainz and Nicholas of Breslau, who arrived in Florence, the former in 1472 and the latter in 1477, also participated in his open-hearted liberality. Printing struck its roots deep into the Tuscan community and flourished excellently. Though the Florentine craft never attained the reputation of the Venetian Aldi and Asolani, the Giunti of Rome, the Soncini of Fano, the Stephani of Paris, and Froben of Basel, it had the name, for a time at least, of being one of the most accurate of all presses.

To Lorenzo it owed this celebrity. At an early date he perceived that the new art would be of little value if there were not careful press readers. He was therefore among the first to induce scholars of distinction to engage in this task. For example, he enlisted the aid of Cristoforo

Landino, who in his *Disputationes Camaldunenses* had really inaugurated the science of textual criticism by urging that a careful comparison of the various codices should constitute the preliminary step in any reproduction of the classics. Landino's work on Vergil and Horace merits the warmest praise. Lorenzo also impressed Poliziano into the work, whose labors in marking the various readings, in adding *scholia* and "notes" illustrative of the text of Catullus, Propertius, Ovid, etc., were of the utmost value. To Lorenzo and to his younger brother Giuliano, another great humanist, Giorgio Merula of Milan, dedicated his *Plautus*, published in Venice in 1472, showing at how early an age the Magnifico had taken his place among the recognized patrons of the Italian Renaissance.

We ought not, moreover, to omit mention of another achievement of Lorenzo, though performed in a sphere of effort lying outside of the strict limits of our Renaissance survey. Seeing it was the "Revival of Letters," however, which induced the revival of the cultivation of the vernacular Italian literature, surely it is not out of place to refer to it here. Early in life Lorenzo became imbued with the conviction that his native tongue was unsurpassed as a medium for "the expression of noble thoughts in noble numbers." Not only did he encourage others to study Dante, Petrarch, and Boccaccio, but by following out his own precepts he became one of the great Italian poets. His *Selve d'Amore*, his *Corinto*, his *Ambra*, his *La Nencia da Barberino*, his *Laude*, his *Sonetti*, his *Cansoni*, etc., are all poems that live in the Italian literature of to-day. Not as a man ashamed of the vernacular, and forced to use it because he can command no better, does Lorenzo write. "He is sure of the justice of his cause, and determined by precept and example and by the prestige of his princely rank to bring the literature he loves into repute again."

But of these poems we cannot here take further note. By the scholars of the Renaissance such work was looked askance at. If they did produce any of these "trifles," as they were called, they almost blushed to own them, and were ashamed to communicate them to each other. That he dared to be natural says much for Lorenzo, and it was largely due to his encouragement that Cristoforo Landino undertook his great work on "Dante," to which we owe so much to-day.

In conjunction with his patronage of printing, there was no line of effort in which Lorenzo did more real good than in collecting manuscripts and antiquities, and in making them practically public property. On this account he is styled, by Niccolo Leonicino, "Lorenzo de' Medici, the great patron of learning in this age, whose messengers are dispersed through every part of the earth for the purpose of collecting books on every science, and who has spared no expense in procuring for your use, and that of others who may devote themselves to similar studies, the materials necessary for your purpose." The agents he employed travelled through Italy, Greece, Europe, and the East--Hieronymo Donato, Ermolao Barbaro, and Paolo Cortesi being the names of some of his most trusted "commissioners." But the coadjutor whose aid he principally relied on, to

whom he committed the care and arrangement of his vast museum and great library, was Poliziano, who himself made frequent excursions throughout Europe, Asia, and Northern Africa to discover and purchase such remains of antiquity as suited the purposes of his patron. Another successful agent, though at a later date, was Giovanni Lascaris, who twice journeyed into the East in search of manuscripts and curios. In the second of these he brought back upward of two hundred copies of valuable codices from the monasteries on Mount Athos.

To still another service rendered by Lorenzo to the cause of the Renaissance attention must be called--the founding of the Florentine Academy for the study of Greek. This institution, distinct, be it remembered, from the *_Uffiziali dello Studio_* (or high-school), exercised a marvellous influence on the progress of the "New Learning." Accordingly, as Roscoe says, succeeding scholars have been profuse in their acknowledgments to Lorenzo, who first formed the establishment from which, to use their own classical figure, as from the Trojan horse, so many illustrious champions have sprung, and by means of which the knowledge of the Greek tongue was extended not only throughout Italy, but throughout Europe as well, from all the countries of which numerous pupils flocked to Florence--pupils who afterward carried the learning they had received to their native lands.

Of this institution the first public professor was Joannes Argyropoulos, who, having enjoyed the patronage of Cosmo and Piero, and directed the education of Lorenzo, was selected by the latter as the fittest person to be the earliest occupant of the chair. During his tenure of it he sent out such pupils as Poliziano, Donato Acciaiuoli, Janus Pannonius, and the famous German humanist Reuchlin. Argyropoulos did not hold the appointment long. His death took place at Rome in 1471, and he was succeeded first by Theodore of Gaza, and then by Chalcondylas. Poliziano certainly discharged the duties of the office frequently, but at first only as *_locum tenens_*. He was then almost incessantly engaged in travelling for his patron in Greece and Asia Minor, and was too valuable a coadjutor to be tied down to the routine of teaching until he had completed his work. During the next decade he became the "professor," and discharged the duties with a genius and an adaptability to circumstances that won for him the admiration and love of all his students.

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This decade was also remarkable for the commencement of the devotion to the cultivation of literary style, a pursuit yet to reach its culmination in Poliziano in Florence and in Bembo and Sadoletto in Rome. Originality gradually gave place to conventionality, until men actually came to prefer the absurdities of Ciceronianism, and a cold, colorless adherence to hard-and-fast rules of composition, to a work throbbing with the pulsation of virile life. Humanism was beginning to take flight from Italy, to find a home and a welcome beyond the Alps.

The final decade of Lorenzo's life constituted the midsummer bloom of the Tuscan renaissance, the meridian of the intellectual and artistic

supremacy of Florence. In Lorenzo it found its fullest expression. He was typical of its spiritual as well as of its moral meaning; typical, too, of that mental unrest which sought escape from the pressing problems of an enigmatic present by reverting to the study of a classic past whose ethical, social, and political difficulties were rarely of a complex character, but concerned themselves principally with what may be termed the elementary verities of man's relations to the Deity and to his fellows.

Lorenzo's amazing versatility has been pronounced a fault by some who believed they detected in him the potential capacity of rivalling Dante, Petrarch, and Ariosto on their own ground, had he only conserved his energies. This is a foolish supposition. Lorenzo's many-sidedness was but the reflection in himself, as the most accurate mirror of the time, of all that wondrous susceptibility to beauty, that eager craving after the realization of the [greek: to kalon] ("the Good") so characteristic of the best Hellenic genius, whether we study it in the dramas of Sophocles or the *Republic* of Plato or in the statesmanship of Pericles. If Lorenzo had resembled his grandfather and concentrated his energies upon finance and politics, there might have been a line of reigning Medicean princes in Florence half a century earlier than actually was the case, but Europe would have been distinctly the loser by the absence of the greatest personal force making for culture which characterized the Renaissance.

This last decade of Lorenzo's life--from his thirty-first to his forty-second year--was memorable in many respects. In the year 1481 he was again exposed to the danger of assassination. Battista Frescobaldi and two assistants in the Church of the Carmeli, and again on Ascension Day, made an attempt to stab him, but were frustrated by the vigilance of Lorenzo's friends. There is no doubt that this second attempt was also instigated by Girolamo Riario, the nephew of Sixtus IV. Thereafter Lorenzo never moved out without a strong bodyguard of friends and adherents--a precaution rendered necessary by the repeated plots that were being hatched against him by his enemies.

No sooner had the presence of the Turks at Otranto, in the extreme southeast of Italy, been rendered a thing of the past by the surrender of the Moslem garrison to the Duke of Calabria in September, 1481, than the peninsula was again ranged in opposing camps by the attempt of the Venetians, assisted by Sixtus and his nephew, to dispossess Ercole d'Este, Duke of Ferrara, of his dominions. The Duke had married the daughter of Ferdinand, King of Naples, an alliance which, by strengthening him, gave on that account great offence to the Venetians. They therefore sought to provoke him by insisting on their monopoly of the manufacture of salt in North Italy, and by building a fortress on a part of the Ferrarese territory which they pretended was within the limits of their own. When he remonstrated, they declined to remove it. In vain he appealed to Sixtus. The latter was one of the wolves waiting to devour him. He then turned to Lorenzo.

To the inexpressible chagrin of Venice and of Sixtus, the Magnifico promptly espoused his cause, formed an alliance with Ferdinand and other states, and, before the Pope and the Venetians were aware he had moved, they found themselves confronted by Naples, Florence, Milan, Bologna, Mantua, and Faenza. The allies were commanded by Federigo of Montefeltro, Duke of Urbino, while the Venetian-papal troops were placed under Ruberto Malatesta of Rimini. In this campaign, however, Lorenzo was really the master-spirit. Although successes were won on both sides, a more than usually tragic complexion was given to the war by the death of the two commanders of the opposing forces. They had been friends from youth, and such a trifle as the fact that they were hired to fight against each other never disturbed the tenor of their mutual regard. Armstrong says no more than the truth when he remarks: "It was a pathetic coincidence. The two rival generals had bequeathed to each other the care of their children and estates, a characteristic illustration of the easy good-fellowship in this game of Italian war."

The war dragged on with varying results until Lorenzo played his reserve card. He induced the Slavic Archbishop of Carniola, who, visiting Rome as the emperor Frederick's envoy, had been shocked by the shameless immorality of the Pope's life, to begin an agitation for a general council. In this he was supported by several of the rulers in Northern Italy and Eastern Europe. The move was so far successful. The Pope became alarmed, and hurriedly broke off his alliance with Venice, on the plea that the prevention of fresh schism in the Church must take precedence of every other consideration. The real fact of the matter was he dreaded the fate of Pope John XXIII, for he knew the actions of his nephew Girolamo Riario would not stand conciliar examination. Moreover, his other nephew, Giuliano della Rovere, afterward Pope Julius II, a bitter enemy to Girolamo, and Lorenzo's warm friend, had, during the disgrace of his cousin, gained the Pope's ear and told him some plain but wholesome truths regarding the unpleasant consequences of a permanent rupture with Lorenzo.

All these considerations induced Sixtus to yield and leave Venice to prosecute the war alone. This it did against a quadruple alliance, for the Pope, when the haughty republic of the lagoons refused to disgorge its Ferrarese prey at his orders, promptly changed sides, and was as keen against the aggressor as he had previously been favorable to it. The Venetians sustained two severe defeats, while their fleet was almost shattered by a storm. The pecuniary strain was beyond their resources longer to maintain. They therefore resorted to the customary project of inducing some other power to intervene. In this case they took the step of inviting the Duke of Orleans to lay claim to the dukedom of Milan, and the Duke of Lorraine to the throne of Naples. The move was successful as regards Ludovico of Milan; he withdrew from the alliance, and much against the wish of the other allies the peace of Bagnolo was concluded in August, 1484. To Sixtus the news came as the knell of his dearest hopes. He gave way to one wild outburst of passion, in which he cursed all who had been engaged in making peace, then apoplexy supervened, and within a few hours he was a corpse. He was succeeded by Cardinal Cybo, a

warm friend toward the Medici, and one who had such a profound admiration for the genius of Lorenzo in statecraft that he seldom took any step without consulting him, though unfortunately he did not always follow the Magnifico's advice.

If no one else reaped honor and glory from this Ferrarese war, Lorenzo undoubtedly did so. By both sides the fact was admitted that he had acted throughout as a far-seeing, sagacious diplomatist, who, while giving preeminence, as was natural, to the welfare of his own state, had sought to conserve the cause of letters, even amid the turmoil incident upon the collision of political interests. He had proved the friend even of the enemies of his own country, when once they had passed from the scene of conflict, as, for example, when he dared Girolamo Riario to raise a finger in the direction of dispossessing the son of the Pope's general, Ruberto Malatesta, of his Rimini estates. He was the friend of the oppressed everywhere, and in more cases than one his powerful protection saved the children of his friends from being robbed by powerful relatives. This connection between Florence, Naples, Milan, Rome, and Ferrara tended to the promotion of intellectual intercourse between them. As printing was now being briskly prosecuted all over Northern and Central Italy, the interchange of literature went on ceaselessly among them.

This, however, was Lorenzo's last great war. True, he was implicated in the prolonged quarrel between the papacy and King Ferrante of Naples, yet it was more as a mediator between the two antagonists than as the ally of the last-named that he took part in it; although, as Armstrong points out, he paid for the services of Trivulsio and four hundred cross-bowmen, that by enabling the Neapolitans to check San Severino, the leader of the papal-Venetian troops, he might induce Innocent VIII to lose heart and retire from the struggle.

Lorenzo, during the last six years of his life, or, to speak more definitely, after the peace of Bagnolo, had become in Italian, as he was rapidly becoming in European, politics the master-spirit that inspired the moves on the diplomatic chess-board. In the mind of the historical student whose attention is directed to this period, admiration and wonder go hand-in-hand as we contemplate the marvellous sagacity and prevision of the man, together with the skill wherewith he made Florence--the weakest from a military point of view of the five greater Italian powers--the one which exercised the most preponderating influence upon the affairs of the peninsula. His supreme genius conceived and consummated the great scheme for ensuring the peace of Italy by a triple alliance of the three larger states--Florence, Milan, and Naples--against the other two, Venice and the papacy.

As showing how entirely it was dependent upon him, the alliance was operative only so long as he was alive to bind the antagonistic forces of Naples and Milan together by the link of his own personal influence. He, in a word, was the subtle acid holding in chemical combination many mutually repellent substances. When his influence was withdrawn by death,

within a few months they had all fallen apart, the triple alliance was forgotten and Italy was doomed. Even by those with whom he was nominally at war he was resorted to for advice. He it was that kept Innocent VIII from taking up a position that would have rendered the papacy ridiculous in the eyes of Europe, when he sought to threaten Naples with consequences he was powerless to inflict.

Many writers have accused Lorenzo of cowardice, of pusillanimity, of want of political resolution on account of this very course of action, namely, that he assisted the enemies of Florence to extricate themselves from their dilemmas. Such criticism fails entirely to understand both the aim and the scope of his policy. He desired to keep Italy for the Italians. His clear-sighted sagacity saw nothing but danger in the plans of Ludovico of Milan to invite the French King into Italy, or in those of Venice to encourage the Duke of Lorraine to press his claims upon Milan. The intervention of either France or Spain in Italy was, in his idea, fraught only with dire disaster. Fain would he have patched up the quarrel between Naples and the papacy by mutual concessions, because he foresaw what would happen if the colossal northern powers had their cupidity aroused regarding Italy, and learned how defenceless she really was. Because he foresaw so clearly the horrors of the invasion of 1494 and 1527, he acted as he did, even toward those who were enemies of Florence. His alarm appears in the letter, dated July, 1489, which he addressed to his ambassador in Rome: "I dislike these Ultramontanes and barbarians beginning to interfere in Italy. We are so disunited and so deceitful that I believe that nothing but shame and loss would be our lot; recent experience may serve to foretell the future." How true a prophet he was, the subsequent course of Italian history revealed!

Anxious though the situation was, crucial though many of the problems he had to solve undoubtedly were, yet the statement may be accepted as approximately true that the last three or four years of Lorenzo's life were spent amid profound peace--at least as far as Florence was concerned. Roscoe's picture is highly colored, but not overcolored:

"At this period the city of Florence was at its highest degree of prosperity. The vigilance of Lorenzo had secured it from all apprehensions of external attack; and his acknowledged disinterestedness and moderation had almost extinguished that spirit of dissension for which it had been so long remarkable. The Florentines gloried in their illustrious citizen, and were gratified by numbering in their body a man who wielded in his hand the fate of nations and attracted the respect and admiration of all Europe; the administration of justice engaged his constant attention, and he carefully avoided giving rise to an idea that he was himself above the control of the law."

And Guicciardini adds: "This season of tranquillity was prosperous beyond any that Italy had experienced during the long course of a thousand years. Abounding in men eminent in the administration of public affairs, skilled in every honorable science and every useful art, it stood high in the estimation of foreign nations; which extraordinary felicity, acquired

at many different opportunities, several circumstances contributed to preserve, but among the rest no small share of it was by general consent ascribed to the industry and the virtue of Lorenzo de' Medici, a citizen who rose so far above the mediocrity of a private station that he regulated by his counsels the affairs of Florence, then more important by its situation, by the genius of its inhabitants, and the promptitude of its resources than by the extent of its dominions, and who, having obtained the implicit confidence of the Roman pontiff Innocent VIII, rendered his name great and his authority important in the affairs of Italy."

Though he had never allowed the demands of civic affairs to interfere with his interest in the progress of the Renaissance, war-time, as we have said, is not favorable to the cultivation of letters. While the connection between the states during the course of hostilities undoubtedly promoted the increase of mutual interest in each other's intellectual development, the fact that the Magnifico had to disburse enormous sums for the prosecution of the campaigns necessarily limited his ability to extend the same princely patronage to the cause of learning. But with the conclusion of peace he resumed the original scale of his benefactions, and the last four years of his life were, perhaps, the most fruitful of all in sterling good achieved in the fostering of the Renaissance.

He encouraged the printers to double their output; he munificently assisted such undertakings as the first edition of Homer, edited by the famous scholars Demetrius Chalcondyles and Demetrius Cretensis, as well as other editions of the classics prepared by Poliziano, Marullus, and others. In the final estimate of his influence upon his age we hope to show that his aim was as pure as the prosecution of its realization was determined. He encouraged foreigners to come to Florence to study Greek, and, when their funds failed them, in many cases he generously entertained them at his own expense. Grocyn and Linacre, as well as Reuchlin, testify to the wise generosity of the great Magnifico, and all three declare that to him, more than to any other man, the Renaissance owed not only its development, but even the character it assumed in Italy in the second last decade of the fifteenth century.

The end came when he was literally in his prime. Only forty-two years of age, he might reasonably have looked forward to many years of active work and the enjoyment of his honors! But Lorenzo, although not a vicious, was a pleasure-loving man, and he had drained the cup of enjoyment to the very lees. His constitution was undermined by worry and late vigils, by the very intensity of interest wherewith he had devoted himself to the pleasures of the moment. Accordingly, late in 1491 he began to feel the gout, from which he had suffered for some years, becoming so troublesome that he was unable for the duties devolving on him. He had lost his wife, Clarice Orsini, in July, 1487, at a time when he was absent at the sulphur baths of Filetta, striving to obtain relief from pain; therefore his last years were lonely indeed.

Life had lost its relish to the dying Magnifico. The only thing over which he showed a flash of the old interest was in March, 1492, when his son Giovanni (afterward Leo X), on being made a cardinal by Innocent VIII, was invested with the insignia in the Abbey Church of Fiesole. Although then within a month of his end, although, moreover, so weak that he was unable to attend the investiture mass or to head his table at the banquet which followed, he caused himself to be carried in a litter into the hall, where he publicly paid reverence to his son as a prince of the Church. He then embraced him as a father and gave him his paternal blessing. That done, and after addressing a few words of welcome to his guests collectively, he was slowly borne back to his chamber to die. Nevermore was he seen in public.

His ruling passion was, however, strong in death. In place of surrounding himself with clergy, his last hours were spent with the humanists and scholars he had loved so well. To his beautiful villa of Careggi, and to that room facing the south which he called his own, he retired, and summoned Ficino, Poliziano, and Pico della Mirandola to bear him company until he dipped his feet in the River of Death. They discussed many things, but principally the consolations afforded by philosophy. Then they reverted to the subject of the classics, and to the valuable codices which Lascaris was bringing back from Greece.

But hope at last burned low, and the physicians had to confess that the case was beyond their skill. How rudimentary as regards medical science that skill was may be judged from the fact that the staple remedy prescribed by the great Milanese doctor, Lazaro da Ficino, who had been called in to consult with Lorenzo's own medical man, Pier Leoni of Spoleto, was a potion compounded of crushed pearls and jewels. As might have been expected, such a treatment accelerated rather than retarded the disease.

The last hours of Lorenzo, and particularly his historic interview with Savonarola, have often been described and are to this day the subject of debate. There are two sides to every story, and this one of the last visit of the haughty prior of San Marco's to the dying Magnifico is no exception. Poliziano relates the incident in one form, the followers of Savonarola in another; but neither report is absolutely authentic. Suffice it for us that Benedetto, writing a week after the Magnifico's death, says of the matter: "Our dear friend and master died so nobly, with all the patience, the reverence, the recognition of God which the best of holy men and a soul divine could show, with words upon his lips so kind, that he seemed a new St. Jerome."

Perhaps the most reasonable attitude to assume toward the problem is that Lorenzo died as he lived, feeling that strange, restless curiosity as to what was summed up in the idea of a "future life" which he had manifested all his days: "If I believe aught implicitly," he is reported to have said in earlier years to Alberti, "I believe in Plato's doctrine of immortality in the Phaedo, for religion is too much a matter of temperament for us to lay down hard-and-fast rules about it." Lorenzo

outwardly conformed in his dying hours to the rites of the Catholic Church. He received the _viaticum_ kneeling, he repeated the responses in an earnest and fervent tone, and then, when he felt that the grains in the hour-glass of life were running out, he pressed a crucifix to his lips and so passed within the veil. As a humanist he had been reared, as a humanist he had lived and labored, as a humanist he died, maintaining to the very last his interest in those studies which it had been his life's passion to pursue.

The sun of the Florentine renaissance had set forever!

[Footnote 1: By permission of Selmar Hess.]



THE FIRST PANTOMIME REHEARSAL

From: The Project Gutenberg eBook, *Behind the Footlights*, by Mrs (Ethel) Alec-Tweedie

Exactly nine days before Christmas, 1902, the first rehearsal for the pantomime of _Mother Goose_ took place at Drury Lane. It seemed almost incredible that afternoon that such a thing as a "first night," with a crowded house packed full of critics, could witness a proper performance nine days later, one of which, being a Sunday, did not count.

The pantomime is one of England's institutions. It originally came from Italy, but as known to-day is essentially a British production, and little understood anywhere else in the world. For the last three years, however, the Drury Lane pantomime has been moved bodily to New York with considerable success.

What would Christmas in London be without its Drury Lane? What would the holidays be without the clown and harlequin? Young and old enjoy the exquisite absurdity of the nursery rhyme dished up as a Christmas pantomime.

The interior of that vast theatre, Drury Lane, was shrouded in dust-sheets and darkness, the front doors were locked, excepting at the booking office, where tickets were being sold for two and three months ahead, and a long _queue_ of people were waiting to engage seats for family parties when the pantomime should be ready.

At the stage door all was bustle; children of all ages and sizes were pushing in and out; carpenters, shifters, supers, ballet girls, chorus, all were there, too busy to speak to any one as they rushed in from their cup of tea at the A.B.C., or stronger drink procured at the "pub"

opposite. It was a cold, dreary day outside; but it was colder and drearier within. Those long flights of stone steps, those endless stone passages, struck chill and cheerless as a cellar, for verily the back of a theatre resembles a cellar or prison more than anything I know.

Drury Lane contains a little world. It is reckoned that about one thousand people are paid “back and front” every Friday night. One thousand persons! That is the staff of the pantomime controlled by Mr. Arthur Collins. Fancy that vast organisation, those hundreds of people, endless scenery, and over two thousand dresses superintended by one man, and that a young one.

For many weeks scraps of *‘Mother Goose’* had been rehearsed in drill-halls, schoolrooms, and elsewhere, but never till the day of which I write had the stage been ready for rehearsal. They had worked hard, all those people; for thirteen-and-a-half hours on some days they had already been “at it.” Think what thirteen-and-a-half-hours mean. True, no one is wanted continuously, still all must be on the spot. Often there is nowhere to sit down, therefore during those weary hours the performers have to stand—only between-whiles singing or dancing their parts as the case may be.

“I’m that dead tired,” exclaimed a girl, “I feel just fit to drop,” and she probably expressed the feelings of many of her companions.

The rehearsal of *‘The Rose of the Riviera’*, was going on in the saloon, which a hundred years ago was the fashionable resort of all the fops of the town. Accordingly to the saloon I proceeded where Miss Madge Lessing, neatly dressed in black and looking tired, was singing her solos, and dancing her steps with the chorus.

“It is very hard work,” she said. “I have been through this song until I am almost voiceless; and yet I only hum it really, for if we sang out at rehearsal, we should soon be dead.”

The saloon was the ordinary *‘foyer’*, but on that occasion, instead of being crowded with idlers smoking and drinking during the *‘entr’actes’*, it was filled with hard-worked ballet girls and small boys who were later to be transformed into dandies. They wore their own clothes. The women’s long skirts were held up with safety-pins, to keep them out of the way when dancing, their shirts and blouses were of every hue; on their heads they wore men’s hats that did not fit them, as they lacked the wigs they would wear later, and each carried her own umbrella, many of which, when opened, seemed the worse for wear. At the end of the bar was a cottage piano, where the composer played his song for two-and-a-half hours, while it was rehearsed again and again—a small man with a shocking cold conducting the chorus. He is, I am told, quite a celebrity as a stage “producer,” and was engaged in that capacity by Mr. George Edwards at the New Gaiety Theatre. How I admired that small man. His energy and enthusiasm were catching, and before he finished he had made those girls do just what he wanted. But oh! how hard he

worked, in spite of frequent resort to his pocket-handkerchief and constant fits of sneezing.

“This way, ladies, please”—he repeated over and over, and then proceeded to show them how to step forward on “_Would_—you like a—flower?” and to take off their hats at the last word of the sentence. Again and again they went through their task; but each time they seemed out of line, or out of time, not quick enough or too quick, and back they had to go and begin the whole verse once more. Even then he was not satisfied.

“Again, ladies, please,” he called, and again they all did the passage. This sort of thing had been going on since 11 o’clock, the hour of the “call,” and it was then 4 p.m.—but the rehearsal was likely to last well into the night and begin again next morning at 11 a.m. This was to continue all day, and pretty well all night for nine days, when, instead of a holiday, the pantomime was really to commence with its two daily performances, and its twelve hours *_per diem_* attendance at the theatre for nearly four months. Yet there are people who think the stage is all fun and frolic! Little they know about the matter.

Actors are not paid for rehearsals, as we have seen before, and many weeks of weary attendance for the pantomime have to be given gratis, just as they are for legitimate drama. Those beautiful golden fairies, all glitter and gorgeousness, envied by spectators in front, only receive £1 a week on an average for twelve hours’ occupation daily, and that merely for a few weeks, after which time many of them earn nothing more till the next pantomime season. It is practically impossible to give an exact idea of salaries: they vary so much. “Ballet girls,” when proficient, earn more than any ordinary “chorus” or “super,” with the exception of “show girls.” Those in the rank of “principals,” or “small-part ladies,” of course earn more.

Ballet girls begin their profession at eight years of age, and even in their prime can only earn on an average £2 a week.

In the ballet-room an iron bar runs all round the sides of the wall, about four feet from the floor, as in a swimming bath. It is for practice. The girls hold on to the bar, and learn to kick and raise their legs by the hour; with its aid suppleness of movement, flexibility of hip and knee are acquired. Girls spend years of their life learning how to earn that forty shillings a week, and how to keep it when they have earned it; for the ballet girl has to be continually practising, or her limbs would quickly stiffen and her professional career come to an end.

No girl gets her real training at the Lane. All that is done in one of the dancing schools kept by Madame Katti Lanner, Madame Cavalazzi, John D’Auban, or John Tiller. When they are considered sufficiently proficient they get engagements, and are taught certain movements invented by their teachers to suit the particular production of the

theatre itself.

The ballet is very grand in the estimation of the pantomime, for supers, male and female, earn considerably less salary than the ballet for about seventy-two hours' attendance at the theatre. Out of their weekly money they have to provide travelling expenses to and from the theatre, which sometimes come heavy, as many of them live a long distance off; they have to pay rent also, and feed as well as clothe themselves, settle for washing, doctor, amusements—everything, in fact. Why, a domestic servant is a millionaire when compared with a chorus or ballet girl, and she is never harassed with constant anxiety as to how she can pay her board, rent, and washing bills. Yet how little the domestic servant realises the comforts—aye luxury—of her position.

The dressing-rooms are small and cheerless. Round the sides run double tables, the top one being used for make-up boxes, the lower for garments. In the middle of the floor is a wooden stand with a double row of pegs upon it, utilised for hanging up dresses. Eight girls share a “dresser” (maid) between them. The atmosphere of the room may be imagined, with flaring gas jets, nine women, and barely room to turn round amid the dresses. The air becomes stifling at times, and there is literally no room to sit down even if the costumes would permit of such luxury, which generally they will not. In this tiny room performers have to wait for their “call,” when they rush downstairs, through icy cold passages, to the stage, whence they must return again in time to don the next costume required.

Prior to the production, as we have seen, there are a number of rehearsals, followed for many weeks by two performances a day, consequently the children who are employed cannot go on with their education, and to avoid missing their examinations a school-board mistress has been appointed, who teaches them their lessons during the intervals. These children must be bright scholars, for they are the recipients at the end of the season of several special prizes for diligence, punctuality, and good conduct.

An attempt was recently made to limit the age of children employed on the stage to fourteen, but the outcry raised was so great that it could not be done. For children under eleven a special licence is required.

Miss Ellen Terry said, on the subject of children on the stage: “I am an actress, but first I am a woman, and I love children,” and then proceeded to advocate the employment of juveniles upon the stage. She spoke from experience, for she acted as a child herself. “I can put my finger at once on the actors and actresses who were not on the stage as children,” she continued. “With all their hard work they can never acquire afterwards that perfect unconsciousness which they learn then so easily. There is no school like the stage for giving equal chances to boys and girls alike.”

There seems little doubt about it, the ordinary stage child is the

offspring of the very poor, his playground the gutter, his surroundings untidy and unclean, his food and clothing scanty, and such being the case he is better off in every way in a well-organised theatre, where he learns obedience, cleanliness, and punctuality. The sprites and fairies love their plays, and the greatest punishment they can have—indeed, the only one inflicted at Drury Lane—is to be kept off the stage a whole day for naughtiness.

They appear to be much better off in the theatre than they would be at home, although morning school and two performances a day necessitate rather long hours for the small folk. They have a nice classroom, and are given buns and milk after school; but their dressing accommodation is limited. Many of the supers and children have to change as best they can under the stage, for there is not sufficient accommodation for every one in the rooms.

The once famous “Green-room” of Drury Lane has been done away with. It is now a property-room, where geese’s heads line the shelves, or golden seats and monster champagne bottles litter the floor.

There have been many changes at Drury Lane. It was rebuilt after the fire in 1809, and reopened in 1812, but vast alterations have been carried out since then. Woburn Place is now part of the stage. Steps formerly led from Russell Street to Vinegar Yard, but they have been swept away and the stage enlarged until it is the biggest in the world. Most ordinary theatres have an opening on the auditorium of about twenty-five feet; Drury Lane measures fifty-two feet from fly to fly, and is even deeper in proportion. The entire stage is a series of lifts, which may be utilised to move the floor up or down. Four tiers, or “flats,” can be arranged, and the floor moved laterally so as to form a hill or mound. All this is best seen from the mezzanine stage, namely, that under the real one, where the intricacies of lifts and ropes and rooms for electricians become most bewildering. Here, too, are the trap-doors. For many years they went out of fashion, as did also the ugly masks, but a Fury made his entrance by a trap on Boxing Day, 1902, and this may revive the custom again. The actor steps on a small wooden table in the mezzanine stage, and at a given sign the spring moves and he is shot to the floor above. How I loved and pondered as a child over these wonderful entrances of fairies and devils. And after all there was nothing supernatural about them, only a wooden table and a spring. How much of the glamour vanishes when we look below the surface, which remark applies not only to the stage, but to so many things in life.

Every good story seems to have been born a chestnut. Some one always looks as if he had heard it before. At the risk of arousing that sarcastic smile I will relate the following anecdote, however.

A certain somewhat stout Mephistopheles had to disappear through a trap-door amid red fire, but the trap was small and he was big and stuck halfway. The position was embarrassing, when a voice from the

gallery called out:

“Cheer up, guv’nor. Hell’s full.”

Electricity plays a great part in the production of a pantomime, not only as regards the lighting of the scenes, but also as a motive power for the lifts which are used for the stage. Many new inventions born during the course of a year are utilised when the Christmas festival is put on.

The property-room presents a busy scene before a pantomime, and really it is wonderful what can be produced within its walls. Almost everything is made in *_papier mâché_*. Elaborate golden chairs and couches, chariots and candelabras, although framed in wood, are first moulded in clay, then covered with *_papier mâché_*. Two large fires burned in the room, which when I entered was crowded with workmen, and the heat was overpowering. Amid all that miscellaneous property, every one seemed interested in what he was doing, whether making wire frames for poke bonnets, or larger wire frames for geese, or the groundwork of champagne bottles to contain little boys. Each man had a charcoal drawing on brown paper to guide him, and very cleverly many of the drawings were executed. Some of the men were quite sculptors, so admirably did they model masks and figures in *_papier mâché_*. The more elaborate pieces are prepared outside the theatre, but a great deal of the work for the production is done within old Drury Lane.

What becomes of these extra property-men after the “festive season”? Practically the same staff appear each Christmas only to disappear from “The Lane” for almost another year. Of course there is a large permanent staff of property-men employed, but it is only at Christmas-time that so large an army is required for the gigantic pantomime changes with the transformation scenes.

That nearly everything is made on the premises is in itself a marvel. Of course the grander dresses are obtained from outside; some come from Paris, while others are provided by tradesmen in London. The expense is very great; indeed, it may be roughly reckoned it costs about £20,000 to produce a Drury Lane Pantomime; but then, on the other hand, that sum is generally taken at the doors or by the libraries in advance-booking before the curtain rises on the first night.

An important person at Drury Lane is the wardrobe-woman. She has entire control of thousands of dresses, and keeps a staff continually employed mending and altering, for after each performance something requires attention. She has a little room of her own, mostly table, so far as I could see, on which were piled dresses, poke bonnets, and artists’ designs, while round the walls hung more dresses brought in for her inspection. In other odd rooms and corners women sat busily sewing, some trimming headgear, other spangling ribbon. Some were joining seams by machinery, others quilling lace; nothing seemed finished, and yet everything had to be ready in nine days, and that vast pile of

chaos reduced to order. It seemed impossible; but the impossible was accomplished.

“Why this hurry?” some one may ask.

“Because the autumn drama was late in finishing, the entire theatre had to be cleared, and although everything was fairly ready outside, nothing could be brought into Drury Lane till a fortnight before Boxing Day. Hence the confusion and hurry.”

Large wooden cases of armour, swords and spears, from abroad, were waiting to be unpacked, fitted to each girl, and numbered so that the wearer might know her own.

Among the properties were some articles that looked like round red life-belts, or window sand-bags sewn into rings. These were the belts from which fairies would be suspended. They had leather straps and iron hooks attached, with the aid of which these lovely beings—as seen from the front—disport themselves. What a disillusion! Children think they are real fairies flying through air, and after all they are only ordinary women hanging to red sand-bags, made up like life-belts, and suspended by wire rope. Even those wonderful wings are only worn for a moment. They are slipped into a hole in the bodice of every fairy’s back just as she goes upon the stage, and taken out again for safety when the good lady leaves the wings in the double sense. The wands and other larger properties are treated in the same way.

Now for the stage and the rehearsal. We could hear voices singing, accompanied by a piano with many whizzing notes.

The place was dimly lighted. Scene-shifters were busy rehearsing their “sets” at the sides, the electrician was experimenting with illuminations from above; but the actors, heeding none of these matters, went on with their own parts. The orchestra was empty and not boarded over; so that the cottage piano had to stand at one side of the stage, and near it I was given a seat. A T-piece of gas had been fixed above the footlights, so as to enable the prompter to follow his book, and—gently be it spoken—allow some of the actors to read their parts. The star was not there—I looked about for the mirth-provoking Dan Leno, but failed to see him. Naturally he was the one person I particularly wanted to watch rehearse, for I anticipated much amusement from this wonderful comedian, with his inspiring gift of humour. Where was he?

A sad, unhappy-looking little man, with his MS. in a brown paper cover, was to be seen wandering about the back of the stage. He appeared miserable. One wondered at such a person being there at all, he looked so out of place. He did not seem to know a word of his “book,” or, in fact, to belong in any way to the pantomime.

It seemed incredible that this could be one of the performers. He wore a thick top coat with the collar turned up to keep off the draughts,

a thick muffler and a billycock hat; really one felt sorry for him, he looked so cold and wretched. I pondered for some time why this sad little gentleman should be on the stage at all.

“Dan, Dan, where are you?” some one called.

“Me? Oh, I’m here,” replied the disconsolate-looking person, to my amazement.

“It’s your cue.”

“Oh, is it? Which cue?” asked the muffled individual who was about to impersonate mirth.

“Why, so and so——”

“What page is that?”

“Twenty-three.”

Whereupon the great Dan—for it was really Dan himself—proceeded to find number twenty-three, and immediately began reading a lecture to the goose in mock solemn vein, when some one cried:

“No, no, man, that’s not it, you are reading page thirteen; we’ve done that.”

“Oh, have we? Thank you. Ah yes, here it is.”

“That’s my part,” exclaimed Herbert Campbell. “Your cue is——”

“Oh, is it?” and poor bewildered, unhappy-looking Dan made another and happier attempt.

It had often previously occurred to me that Dan Leno gagged his own part to suit himself every night—and really after this rehearsal the supposition seemed founded on fact, for apparently he did not know one word of anything nine days before the production of *“Mother Goose,”* in which he afterwards made such a brilliant hit.

“Do I say that?” he would inquire, or, “Are you talking to me?”

After such a funny exhibition it seemed really wonderful to consider how excellent and full of humour he always is on the stage; but what a strain it must be, what mental agony, to feel you are utterly unprepared to meet your audience, that you do not know your words, and that only by making a herculean effort can the feat be accomplished.

Herbert Campbell differs from Dan Leno not only in appearance but method. He was almost letter-perfect at that rehearsal, he had studied his “book,” and was splendidly funny even while only murmuring his

part. He evidently knew exactly what he was going to do, and although he did not trouble to do it, showed by a wave of his hand or a step where he meant business when the time came.

Herbert Campbell's face, like the milkmaid's, is his fortune. That wonderful under lip is full of fun. He has only to protrude it, and open his eyes, and there is the comedian personified. Comedians are born, not made, and the funny part of it is most of them are so truly tragic at heart and sad in themselves.

There is a story I often heard my grandfather, James Muspratt, tell of Liston, the comic actor.

Liston was in Dublin early in the nineteenth century, and nightly his performance provoked roars of laughter. One day a man walked into the consulting-room of a then famous doctor.

"I am very ill," said the patient. "I am suffering from depression."

"Tut, tut," returned the physician, "you must pull yourself together, you must do something to divert your thoughts. You must be cheerful and laugh."

"Good Heavens! I would give a hundred pounds to enjoy a real, honest laugh again, doctor."

"Well, you can easily do that for a few shillings, and I'll tell you how. Go and see Liston to-night, he will make you laugh, I am sure."

"Not he."

"Why not?"

"Because I am Liston."

Collapse of the doctor.

This shows the tragedy of the life of a comic actor. How often we see the amusing, delightful man or woman in society, and little dream how different they are at home. Most of us have two sides to our natures, and most of us are better actors than we realise ourselves, or than our friends give us credit for.

But to return to Drury Lane. Peering backwards across the empty orchestra I saw by the dim light that in the stalls sat, or leaned, women and children. Mr. Collins, who was in the front of the stage, personally attending to every detail, slipped forward.

"Huntsmen and gamekeepers," he cried. Immediately there was a flutter, and in a few minutes these good women—for women were to play the _rôles_—were upon the back of the stage.

“Dogs,” he called again. With more noise than the female huntsmen had made, boys got up and began to run about the stage on all fours as “dogs.”

They surrounded Dan Leno.

“I shall hit you if you come near me,” he cried, pretending to do so with his doubled-up gloves.

The lads laughed.

“Growl,” said Mr. Collins—so they turned their laugh into a growl, followed round the stage by Dan, and the performance went on.

It was all very funny—funny, not because of any humour, for that was entirely lacking, but because of the simplicity and hopelessness of every one. Talk about a rehearsal at private theatricals—why, it is no more disturbing than an early stage rehearsal; but the seasoned actor knows how to pull himself out of the tangle, whereas the amateur does not.

About a fortnight after the pantomime began I chanced one afternoon to be at Drury Lane again, and while stopping for a moment in the wings, the great Dan Leno came and stood beside me, waiting for his cue. He was dressed as Mother Goose, and leant against the endless ropes that seemed to frame every stage entrance; some one spoke to him, but he barely answered, he appeared preoccupied. All at once his turn came. On he went, hugging a goose beneath which walked a small boy. Roars of applause greeted his entrance, he said his lines, and a few moments later came out amid laughter and clapping. “This will have cheered him up,” thought I—but no. There I left him waiting for his next cue, but I had not gone far before renewed roars of applause from the house told me Dan Leno was again on the stage. What a power to be able to amuse thousands of people every week, to be able to bring mirth and joy into many a heart, to take people out of themselves and make the saddest merry—and Dan can do all this.

The object of my second visit was to have a little chat with Miss Madge Lessing, the “principal girl,” who exclaimed as I entered her dressing-room:

“I spend eleven hours in the theatre every day during the run of the pantomime.”

After that who can say a pantomime part is a sinecure? Eleven hours every day dressing, singing, dancing, acting, or—more wearisome of all—waiting. No one unaccustomed to the stage can realise the strain of such work, for it is only those who live at such high pressure, who always have to be on the alert for the “call-boy,” who know what it is to be kept at constant tension for so many consecutive hours.

Matinée days are bad enough in ordinary theatres, but the pantomime is a long series of _matinée_ days extending over three months or more. Of course it is not compulsory to stay in the theatre between the performances; but it is more tiring, for the leading-lady, to dress and go out for a meal than to stay in and have it brought to the dressing-room.

Miss Lessing was particularly fortunate in her room; the best I have ever seen in any theatre. Formerly it was Sir Augustus Harris's office. It was large and lofty, and so near the stage—on a level with which it actually stood—that one could hear what was going on in front. This was convenient in many ways, although it had its drawbacks. Many of our leading theatrical lights have to traverse long flights of stairs between every act; while Miss Lessing was so close to the stage she need not leave her room until it was actually time to step upon the boards.

It was a _matinée_ when the pantomime was in full swing that I bearded the lion in her den, and a pretty, dainty little lion I found her. It was a perilous journey to reach her room, but I bravely followed the “dresser” from the stage door. We passed a lilliputian pony about the size of a St. Bernard dog, we bobbed under the heads and tails of horses so closely packed together there was barely room for us to get between. The huntsmen were already mounted, for they were just going on, and I marvelled at the good behaviour of those steeds; they must have known they could not move without doing harm to some one, and so considerately remained still. We squeezed past fairies, our faces tickled by their wings, our dresses caught by their spangles, so closely packed was humanity “behind.” There were about two hundred scene-shifters incessantly at work moving “cloths,” and “flies,” and “drops,” and properties of all kinds. Miss Lessing was just coming off the stage, dressed becomingly in white muslin, with a blue Red Riding Hood cape and poppy-trimmed straw hat.

“Come along,” she said, “this is my room, and it is fairly quiet here.” The first things that strike a stranger are Miss Lessing's wonderful grey Irish eyes and her American accent.

“Both are correct,” she laughed. “I'm Irish by extraction, although born in London, and I've lived in America since I was fourteen; so you see there is ground for both your surmises.”

Miss Lessing is a Roman Catholic, and was educated at the Convent of the Sacred Heart at Battersea.

“I always wanted to go on the stage as long as ever I can remember,” she told me, “and I positively ran away from home and went over to America, where I had a fairly hard time of it. By good luck I managed to get an engagement in a chorus, and it chanced that two weeks later one of the better parts fell vacant owing to a girl's illness, and

I got it—and was fortunate enough to keep it, as she was unable to return, and the management were satisfied with me. I had to work very hard, had to take anything and everything offered to me for years. Had to do my work at night and improve my singing and dancing by day; but nothing is accomplished without hard work, is it? And I am glad I went through the grind because it has brought me a certain amount of reward.”

One had only to look at Miss Lessing to know she is not easily daunted; those merry eyes and dimpled cheeks do not detract from the firmness of the mouth and the expression of determination round the laughing lips. There was something particularly dainty about the “principal girl” at Drury Lane, and a sense of refinement and grace one does not always associate with pantomime.

“Why, yes,” she afterwards added, “I played all over the States, and after nine years was engaged by Mr. Arthur Collins to return to London and appear in the pantomime of *The Sleeping Beauty*. Of course, I felt quite at home in London, although I must own I nearly died of fright the first time I played before an English audience. It seemed like beginning the whole thing over again. Londoners are more exacting than their American cousins; but I must confess, when they like a piece, or an artist, they are most lavish in their applause and approbation.”

It was cold, and Miss Lessing pulled a warm shawl over her shoulders and poked the fire. It can be cold even in such a comfortable dressing-room, with the luxury of a fire, for the draughts outside, either on the stage or round it, in such a large theatre are incredible to an ordinary mind. Frequenters of the stalls know the chilly blast that blows upon them when the curtain rises, so they may form some slight idea of what it is like behind the scenes on a cold night.

“After the performance I take off my make-up and have my dinner,” laughed Miss Lessing. “I don’t think I should enjoy my food if all this mess were left on; at all events I find it a relief to cold-cream it off. One gets a little tired of dinners on a tray for weeks at a time when one is not an invalid; but by the time I’ve eaten mine, and had a little rest, it is the hour to begin again, for the evening performance is at hand.”

“At all events, though, you can read and write between whiles,” I remarked.

“That is exactly what one cannot do. I no sooner settle down to a book or letters than some one wants me. It is the constant disturbance, the everlasting interruption, that make two performances a day so trying; but I love the life, even if it be hard, and thoroughly enjoy my pantomime season.”

“Have you had many strange adventures in your theatrical life, Miss Lessing?”

“None: mine has been a placid existence on the whole, for,” she added, laughing, “I have not even lost diamonds or husbands!”



WAR SHOCK AND FREUD'S THEORY OF THE NEUROSES[7]

By Dr. Ernest Jones, London.

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A matter that used to hamper the opponents of psycho-analysis to some extent was that there was no alternative theory of the neuroses seriously tenable. It was clearly impossible to explain all neurotic manifestations by the catch-word use of the two terms “heredity” and “suggestion”, for our conceptions of heredity, however important in this connection they may well become in the future when more is known of the subject, are at present too vague to explain any complex psychological phenomena, and the idea of suggestion merely introduces yet another problem without solving any of the old ones.

The experience of neurotic affections engendered by the war, however, has enabled the critics of psycho-analysis to put forward the view that the factors invoked by Freud in explanation of these affections need not be present, and therefore cannot be regarded as essential, in the way maintained by him, whereas, on the other hand, a different set of factors is undeniably present and operative; not only so, but these latter factors are held to be all-sufficing, so that it is not necessary to search for any others in the ætiology of the conditions in question. Some opponents of psycho-analysis, particularly those more concerned with combating an unwelcome theory than with ascertaining truth, have even maintained that the experience of the war has proved all Freud's views to be utterly untenable and false.

It would be easy to criticise the standpoint thus adopted, though that is in no sense my purpose here. Two points alone may be raised. If, as some writers assert, the strain of war conditions is in itself sufficient to account for the development of a psychoneurosis without the introduction of any other factor, then how is one to explain the actual incidence of war neuroses? Neurotic symptoms amounting to a definite clinico-pathological condition are by no means so common as is sometimes stated. I do not know of any statistics on the matter, but I should be surprised to hear that more than 2 per cent. of the

Army serving in France are affected in this way. This consideration in itself shews that some other factors than war strain must be involved, factors relating to the previous disposition of the men affected, and the problem is to determine what these are. In the second place, as to the dogmatic assertion that Freud's theory of the psychoneuroses cannot apply to those arising under war conditions. An essential feature of this theory is that psychoneuroses result from unconscious mental conflicts. To ascertain whether these are operative in a given case, therefore, it is obviously necessary to employ some method, such as psycho-analysis, which gives access to the unconscious. It may, I think, be taken as certain that those who deny the action of these conflicts in either the war neuroses or in what, by way of contradistinction, must be called the peace neuroses, have not thought it necessary to use any such method, and they thus place themselves in a position very similar to that of a writer who would on *a priori* grounds deny the details or even the existence of histology without ever having looked through a microscope, the only avenue to histology. I choose this simile because it seems to me that the relation of psycho-analysis to clinical psychiatry is not at all inaptly described[8] as being like that of histology to anatomy. Or one might draw an analogy from a strictly medical field. If some one were to take a series of cases of tuberculosis supervening on measles or typhoid, and then maintain that because this ætiological factor was present therefore no microorganism could be, so that Koch's views as to the causation of tuberculosis were entirely unfounded, one would surely have the right to ask whether any search for the bacillus had been made in the cases in question, and to satisfy oneself that the observer had grasped the difference between essential and merely exciting causes of disease. If the answer to both these inquiries were in the negative, I think it will be agreed that no great weight would be attached to the claim that Koch's theory of the nature of tuberculosis had been demolished. Yet this is precisely the order of scientific thinking evinced by those who maintain that Freud's theory of the neuroses has been demolished by the simple observation that they may manifest themselves under the stress of warfare.

I do not mean, however, to assert the contrary of this proposition—namely, that the validity of Freud's theory has been proved in the case of war neuroses, as I should maintain it has been in the case of peace neuroses. I simply hold that the matter is at present *sub judice*, and must remain so until sufficiently extensive investigations shall have settled the question one way or the other. It so happens that the traumatic neuroses are the field in psychopathology that has hitherto been the least explored by psycho-analysis even in peace time, while the opportunity of psycho-analytic investigation of the war neuroses has, in this country at least, been so meagre that the time is not ripe for any generalisation on the subject. Personally I have examined a considerable number of cases in the cursory way that is usual in hospital work, but I have been able to make an intensive study in only some half-dozen cases, and I do not know of any other cases that have been investigated by the psycho-analytic

method. In spite of this paucity of material, a feature inherent in intensive work, the critic of psycho-analysis may legitimately demand of the analyst, who advances considerable pretensions in regard to understanding the pathology of neurotic affections in general, that he should be able to formulate some tentative conception of the relation between the phenomena commonly observed in the war neuroses and the psycho-analytical theory. In the following remarks an attempt will be made to meet this demand, although, as has just been explained, there can be no question of solving the numerous and as yet unstudied problems raised by the observations made in connection with war shock.

It is desirable in the first place to clear away some general misconceptions on the subject. The task of assimilating our new experiences in connection with the war with any previously held theory of neurotic affections has undoubtedly been rendered more difficult by the attitude of those workers whose interest in such problems is of contemporary origin. They lay much too much emphasis on the newer and perhaps more sensational aspects of the phenomena observed, instead of trying to correlate the more familiar and better understood ones. This attitude has been so pronounced with some writers that one might almost imagine that before the war there had never been such calamities as wrecks, earthquakes, and railway accidents, and that men had never been tried to the limit of their endurance with privation, fatigue, and danger, while familiar symptoms like hysterical blindness and paralysis are thought worthy of detailed description and are treated almost as novelties in psychological medicine. So far as I know, however, although some symptoms—e.g., dread of shells—assume a form that is coloured by war experiences, no symptom, and hardly any grouping of symptoms, occurs in war neuroses that is not to be met with in the neuroses of peace, a fact which in itself would suggest that fundamentally very similar agents must be at work to produce the neurosis in both cases.

Another very prevalent misconception, one strengthened by the official use of that unfortunate catch-word “shell-shock”, is that war neuroses constitute a more or less unitary syndrome. It is so often forgotten that the term “shell-shock” can only mean, and no doubt was originally intended to mean, a certain ætiological factor, and not the disease itself. I have preferred to use the less ambiguous and more obviously ætiological term “war-shock,” one coined, I think, by Eder[9]. Even when the term “shell-shock” is avoided, its place is usually taken by the all-embracing expression “neurasthenia”—in most cases, in fact, where there are no physical symptoms of hysteria present. True neurasthenia in its strict sense, on the contrary, is a relatively rare complaint, certainly in anything like a pure form; I have not come across a single case myself in connection with the war. The results of war strain are anything but unitary; most of the diverse forms of neurosis and psychoneurosis are found to be represented, and until these are adequately distinguished one from another it is impossible to make any satisfactory study of their individual pathology. A further point still more often overlooked, and perhaps even more important,

is that not only are the results diverse, but the ætiological factors concerned in war strain are much more complex than is sometimes realised. Careful study of the cases shews that what was the most important pathogenetic agent with one patient had nothing to do with the neurosis of a second patient, although he may have been equally exposed to its influence. For instance, the sight of a near friend being killed may have greatly affected one soldier and been closely related to his subsequent neurosis, whereas with a second patient who has gone through the same experience there may be no connection between it and his neurosis; the same applies to the other painful features of warfare, the tension of waiting under shell fire, the experience of being buried alive, and so on. These considerations indicate the great importance of the individual factor predisposing to particular neurotic reactions, and point to the necessity for careful dissection of the various pathogenetic factors in a number of cases before making generalisations as to the way in which the numerous separate influences grouped together as war strain may operate.

Coming now to the points of contact between war experience and Freud's theory, one may remark, to begin with, how well the facts of the war itself accord with Freud's view of the human mind as containing beneath the surface a body of imperfectly controlled and explosive forces which in their nature conflict with the standards of civilisation. Indeed, one may say that war is an official abrogation of civilised standards. The manhood of a nation is in war not only allowed, but encouraged and ordered to indulge in behaviour of a kind that is throughout abhorrent to the civilised mind, to commit deeds and witness sights that are profoundly revolting to our æsthetic and moral disposition. All sorts of previously forbidden and buried impulses, cruel, sadistic, murderous and so on, are stirred to greater activity, and the old intrapsychical conflicts, which, according to Freud, are the essential cause of all neurotic disorders, and which had been dealt with before by means of "repression" of one side of the conflict, are now reinforced, and the person compelled to deal with them afresh under totally different circumstances.

It is plain, as MacCurdy has well pointed out[10], that men entering the Army, and particularly on approaching the battle-field, have to undergo a very considerable readjustment of their previous attitudes of mind and standards of conduct, a readjustment which is much greater in the case of some men than in that of others, and also one which some men find it much more easy to accomplish satisfactorily than do others. The man's previous standards of general morality, of cleanliness and æsthetic feeling, and of his relation to his fellow-man, have all to undergo a very considerable alteration. In all directions he has to do things that previously were repugnant to his strongest ideals. These ideals are ascribed by some—e.g., Trotter[11], and, following him, MacCurdy—to the operation of the herd instinct, in other words to the influence of the social milieu in which he may happen to have been brought up. I think personally that behind this influence there are still deeper factors at work of a more individual order, derived

essentially from hereditary tendencies and the earliest relation of the child to its parents. However this may be, it is certain that every one has such ideals, though he may not describe them under this name, and that in the course of development he insensibly builds up a series of standards of which his ego approves—and which I therefore propose to refer to by Freud's term of the "ego ideal"—together with a contrasting series of which his ego disapproves.

As every student of genetic psychology knows, this gradual building up is never performed smoothly, but always after a number of both conscious and unconscious internal conflicts between the conscious ego on the one side and various impulses and desires on the other, after a series of partial renunciations and compromises. Further, it is exceptional for the whole result to be satisfactory; there always remain certain fields—more especially in the realm of sex—where the resolution of the conflict is an imperfect one, and it is just from this imperfect resolution that, according to Freud, neurotic affections arise. The question whether a neurosis will result in a given case is essentially a quantitative one. The mind has the capacity of tolerating without harm a certain amount of stimulation from these internal impulses and desires that are not in unison with the ego, and when this limit is passed the energy derived from them flows over into neurotic manifestations. The mind has several methods for dealing with the energy of the anti-ego impulses successfully—that is to say, without the impairment of mental health—and it is only when these methods are inadequate to deal with the whole that neurosis ensues. Two of these methods may especially be noted. One is the deflection of the energy in question from its primitive and forbidden goal to another one in harmony with the more social standards of the ego; as every schoolmaster knows, sport is an excellent example of this. When the primitive goal was a sexual one, this process of deflection, here on to a non-sexual goal, has been given the name of "sublimation", but there are similar refining and modifying processes at work in connection with all anti-ego impulses—e.g., cruelty. A second method is to keep the energy in a state of repression in the unconscious, the conscious mind refusing to deal directly with it and guarding itself against its influence by erecting a dam or barrier against it, known as a reaction-formation. Thus in the case of primitive cruelty, a cruel child may develop into a person to whom the very idea of inflicting cruelty is alien and abhorrent, the original impulse having been quite split off from the ego into the unconscious, and its place taken in consciousness by the reaction-formation barrier of horror and sensitiveness to pain and suffering. In such ways as these a state of practical equilibrium is attained in the normal, the power of the ego-ideal having proved sufficient either to utilise for its own purposes (by means of modifying) or to keep at bay, the impulses and desires that are out of harmony with it. In some people the state of equilibrium thus attained is of considerable stability, they have what is popularly called a reserve of mental and moral force with which they can meet disappointments, difficulties, and emergencies of various kinds in life, which means in practice that their capacity for

readjustment to radically new situations is fairly elastic.

Now, on approaching the field of war the readjustment necessary is one of the more difficult ones experienced in life, although it is by no means so difficult as can arise in various situations appertaining to the field of sex. It is an adjustment which practice shews is possible to the large majority of men, but there is no doubt that the success with which it is carried out is extremely variable in different people; and it probably varies in the same person from time to time for either internal reasons or for external reasons relating to the precise environment at the moment, to the precise war experiences through which they may be passing. It is further clear that the readjustment is likely to vary in its success almost entirely with the success with which the earlier adjustments were made during the development of the individual. This statement is meant to carry more than its obvious meaning that the more stable a man is the more surely can he meet the problems and difficulties of warfare; it has a deeper implication. Namely, there is an important relationship between the two phases of difficult adjustment, the current one and the older one. Fundamentally it is the same difficulty, the same conflict; it is only the form that is different. Let us suppose, for instance, that the original difficulty in adjustment was over the matter of cruelty, that in childhood the conflict between strong tendencies of this kind and perhaps specially strong ideals of the contrary sort was an exceptionally sharp one, so that it was never very satisfactorily resolved, though a working equilibrium may have been established on the basis of powerful reaction-formations and various protective devices for avoiding in every possible way contact with the subject of cruelty. Such a man may well have unusual difficulty in adapting himself to the cruel aspects of war, which really means that his long-buried and quite unconscious impulses to cruelty, impulses the very possibility of whose existence he would repudiate with horror, are stimulated afresh by the unavoidable sights and deeds of war. In bayonet practice, for instance, the man is taught how best to inflict horrible injuries, and he is encouraged to indulge in activities of this order from the very thought of which he has all his life been trying to escape. He now has to deal afresh with the old internal conflict between the two sides of his nature, with the added complication that there has to take place an extensive revaluation of his previous standards, and in important respects an actual reversal of them. He has to formulate new rules of conduct, to adopt new attitudes of mind, and to accustom himself to the idea that tendencies of which he had previously disapproved with the whole strength of his ego-ideal are now permissible and laudatory under certain conditions. One would get a very erroneous view of the picture I am trying to draw if one imagined that the process of readjustment in question goes on in the person's consciousness. This is never entirely true, and often not at all true; the most important part of the readjustment, and often the whole of it, is quite unconscious. We thus see that to obtain a proper understanding of the problems of an individual case, and to be able to deal with them practically in therapeutics, it is often necessary to appreciate the relation

between a current conflict and an older one, for the real strength and importance of the current one is often due to the fact that it has aroused buried and imperfectly controlled older ones.

I have taken the one instance of cruelty, but there are many others in connection with warfare. It may, indeed, be said in general that the process of re-adaptation in regard to war consists of two distinct sides: on the one hand, war effects an extensive release of previously tabooed tendencies, a release shewn in endless ways—for instance, even in the language of camps; and on the other hand the acquiring of a strict discipline and self-control along lines widely different from those of peace-times. The one is a correlative of the other, and we have perhaps in these considerations a psychological explanation of the feature of military life that is so puzzling to most civilians—namely, the extraordinary punctiliousness that a rigid discipline attaches to matters which to the outsider appear so trivial. An indisciplined army has always been the bane of commanders, and perhaps the risks attaching to indiscipline are related to the release of imperfectly controlled impulses that war deliberately effects.

The way in which a relative failure in war adaptation may lead to a neurosis can be illustrated by a parallel drawn from the more familiar problems of peace neuroses. Imagine a young woman who has never been able to reconcile the sexual sides of her nature with her ego ideal, and whose only way of dealing with that aspect of life has been to keep it at as great a distance from her consciousness as possible. If now she gets married, it may happen that she will find it impossible to effect the necessary reconciliation, and that, being deprived of the *_modus vivendi_*—namely, the keeping sexuality at a distance—which previously made it possible to maintain a mental equilibrium, she develops a neurosis in which the repressed sexual desires achieve a symbolic and disguised expression. Similarly in a war neurosis when the old adjustment between the ego-ideal and the repressed impulses is taken away, it may prove impossible to establish a fresh one on the new conditions, and then the repressed impulses will find expression in some form of neurotic symptom.

So far as I can judge, the specific problems characteristic of the war neuroses are to be found in connection with two broad groups of mental processes. One of these relates to the question of war adaptation considered above, the other to that of fear. The latter is hardly to be regarded as a sub-group of the former, inasmuch as there is no readjustment or transvaluation of values concerned, as there typically is with the former. The moral attitude towards fear, and the conflicts arising in connection with it, remain the same in war as in peace. In both cases it is considered a moral weakness to display or be influenced by fear, and especially to give in to it at the cost of not doing one's duty. The soldier who would like to escape from shell fire is, so far as moral values are concerned, in the same position as a man in peace-time who will not venture his life to save a drowning child. Indeed, the conflict cannot be as sharp in the case of the

soldier, for he would find very widespread and thorough sympathy for his quite comprehensible desire, and there would be much less social blame or guilt attaching to him than to the man in the other situation mentioned. So that the problem of fear, which we all agree plays a central part in connection with the typical war neuroses, seems to be apart from that of war adaptation in general as expounded above.

Before discussing the problem of fear, however, I should like at this point to review the position and see how far we have got in the attempt to approximate the facts of war neuroses to the psycho-analytical theory. This theory of the neuroses is a very elaborate one, including many problems of unconscious mechanisms, distinctions between the predispositions and mechanisms characteristic of the different neuroses, and so on, but it is possible to formulate the main principles of it along fairly simple lines, and I now propose to do this in a series of statements.

(1) The first principle in Freud's theory of neurotic symptoms is that they are of volitional origin. This principle, long suspected by both the medical and the lay public, and the real reason why in the past they have been so confounded with malingering, would be at once evident were it not for the fact that it is not true of volition in the ordinary sense of conscious deliberate voluntary purpose. In other words, it is not true of the will as a whole, but only of a part of it—namely, a part that the patient is not aware of. Thus, neuroses are not diseases or accidents that happen to a person, as the French school of psychopathology maintains, but are phenomena produced and brought about by some tendency in the person's mind, and for specific purposes. Freud distinguishes three classes of motives that operate in this way, one essential, the other two not. The indispensable one is an unconscious desire to obtain pleasure by gratifying in the imagination some repressed and dissociated impulse, a motive, therefore, arising in the part of the mind that is not in harmony with the ego-ideal. A second motive is to achieve some end in the outer world; for instance sympathy from an unkind husband, which the person finds easier to do by means of a neurosis than in other ways. The third set of motives has the same purpose as the last, but may be distinguished from it in that they concern the making use of an already existing neurosis rather than the helping to bring one about. Both the latter sets are usually, but not always, unconscious: more strictly, they are preconscious—that is, they do not relate to deeply buried tendencies, and so are correspondingly easy to reveal; Freud terms them the primary and secondary “gain of illness” respectively. Now I take it that this principle of volitional origin is no longer very widely questioned by modern psychopathologists, and in the case of war neuroses the main motives are visible and comprehensible enough—namely, the desire to find some good reason for escaping from the horrors of warfare.

(2) The second principle is that all neurotic symptoms are the product of an intrapsychical conflict which the person has failed satisfactorily to resolve, and that they constitute a compromise

formation between the two conflicting forces. Here, again, I think that those who have been investigating the psychology of war neuroses will agree with this principle. MacCurdy,[12] in particular, has described in great detail the conflict that arises in soldiers between, on the one hand, the motives actuating to continuance at duty and concealment of growing sense of incapacity and apprehension, and, on the other, the awful sense of failure accompanying the sometimes almost overwhelming desire to escape from the horrors of their position. The neurosis offers a way out of this dilemma, the only way that the particular person is able to find, and the actual symptoms, which are often grossly incapacitating, such as blindness, represent the fulfilment of the desire against which the man has been fighting. We reach, therefore, the wish-fulfilment part of Freud's theory.

(3) The third principle is that the operative wish that leads to the creation of the neurosis is an unconscious one. Freud means this in the full sense of the word, and in this sense the principle has not yet been confirmed from the experience of the war neuroses. There are, however, different degrees of unconsciousness of a mental process, and the important point to Freud is not so much the degree of the unawareness in itself—this being largely an index of the repression—as the repression or dissociation that has led to the unawareness. What he maintains is that the wish producing the neurosis is one that is not in harmony with the ego-ideal, and which is therefore kept at as great a distance as possible from it. Anyone who has read the touching accounts given by MacCurdy or Rivers[13] of the shame that soldiers feel at their increasing sense of fear, and the efforts they make to fight against it, to conceal it from others, and if possible from themselves, will recognise that the wish in question is one alien to the ego-ideal and is well on in the first stages of repression, even if it is half-avowed.

(4) The fourth principle is that current repressed wishes cannot directly produce a neurosis, but do so only by reviving and reinforcing the wishes that have been repressed in older unresolved conflicts. According to Freud, a pathogenetic disappointment or difficulty in readjustment leads first to an introversion or turning inwards of feeling, and the wish that has been baulked seeks some other mode of gratification. It tends to regress back to an older period of life, and thus to become associated with similarly baulked and repressed wishes belonging to older conflicts. It is the combination of these two, the present and the old, that is the characteristic mark of the pathogenesis of neurotic disorders as distinct from other modes of reaction to the difficulties of life.

Freud considers that there are probably always three factors in the causation of any neurosis: a specific hereditary predisposition, secondly an unresolved infantile conflict which means that the person has not satisfactorily developed past a given stage of individual evolution—in other words, that he has been subjected to what is called an “infantile fixation” at a given point in development, and thirdly

the current difficulty. There is a reciprocal relationship between these three factors, so that if any one is especially pronounced the others may be correspondingly less important. For instance, if the hereditary factor is very pronounced then a person may become neurotic from the quite ordinary experiences of childhood and adult life, for he is incapable of dealing adequately with them. In the case of war neuroses it is evident that the current factor is of the greatest importance, being, indeed, the only one that so far has attracted attention. The only traces of infantile factors I have seen noted have been the instances where the localisation of hysterical symptoms seems to have been determined in part by the site of old injuries, and in a general way the many traits of childhood, such as sensitiveness to slights, self-centredness, and desire to be guarded, protected, and helped, which are sometimes very evident in the cases of war neurosis.

We thus see that only one half of the psycho-analytical theory has so far been confirmed by the observations of war neuroses. According to this theory, there are typically two sets of wishes concerned in the production of any neurosis. One of these, the “primary gain of illness”, a current one, alien to the conscious ego ideal, and therefore half repressed and only half conscious—if that—has not only been demonstrated by a number of observers, but has been shewn to be of tremendous importance, and certainly the effects of treatment largely turn on the way in which it is dealt with. The other factor, the infantile and altogether repressed and unconscious one, which, according to psycho-analysis, is also essential to the production of a neurosis, has not been systematically sought for, though I have found it in the few cases of which I have been able to make a full study. Its presence or absence is a matter of greater theoretical importance than might perhaps appear, even though its practical importance may often not be great. For my own part I have the utmost difficulty in believing that a current wish, however strong that is half conscious and sometimes fully conscious can ever in itself produce a neurosis, for it contradicts all one’s knowledge concerning the nature of neuroses, as well as my experience, such as it is, of war neuroses themselves. I would therefore urge that no conclusion is possible on the matter one way or the other until adequate investigations have been carried out. That it has its practical side also will be pointed out when we come to consider the chronic cases where war neuroses pass over into peace ones.

(5) The principle of the psycho-analytical theory that has aroused the strongest opposition is that the primary repressed wish ultimately responsible for the neurosis is always of a sexual nature, so that the conflict is between the two groups of instincts that go to make up the whole personality, those concerned respectively with preservation of the self and of the species. Dr. MacCurdy has suggested to me that this is so only because, apart from war, there is no instinct that comes into such strong conflict with the ego-ideal as does the sexual one, but that in war the conflict between the instinct for self-preservation and the ego-ideal is enough to lead to a neurosis. This may seem very plausible, but I shall be surprised if it is

confirmed by future research. That a neurosis, which after all is a disorder of the unconscious imagination, should arise from a conflict between two states of mind that are fully in contact with reality would be something entirely contradictory of our past experience, as would also a neurosis arising from a conflict between two tendencies both belonging to the ego. I shall venture to put forward an alternative hypothesis presently when discussing the subject of fear, which we have next to consider.

Freud states[14] that from one point of view all psychoneurotic symptoms may be regarded as having been constructed in order to prevent the development of fear—another point of contact between his theory and the observers of war neuroses, who would surely agree that fear is the central problem they have to deal with. By fear is here meant rather the mental state of dread and apprehension, increasing even into terror, and accompanied by well-marked bodily manifestations, a state for which psychopathologists have agreed to use the term “morbid anxiety” (or, shortly, “anxiety”) in a special technical sense as being the nearest equivalent of the German word *Angst*.

Morbid anxiety is certainly the commonest neurotic symptom, and the theory of its pathogenesis has been the occasion of a very great deal of investigation,[15] with, in my opinion, very fruitful results. We meet it in the form of a general apprehensiveness of impending danger and evil, as the anxiety-neurosis, and also in hysteria in the form both of apparently causeless attacks of dread and of innumerable specific phobias. In all its forms its most striking feature is the disproportion between its intensity and its apparent justification, so that it seems at first sight extremely difficult to correlate with the biological view of fear as a useful instinct that guards against danger. Practically all modern investigations into its pathogenesis agree that it stands in the closest relation with unsatisfied and repressed sexuality, and, in my judgment, the conclusion that morbid anxiety represents the discharge of repressed and unconscious sexual hunger is one of the most securely established in the whole of psychopathology; it is impossible here to consider the extensive evidence in support of this conclusion, and I can only refer to the published work on the subject[16].

The next question is: What is the relation between morbid anxiety as seen in peace neuroses and real—i.e., objectively justified—fear, as seen in various situations of acute danger and so prominently in the war neuroses? The point of connection is the defensive character of the reaction. Morbid anxiety, as we are familiar with it in the peace neuroses, is a defensive reaction of the ego against the claims of unrecognised “sexual hunger” (*Libido*), which it projects on to the outside world—e.g., in the form of phobias—and treats as if it were an external object; it is, in a word, the ego’s fear of the unconscious. But there appears to be an important difference between it and “real” dread in that the latter concerns only the ego itself, arises only in connection with external danger to the ego, and has nothing to do with

the desires of repressed sexual hunger. One is tempted to say that the latter (real dread) is a normal protective mechanism that has nothing to do with the abnormal mechanism of morbid anxiety. Here, however, as elsewhere, the line between normality and abnormality is not so absolute as might appear, and consideration of the matter leads one to examine more closely into the nature of real dread itself. We then see that this can be dissected into three components, and that the whole reaction is not appropriate and useful as is commonly assumed. The reaction to external danger consists normally of a mental state of fear, which will be examined further in a moment, and in various activities suited to the occasion—flight, concealment, defence by fighting, or even sometimes by attacking. On the affective side there is, to begin with, a state of anxious preparedness and watchfulness, with its sensorial attentiveness and its motor tension. This is clearly a useful mental state, but it often goes on further into a condition of developed dread or terror which is certainly the very reverse of useful, for it not only paralyses whatever action may be suitable, but even inhibits the functioning of the mind, so that the person cannot judge or decide what he ought best to do were he able to do it. The whole reaction of “real” fear is thus seen to consist of two useful components and one useless one, and it is just this useless one that most resembles in all its phenomena the condition of morbid anxiety. Further, there is seen to be a complete lack of relation between development of dread and the degree or imminence of danger, nor does it bear any relation to the useful defensive activities. Thus, one does not flee because one is frightened, but because one perceives danger; in situations of extreme danger men very often respond with suitable measures of flight, fight, or what not, when they are not in the least degree frightened; on the other hand, the neurotic can be extremely frightened when there is no external danger whatever. The inference from these considerations is that even in situations of real danger a state of developed dread is not part of the useful biological mechanism of defence, but is an abnormal response akin to the neurotic symptom of morbid anxiety.

In a recent publication[17] Freud has made the striking suggestion that the developed dread sometimes found in situations of real danger is derived, not from the repressed sexual hunger that is directed towards external objects, as is the case with morbid anxiety of the peace neuroses, but from the narcissistic part of the sexual hunger that is attached to the ego, and I venture to suggest that we may here have the key to the states of terror with which we are so familiar in the war neuroses. The psycho-analytic investigations of recent years have laid increasing stress on the distinction between “object-libido”, the sexual impulses that are directed outwards, and the “ego-libido”, the narcissistic portion that is directed inwards and constitutes self-love. There is good reason to suppose that the latter is the more primary of the two, and also the more extensive—though the least explored as yet—so that it constitutes, as it were, a well from which externally directed sexuality is but on overflow. The analogy naturally occurs to one of the protoplasmic outpourings in the pseudopodia of

the amœba, and the reciprocal relation of these to the main body seems to be similar to that between love of others and self-love. It has been known for some time that there is a limit on the part of the organism to tolerate without suffering more than a given quantity of sexual hunger in its familiar sense of impulses directed outwards, and analytic study of the psychoses, notably of paraphrenia, has shewn that the same is even more profoundly true of the narcissistic sexual hunger. In both cases, before other symptoms are formed so as to deal with the energies in question and bind them, the first thing that happens is a discharge in the form of morbid anxiety, so that we reach the comforting conclusion that a normal man would be entirely free from dread in the presence of any danger, however imminent, that he would be as fearless as Siegfried; it is a gratifying thought that there seem to be many such in our Army to-day. It seems to me probable that the intolerance of narcissistic sexual hunger which leads to dread in the presence of real danger is to be correlated with the inhibition of the other manifestations of the fear instinct, with the accumulated tension characteristic of the mode of life in the trenches.

I would suggest, therefore, that investigations be undertaken from this point of view with cases of war neurosis, especially the anxiety cases. Many of the features noted by MacCurdy[18], for instance, accord well with the picture of wounded self-love: thus, the lack of sociability, the sexual impotence and lack of affection for relatives and friends, the feeling that their personality has been neglected, or slighted, that their importance is not sufficiently recognised, and so on. Perhaps a new light may also be thrown in this way on the attitude of such patients towards death. I understand that a great part of the war neurotic symptoms, and the battle dreams in particular, have been widely interpreted as symbolising the desire to die so as to escape from the horrors of life, an interpretation that does not accord well with the equally widespread view that the fundamental cause of such neuroses is a fear of death. I greatly doubt, on the contrary, whether the fundamental attitude is either a fear of death in the literal sense or a desire for death. The conscious mind has difficulty enough in encompassing in the imagination the conception of absolute annihilation, and there is every reason to think that the unconscious mind is totally incapable of such an idea. When the idea of death reaches the unconscious mind it is at once interpreted in one of two ways: either as a reduction of essential vital activity, of which castration is a typical form, or as a state of nirvana in which the ego survives, but freed from the disturbances of the outer world.

A word in conclusion as to the therapeutic aspects of psycho-analysis in the war neuroses. Even if it were possible, I see no reason whatever why a psycho-analysis should be undertaken in the majority of the cases, for they can be cured in much shorter ways. But I consider that a training in psycho-analysis is of the very highest value in treating such cases, from the understanding it gives of such matters as the symbolism of symptoms, the mechanisms of internal conflict, the nature of the forces at work, and so on, and there is certainly a considerable

class of cases where psycho-analysis holds out the best, and sometimes the only, prospect of relief—namely, in those chronic cases where the war neurosis proper has, by association of current with older conflicts, passed over into a peace neurosis and become consolidated as such.

FOOTNOTES:

[7] Read before the Royal Society of Medicine, Section of Psychiatry, April 9, 1918. Published in the Proceedings, Vol. XI. Reprinted in "Papers on Psycho-Analysis": Jones, 2nd. Ed. 1918, Ch. XXXIII, p. 564. (Baillière, Tindall & Cox.).

[8] By Freud, "Allgemeine Neurosenlehre", 1917, S. 286.

[9] Eder, "War Shock," 1917.

[10] MacCurdy, "War Neuroses", _Psychiatric Bull._, July, 1917, pp. 252, 253.

[11] Trotter, "Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War", 1916.

[12] MacCurdy, _op. cit._

[13] Rivers, "The Repression of War Experience", _Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine_, 1918, xi (Sect. of Psych.), p. 1, Dec. 4, 1917.

[14] Freud, _op. cit._, S. 470.

[15] The latest discussion of the subject will be found in Freud's "Allgemeine Neurosenlehre," 1917, chapter xxv, "Die Angst". See also his papers in "Sammlung kleiner Schriften zur Neurosenlehre," 1906, chapters v, vi, vii, and a general review of the subject in my "Papers on Psycho-Analysis," 2nd ed., 1918, chapter xxvii, "The Pathology of Morbid Anxiety".

[16] _See_ also Stekel, "Angstzustände," 2e. Aufl., 1912.

[17] Freud, _op. cit._, S. 502.

[18] MacCurdy, _op. cit._, pp. 269-272.



DID THE INDIAN INVENT OR BORROW HIS CULTURE?

The Project Gutenberg EBook of *Early Man in the New World*, by
Kenneth Macgowan and Joseph A. Hester, Jr.

American anthropologists usually deny that Old World cultures have influenced to any great extent the pre-Columbian development of the American Indian. We have set up for Aboriginal America a sort of _ex post facto_ Monroe Doctrine and are inclined to regard suggestions of alien influences as acts of aggression. This is probably a scientifically tenable position, although I am afraid it has often been maintained in part by an emotional bias—an “America for Americans” feeling.

—EARNEST A. HOOTON

Diffusion vs. Independent Invention

We hope you have not been skipping the choice thoughts that we have placed at the beginning of chapters. Some of them are merely amusing, but certain ones make an important point. Such is the above remark from Hooton. It calls our attention to an unscientific emotionalism which often lies behind one of the dogmas of American archaeology.

This dogma is called the autochthonous origin of Indian cultures. It asserts that practically all the traits, discoveries, and inventions which Columbus, Cortes, and Pizarro found in the New World were homegrown products—importations barred. The question at issue between the friends and the opponents of this dogma is commonly expressed as Independent Invention versus Diffusion. But the phrasing is not quite accurate: it needs a little amplification. Anything invented by man is in a sense an independent invention. In the present case we are talking of an invention made in one center, the New World, independent of a similar invention in another center, the Old. We are concerned, not with independent invention, but with _parallel_ independent invention. “Diffusion” is still more inaccurate. Normally it means the gradual transfer of some trait or technique from one people to another, often through the intervention of a third or of a third and a fourth people. In the present discussion it is more a matter of a people’s carrying the trait or the technique to a new home. The question is not merely, “Did the Indian invent pottery?” or “Did the American Australoid invent the bull-roarer?” It is rather, “Did he invent it in the New World or the Old?” or “Did he invent it in the Old World and carry it to the New?” or “Did he invent it in the New World while another fellow invented it in the Old?”

This problem of parallel independent invention versus diffusion is important to any discussion of early man, because it can also be phrased: “Did he or did he not bring traits from the Old World that may indicate his racial ancestry?”

[Illustration: FROM BURMA TO MELANESIA TO AMERICA?

Among the most curious resemblances between traits in the New World and in the Old are those of Panpipes. Certain pipes from the Solomon Islands have been found to have the same scale and the same absolute pitch as specimens from western Brazil. Double rows of pipes come from the hinterland of Burma, from the Solomon Islands, and from Panama and the Andean highlands, and in all these areas the two rows are tuned in the same relation to each other. The two sets may be lashed together, like these from the Solomon Islands, left, and from Bolivia, right, or they may be merely connected by a cord and blown by two men or, alternately, by one. (Left, after von Hornbostel, 1912; right, after Nordenskiöld, 1924.)]

[Illustration: _The material used in these fishhooks—pearl shell in Tahiti; abalone shell on San Nicolas Island, off southern California—dictated the slight difference in shape. Objects like these are found only in these general areas. (Courtesy of the American Museum of Natural History and the Santa Barbara Museum of Natural History.)_]]

Both the theory of diffusion and the theory of parallel, independent invention arise from the same scientific fact. This fact is that different primitive peoples often make similar tools, build similar buildings, enjoy similar institutions, live by similar customs, or believe similar myths. And they do this although the tribes may be widely separated from one another. To pin the matter down to our own present concern, certain objects found in the New World and dated before Columbus are almost exactly like objects in the Old World. For instance, a spear-thrower from western Texas not only employs the same principle as one from Australia, but has practically the same physical shape. Curved throwing-sticks and bull-roarers come from both these localities (see illustration, page 226). Star-shaped mace heads of Melanesian type turn up in Peru. Looms that have the same eleven working parts are found in areas of the New World as well as the Old. Easter Island has polygonal stonework with locked joints which matches a form of masonry in Andean Peru, and a certain people of Easter Island stretched their ear lobes in the same fashion as the Incas. Panpipes of the Old World type appear in South America, Panama, and California; some from western Brazil are identical in tonal scale and absolute pitch with some from the Solomon Islands (see illustration, page 235). In Hawaii and in Peru, as in Egypt and ancient Japan, brothers married to sisters were of superior status. The digging stick of certain Polynesians has a step like that of the Indians of Peru. The quipu, or knotted-string record, spread from Polynesia to Peru, and the decimal system was found in both areas, though farther north, in Middle America, men employed the vigesimal system based on progression by twenties. The Hindu game of pachisi resembles the Mexican game of patolli. Lists have been published of as many as fifty such similarities between Oceania and the Americas.[1]

[Illustration: DIFFUSION OR INDEPENDENT INVENTION?

Striking resemblances exist between Old World and New World artifacts. The stone clubs are about 14 inches long. (Upper left, after Gladwin, 1937; the Chinese bell, after Gladwin, 1937, the Arizona bell, after Elmore, 1945; upper right, the New Zealand club, after Wickersham, 1895, the California and Peruvian clubs, after Imbelloni, 1930. The mace heads, after Gladwin, 1937.)]

Effigy Flints

Russia

Illinois

Bronze and Copper Bells

China

Arizona

Two-Edged Stone Clubs

New Zealand

California

Peru

Star-Shaped Mace Head

Melanesia

Peru

Bastian's "Psychic Unity"

Those who argue for independent invention rest their case largely on a distortion of the theory of "psychic unity" put forward by Adolf Bastian in mid-Victorian days. From studies of African and Asiatic cultures, Bastian developed the thesis that "psychic unity" everywhere produced similar "elementary ideas." Thus early man in France and early man in Asia might harden the point of a wooden spear in a fire, or knock chips off a lump of flint to make a sharper tool, or make a rope out of twisted vines. But beyond "elementary ideas," said Bastian, man would develop different things in different places, depending on different physical conditions; and finally, as he reached a higher plane of mental and social development, his ideas and his behavior would be influenced by other men and other cultures with which he came in contact. This was a sound thesis. Unfortunately, however, Bastian's followers ignored the words "elementary ideas," as well as the last half of his theory, and made "psychic unity" the provider of all good things from pots to pyramids.

There have been opponents of independent invention, of course. There were some in Bastian's day. They pointed out—as Robert H. Lowie has done recently—that the champion of the theory must prove that different peoples making similar things were subjected to similar stimulants in both areas. Otherwise "all the societies of the world should share the features in question." [2] Lowie might have said that all cultures of man should be alike today.

By and large, the diffusionists were in the minority. The distorters of

Bastian triumphed. They triumphed even in the Old World, where distances were not always very great, and where traffic between Africa and Eurasia seemed not so very difficult. You can imagine, therefore, what a happy hunting ground the independent inventionists have made of the Americas. The New World is remote indeed from the Old. You must go back to the time of the glaciers to find a land-bridge and up to the Arctic to bring the two worlds within hailing distance of each other. Otherwise you must be willing to accept thousands of miles of ocean voyaging. The physical fact of the remoteness of the Americas has stopped many a mental adventurer among the anthropologists. He rereads with respect—perhaps too much respect—these words of Spinden's: "The fact that no food plant is common to the two hemispheres is enough to offset any number of petty puzzles in arts and myths."^[3]

If the physical fact of the Pacific Ocean had not been enough to stifle talk of diffusion, the extravagant theories of Sir Grafton Elliot Smith would have done the job. Here was a diffusionist indeed! Echoed by W. J. Perry, Smith found the beginnings of all culture of any importance in Egypt, and from there he sent its traveling salesmen abroad to sell it to Europe, Asia, and the Americas. Pearls and pyramids, gold and dolmens, initiations and totemism, sun worship and the marriage of brother and sister, mummies—even if they were no more than desiccated bodies wrapped in a bag—these traits and many more all "proved" that the Children of the Sun had sold their cultural goods to lesser peoples.

There were other theorists as wild and whirling. Augustus Le Plongeon brought the Maya from Atlantis to found Egypt. Ignatius Donnelly reversed the procession and dragged Greeks to Atlantis and then Mexico. Lewis Spence transported Atlas across the Atlantic as the Mexican god Quetzalcoatl. Leo Wiener, as Spinden has put it, "derives everything of importance in the New World from the highly civilized coasts of Gambia and Sierra Leone ... brightest Africa."^[4] And then there was Churchward with his continent of Mu.

Smiths and Perry's uncritical use of evidence and their distortion of fact—plus these fantasies of Africa and Atlantis and Mu—put the friends of independent invention even more firmly in the saddle than the single and simple fact of the Pacific Ocean. The diffusion of Smith _et al._ was a diffusion to end all diffusion.

Americanists—students of man in the New World—have not yet escaped from the curse of the Children of the Sun, and the terror of Atlantis and Mu. One of the best, Baron Erland Nordenskiöld, a distinguished Swedish scientist, gave a great deal of energy to the cataloguing of the many evidences of analogies; and yet he came to the conclusion that, by and large, Indian culture was a product of independent invention in the New World.^[5] He granted that the Indians may have received from Oceania through random voyages "one or two cultivable plants and possibly a few more culture elements"—knowledge of how to make crude clay vessels, for example.^[6] Hrdlička, too, conceded a small number of sea-borne visitors before Columbus: "It is ... probable that the western coast of America,

within the last 2,000 years, was on more than one occasion reached by small parties of Polynesians, and that the eastern coast was similarly reached by small groups of whites, and that such parties may have locally influenced the culture of the Americans.”[7] But Hrdlička considered such voyaging of very little importance.

[Illustration: CIRCUMPACIFIC NAVIGATION?

There are marked resemblances between the traits of the Maori of New Zealand and of the Indians of the northwest coast of North America. Among these are sailing ships and houses. (After figures on a map by Covarrubias, 1940.)]

NEW ZEALAND
NORTHWESTERN AMERICA

Only two anthropologists of any standing have favored diffusion. The first of these, Earnest A. Hooton, rejected “the supposition that these various Asiatic invaders brought with them to the New World nothing but a repressed desire to indulge in independent invention, that they came with culturally empty hands, but brains stuffed full of patents to be filed only after arrival.... I have no use at all for the anthropological isolationists who are determined to maintain the incredible dogma that there was no diffusion of inventions and ideas from the Old World to the New, but only of naked human animals.”[8]

Complexity an Argument for Diffusion

The chief modern American proponent of diffusion is Harold S. Gladwin. What is his case? How does he come to his conclusions? He begins, of course, by noting a large number of random resemblances. Some are in simple objects. Some are in complex ones. As he seeks a scientific basis for his argument, he concentrates on the complex things. Complexity seems to rule out coincidence. If a tool has only one or two parts—like a curved throwing stick or a hafted knife—it is not difficult to conceive of two different men inventing it on opposite sides of the world. A bow and arrow with three essential parts presents a little more of a problem, but not too much, for the three parts are dependent on one another. If the bow has a back reinforced by sinew, if the arrow has feathers and a foreshaft, and the foreshaft has a flint arrowhead—making seven elements in all—then one begins to wonder at the mathematical chances of two men exactly duplicating the whole arrangement. Then, consider the vertical loom with nine separate elements, and eleven if it sports a shuttle and a reed fork.

From citing such coincidences, Gladwin turns to the second step of the diffusionist’s argument. This has to do not alone with one complex object, but with unrelated things grouped around it—let us say a vertical loom and bark cloth, painted tripod pottery, and metal casting by the lost wax method. Now if all these disconnected objects can be

found in another locality and in use by another people, the suggestion of diffusion becomes far stronger than even in the case of a single complex machine. As Gladwin puts it:

If ... a man should report to the Chinese police that some copper bells, a vertical loom, some tripod trays, and a roll of bark cloth had been stolen from his house, and if, after broadcasting the details, the American police should find all these articles in the possession of a man in America, where such things had hitherto been unknown, would the authorities be satisfied with the explanation that the possessor had independently invented each item? I am inclined to think that, if I should happen to be the attorney for the defense, knowing that my client had recently come over from Asia, a plea of insanity might carry more weight with the jury than my client's explanation.

He argues his point still more vividly:

If a Scotsman uses a split-bamboo trout rod, a waterproof silkline, and a barbed hook, it is not necessarily a case of diffusion if a man in Saskatchewan is found to be fishing with a willow twig, a piece of string, and a bent-pin, since each item is dependent upon the others. But if in addition to their fishing tackle, the Scotsman and the man in Saskatchewan are found to possess a shot-gun, a flask, a brier-pipe and bagpipes, then it would look like a case of diffusion since no one item of the assemblage is dependent upon any other.[9]

Dispersion as Well as Diffusion

The difficulty of this second step in the diffusionist's argument lies in the fact that it is hard indeed to find a complex of traits in one American locality that resembles exactly a complex of traits in a single Old World one. If the traits are all together in Peru, some may come from one place in the Old World and some from another. Or, if we take a group of traits from a single Old World locale, we find them spread out widely and separately in the Americas. An excellent example of this may be drawn from Oceania and South America. Dixon writes of the diffusionists:

When in South America, they say, you find not only coca-chewing, plank canoes, and tie-dyeing, but also terraced irrigation, Panpipes, and the blow gun—all traits widespread in the western Pacific and southeastern Asia—how can you deny that their occurrence is due to diffusion, or believe for a moment that so many similar and parallel inventions could take place? The challenge is a formidable one. Is there anything that can be said in reply?

Dixon points out that these Oceanic traits are not found together in the New World. The plank canoe is confined to the Santa Barbara Islands and southern Chile; tie-dyeing, to the arid coasts of northern Peru;

coca-chewing, originally to the Andean highlands and the tropical forests along its eastern border; terraced irrigation, to the Andes of Peru and Bolivia; the blow gun, to the upper Amazon and Orinoco forests, the Antilles, and the eastern United States; the Panpipe, to the Amazon-Orinoco drainage and southward through Bolivia to northern Chile and the Peruvian coast, and to one or two isolated spots in Ecuador and Colombia. "With one exception the only area where the distribution of any two of these traits is found to overlap lies in the Andean highlands and the tropical forest area to the eastward. Only tie-dyeing and the Panpipe are found together on the coast." Further, the two traits we find on the coast are separated in the Old World. Tie-dyeing is found specifically in Indonesia "and known in Melanesia only in degenerate form in one small area, whereas the Panpipe is primarily Melanesian and almost unknown in Indonesia." [10] He seems to be ignorant of double Panpipes connected by a cord which are found in the hinterland of Burma and also in Panama and South America. [11]

No opponent of diffusionism is so blind as to deny the importation of some culture traits by the migrants from northern Asia. Kroeber concedes the fire drill, the spear-thrower, stone chipping, twisting of string, the bow, the throwing harpoon, simple basketry and nets, hunting complexes, cooking stones in vessels of wood, of bark, or of skin, body painting and perhaps tattooing, the domestication of dogs. [12] But, except for these and a few other examples, most anthropologists deny that the American Indians, early or late, brought any objects of their culture from the Old World. Alfred V. Kidder has phrased very neatly their antagonism to "non-stop journeys by bag-and-baggage culture carriers." [13] This phrase is aimed at a weak chink in the diffusionist's armor—the fact that Old World traits found, say, in the Southwest, Middle America, or farther south leave no trail across Alaska and down through Canada and over the Great Plains.

In addition, the opponents of diffusion like to point out that certain things in the Indian culture of the northern part of the New World are like certain things in the Indian culture of the southern part, while in between lies a very large area—Middle America and Peru—of entirely different culture traits. Here we find none of the northern and southern things. Nordenskiöld observes that, while some of the identical northern and southern traits may be due to the stimulus of similar cold climates, there are numerous traits that have nothing to do with temperature and humidity. He doubtless feels he is delivering the coup de grâce when he writes:

It is a very characteristic fact that incomparably greater similarity exists between civilizations as far apart as those of the Calchaquis of Argentina, and the Pueblos of North America, than between the culture of any Indian tribe and that of any people in the whole of Oceania. [14]

If such traits were diffused from one American area to the other, they left no trace between. When we add this to the fact that from Alaska to

Middle America there are no traces of even the simplest beginnings of the cultures of the central area, the advocate of independent invention has a pretty good case. In answer, the diffusionist has been tempted to argue that when men are moving rather steadily across an area, they do not leave evidence that is easy to find some millenniums later. Only a hundred years have passed since Brigham Young led his people from Independence, Missouri, to Salt Lake City, and yet there is a singular paucity of spinning wheels and first editions of *The Book of Mormon* along their trail.

The Trap of Time

Gladwin has a better answer, which is also an attack on a basic weakness of his opponents. Through many years he has been pointing out that friends of the inventive Indian have been getting squeezed tighter and tighter in a trap of their own independent invention. It is the trap of time.

When the Spaniards found the New World, they found it full of inventions and discoveries. There were cities of stone, painted temples, great pyramids. Metal workers smelted ores, made alloys, and cast elaborate ornaments of gold by a most intricate process. There was a complex despotism in Mexico and as complex and despotic a communism in Peru. The Maya had a calendar more accurate than the one Columbus used. They had devised a hieroglyphic writing and knew how to make cement. The Indians of both continents had developed an extensive agriculture, with potatoes and fertilizers in Peru and corn and beans and tomatoes all over the place.

As soon as the archaeologists decided that all this had been invented in the New World with no help to speak of from the Old, they had to recognize that it would take quite a little time. At first this posed a difficulty, for there was no very early evidence of man in Mexico. In 1917, however, came the discovery of skeletons and pottery under a lava flow at Copilco near Mexico City and of a primitive pyramid half buried under the same flow at near-by Cuicuilco; and the archaeologists promptly dated the eruption of the lava at 4000 B.C.

Then, unfortunately, new evidence narrowed the trap of time once more. George C. Vaillant and his wife dated other sites with the same kind of pottery as Copilco considerably later than the birth of Christ. A radiocarbon date based upon charcoal within the pottery level below the Cuicuilco lava falls between these guesses; it is 2422 ± 250 years.[15] The Basket Makers advanced from an estimated 2000 B.C. to a tree-ring date about A.D. 217. And all this time nobody could find any really primitive beginnings of pottery in Middle America, and nothing that seemed earlier than the birth of Christ. The trap of time was growing tighter and tighter. A very elaborate civilization would have to develop in 1,500 years, without any roots. Gladwin pointed out this difficulty and urged the theory that man came into the Americas not only as a

paleolithic primitive 15,000 or 25,000 years ago, but as a fairly civilized and perfected neolithic close to the beginning of the Christian era.

Escape from the Trap

The similarity between the traits of the north and the south which Nordenskiöld points out, and the fact that a different lot of traits were dropped in between the others are grist to Gladwin's diffusion mill. In 1937, when he wrote *Excavations at Snaketown*, he was only beginning to see an answer. By 1947, when *Men Out of Asia* appeared, he had a fairly complete and certainly an ingenious explanation.

His first proposition is that the Mongoloids came late—very late—and that they brought not much more than the brawn and brains which someone else would later direct. His fifteenth chapter begins with the following parody of a baseball score:

Score at the End of the Fourth Inning

NORTH AMERICA 4

Australoid, Folsom, Algonquin, Eskimo

SOUTH AMERICA 1

Australoid

No Discoveries No Inventions No Mongoloids

By 300 B.C.—two hundred years after the Eskimo—Gladwin is willing to add 1 run to the North American score and make that run Mongoloid. But he does not believe that the Mongoloids reached South America in any numbers, or contributed anything but labor to the culture which Columbus found. They did not make black-on-white pottery in the Pueblo country or red-on-buff pottery and irrigation canals in southern Arizona, create incised pottery, pyramids, carved jade, or a calendar system and hieroglyphs in Middle America, pound bark cloth in Central America, or produce stone fortresses and superb weaving and portrait jugs in Peru. Left to their own devices, the Mongoloids would have accomplished no more in the New World than they had in the Old before the Huns made things unpleasant for them in northern China. Gladwin believes that the people who created the culture of Middle America and Peru came overseas, spreading north and south from the isthmus of Panama. The suggested invasion by water explains the odd fact that many of the traits of northern North America are like some of those of southern South America, and not at all like most of the traits of the area between. Some of these northern and southern traits, says Gladwin, are the property of the Australoids who came far back; others in North America find analogies in China and northern Asia. His overseas peoples thrust themselves and their culture into the central part of the New World, changing or obliterating the Australoid traits that they found there, and isolating those that lay to the north and south. He believes that these people brought with them certain objects and customs from the

islands in the Pacific, from southeastern Asia, and from China and points west. Among them is the habit of squeezing a baby's head between boards to give it an elegant elongation; this head deformation is not practiced in northern Asia, from which the Indians are presumed to have come.

It is hardly necessary to point out that Gladwin's hypothesis disposes of the question: "Why are there no traces of Middle American and Peruvian traits on the trail down from Alaska?" But we might ask: "Why are there not more of them in the Pacific islands?"

Gladwin has not worked out his maritime invasions too thoroughly; but he sees the Melanesians—who, he believed, reached Easter Island—continuing on to Central America and becoming the Caribs and spreading into South America and the West Indies. He sees the Polynesians taking much the same route and turning into the Arawaks.

What started these South Sea islanders off on their career of civilizing the central part of the Americas? Where did they get some of the traits and some of the physical features that Melanesians and Polynesians do not now possess, as well as their inventive brains? Here Gladwin has a startling and fabulous theory to put forward. Here is where Alexander the Great and his sailors and ships come in.

Dead Alexander Invades America

[Illustration: BEARDED WHITE GODS?

Middle American portraits of men who, unlike the generality of Mongoloids, wore beards. Upper left, the back of a Totonac slate mirror probably from the state of Veracruz. Upper right, a carving from Tepataxco, Veracruz. Center, a figure on a pottery vase from Chama, Guatemala. Lower left, a pottery head found at Tres Zapotes, Veracruz. Lower right, a carving on a stela at La Venta, which appears to have an artificial beard such as was worn by the Egyptians. (The first three, after Vaillant, 1931; the fourth, after Stirling, 1940; the last, after Covarrubias, 1946.)]

Before Alexander died in 323 B.C. he brought 5,000 Levantine and Greek shipwrights and sailors to the Persian Gulf and built a navy of 800 vessels. We hear a good deal about what his army did after his death, of the quarrels of generals and the dissipation of their forces—but not a word about the 5,000 nautical men or their fleet. As Gladwin points out, it is hard to imagine that sailors with sound vessels under them would take shore leave and walk home to Greece. If they sailed away from the Persian Gulf, which way would they have gone? They would hardly have sailed southwestward along the Arabian coast; for Alexander died at a season when the winds would have been against them, and the coast is lacking in fresh water and harbors at any time. A southeastward voyage would have been another matter. The wind would have been behind them,

and they had already found the coast attractive in that direction.

With this much to go upon, Gladwin sends the fleet of the dead Alexander down the coast of India, past the Spice Islands, and out through Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia. On the way the fleet picks up men and women of various races, and stimulates the whole South Seas into a navigating era. The end result is another discovery of America. It is a discovery by a varied and talented people. Along with the Melanesian-Carib and Polynesian-Arawak, the fleet of Gladwin and Alexander finally brings to our western shores those bearded white men with civilizing propensities who are found in the legends of the Toltec and Maya and the peoples of Colombia and Peru. They it is who teach the Mongoloids how to build stone edifices, work metals, weave textiles, and make fine pots. Gladwin documents all this assiduously and even goes to his opponents for evidence.

He bolsters his argument with the “Q Complex”—that list of traits in the cultures of Middle America and the southeastern portion of the United States which Vaillant and Lothrop compiled as being very old indeed and unaccounted for in present theory. *Men Out of Asia* suggests that the Levantine voyagers brought these things or shaped them after they landed.

He uses with the greatest relish the mass of material on Oceanic traits in the Americas that Nordenskiöld drew together in “Origin of the Indian Civilizations in South America.” Of the forty-nine elements of culture which the Swede found common to both regions, Gladwin points out that more occur in Colombia and Panama than in any other New World area—thirty-eight in all—and that Colombia and Panama surround the spot where ships would have landed if they had followed the Equatorial Counter Current to the Gulf of Darien. From this region as a center the Melanesian and Polynesian traits gradually thin out to the north, the south, and the east.

[Illustration: The Equatorial Counter Current, which flows just north of the equator, varies in width from 150 to 500 miles. The winds in this area are light and blow from south of east over its southern area and north of east over its northern area.]

Against Gladwin’s argument must be set, however, the evidence that Gonzalo Aguirre Beltrán has recently developed showing that, among the slaves sent to Mexico from Manila during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, there were many from New Guinea and other Pacific islands.[16] Was there a similar trade with Colombia, where Oceanic traits are slightly more plentiful than in Mexico and Central America, and with Amazonia, where they are almost as plentiful? It is vitally important, however, to remember that Melanesian slaves cannot possibly be credited with the importation of objects that have been found in pre-Columbian burials—certain Panpipes and mace heads, for example.

There are plenty of other objections, of course, to Gladwin’s theory,

even though it seems to explain much that has been a mystery; but there are also defenses that he has not made. If the islands of the Pacific are not too well provided with pottery, pyramids, cement, metallurgy, and textiles, he might have pointed out that they were imperfectly supplied with the proper raw materials. If the white voyagers left their triremes behind in favor of double canoes, and if they did not build Greek temples in the New World, he might have suggested that some generations of sojourn in the South Seas led them to forget a few things. Indeed, it is surprising that these sailors remembered so much of weaving, metal working, and pottery (minus the potter's wheel). It is equally surprising and just a little disquieting that the white gods, almost as soon as they landed, invented a complex and unique calendar and a hieroglyphic system like nothing they were familiar with. (Perhaps they could not agree on which of the many Old World varieties to use and had to devise something new.)

Before pouncing too heavily on Gladwin and his Alexandrians, it may be well to reread some sentences in his Introduction:

We are going to offer an explanation that will be a radical departure from those in current circulation, and I shall be the first to admit that this tale will need a great deal of patching and strengthening before it will carry much weight. This may seem a strange way to launch a new theory, but I am more concerned in opening up new channels of inquiry than in trying to provide pat answers to all the questions that are plaguing us.... I do not know of anyone who has yet been rash enough to try to connect the origins of American civilizations with definite causes, at definite dates, in the progress of Old World history, and it is for this reason that I have said this tale will need support and will undoubtedly need to be changed. This, however, is the way that every theory should be treated, and no harm will be done if when a new idea is launched it is regarded with due reserve, but also without prejudice.[17]

Our next chapter will return to rather formidable arguments for inventiveness in the American Indian; but first we should perhaps point out that Gladwin is not an Elliot Smith riding the hobby of diffusion to the end. He admits independent invention in many important fields. Pottery was invented, he believes, at least twice in the Old World. He concedes a number of origins for agriculture in the New. But he believes that the really inventive men of the New World—the men who developed corn, and devised the Maya calendar—were the men who brought brains as well as cultural equipment in the ships of Alexander, and put those brains to work devising more cultural equipment. (He ignores the fact that corn was developed more than a thousand years before Alexander was born.) Gladwin simply does not consider that early man and his successors before the birth of Christ were smart enough to produce much more than exceptionally good spear points and rather inferior milling stones. He does not believe that the Australoids or the Folsom men or the Algonquins or the Mongoloids who came over just before our era—let alone the Uto-Aztecs or the Athabascans a little later—were capable of

inventing much in the way of neolithic civilization. He points out that the Indian—bereft, presumably, of the brains and blood of the men of Alexander's fleet—has not done much inventing in the past four centuries. An opponent might remark that many an inventive, creative people has lapsed from grace—the Egyptians and the Greeks, for instance. The Polynesians and the Melanesians have not done much more inventing than the Indians since the days when the Alexandrians turned them into pre-Columbian pioneers of America culture.

Independent Inventions Neither Parallel Nor Diffused

It will be some years before the debate of diffusion versus independent invention comes anywhere near settlement. Much of Gladwin's evidence for diffusion is striking and not to be laughed aside—particularly the group of Australian traits in our Southwest, and the Polynesian and Melanesian traits in the area around the Gulf of Darien. His injection of Old World voyagers between the northern and southern areas of the New World explains certain puzzling matters; but the theory presents puzzles of its own. Many culture traits of Middle America and Peru are not found in Oceania: the use of cement in masonry and the vigesimal system of numeration in Middle America; the amazingly intricate Maya calendar and hieroglyphics with the first invention of zero; baked brick in two Mexican sites; bronze in Peru; the hammock; the whistling jar; the manioc press. Some of these New World traits must have been invented here, but we are asked to believe that the others were forgotten in Oceania and remembered in the Americas. One argument for trans-Pacific diffusion is clear and cogent, however. It is hard to believe that the men who voyaged as far as the Marquesas and Easter Island stopped there, and so missed our long coast line. Certainly the sweet potato made the ocean crossing in the reverse direction, but was it before Columbus?[18]

Other things went with the sweet potato, according to the great chemist Gilbert N. Lewis. Without believing that man originated in South America, he thinks that man first reached the neolithic level in the area east of the Peruvian Andes while his fellow man in the rest of the world was wandering in paleolithic darkness. In the Andean highlands, man developed architecture, numeration, metallurgy, weaving, sculpture, and so forth. He spread these things to Middle America 6,000 or 8,000 years ago, and then carried them across the Pacific to the Old World.[19] As a whole, Lewis's theory may be unacceptable; but his arguments for diffusion and against independent invention are persuasive.

In 1947 six Scandinavians demonstrated the possibility of an east-west crossing by sailing and drifting 4,300 miles in 101 days on a primitive raft of balsa logs from Peru to an atoll not many days from Tahiti.[20]

The position of the American partisans of independent invention is a curious one. It is both weak and strong. Man is inventive—even primitive man. But his inventions often have a unique quality: they are not always

duplicated, or they are not duplicated at the same level of cultural development. Consider the cave paintings and the sculpture of the Aurignacians, Solutreans, and Magdalenians in the late Paleolithic. It is an art of remarkable perfection that utterly disappeared, and was not equaled again for thousands upon thousands of years. At Bonampak, in southern Mexico, a Maya painter used consummate perspective and foreshortening long before they appeared in Asia. Then there are the unique Folsom point, the perfection of the Solutrean and Eden points, the Maya calendar and hieroglyphs, the mosaic walls of Mitla in Mexico, Egyptian architecture and sculpture as well as writing, the beautifully expressive masks of the African Negro, the Melanesian, and the Eskimo. These were independent inventions, but they were unique ones. They were not independent, _parallel_ inventions. And they were not diffused.

As for early man in the New World, we may believe if we wish that the shape of the Sandia point was diffused from the Solutreans of Europe. We may deny the independent invention in our Southwest of spear-throwers, bull-roarers, bunt points, and curved throwing sticks that look more as if they had been brought from Australia. The Eden point may have come from Siberia, or Siberia may have got it from North America. The Folsom point, however, looks definitely like an independent invention, for it is found nowhere else in the world. This argues that the people who ultimately succeeded in making it must have been in the New World for many, many generations before one of them lashed a Folsom point to a spear and thrust it into a bison. Where are the flints they shaped before the Sandia, Clovis, and Folsom? Can they have evolved the craft of flint knapping here in the New World? When we know this, we shall probably know whether they came before or after the last glaciers.

What Diffusion of Plants and Art?

Meantime it is interesting to observe that the log-jam of the independent inventionists is weakening a bit. When the International Congress of Americanists met in New York in 1949, the hitherto conservative and autochthonous American Museum of Natural History presented for the instruction and delectation of the Congress a rather elaborate exhibition of parallelisms between the cultural traits of the Old World and the New. A follow-up to this noteworthy gathering was a symposium of many of the same anthropologists at a meeting, two years later, of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. The theme was "Prehistoric and Historic Asia: Transpacific Contacts with the New World." [21] The question of contacts was not squelched, but there was no substantial progress in finding answers. The symposium focused the problem on two tests of possible diffusion. These concerned domesticated plants and formal art.

The strongest cases that can be made for the diffusion of any plant concern the _Lagenaria_ gourd, cotton, the sweet potato, and the coconut. None of these ranks as a staple of subsistence, and two of them are not even food plants. Thus Old World and New World crops are

mutually exclusive. The four plants that we have mentioned may have had world-wide distribution before man reached the New World; they may have followed the first contacts of white men with the Americas; there is only a remote possibility that they crossed the ocean through natural agencies.

In formal art—or perhaps we should say religious art—there are some tantalizing prospects for rather recent Asia-America diffusion. Gordon Ekholm, of the American Museum of Natural History, has listed a number of these. He suggests that the time of contact would have been about 700 A.D. This, you will note, is much too late to do much in shaping American civilization. At the most, it would have furnished no more than a bit of Asiatic frosting upon the cake of American civilization. Drawing upon elements of art from India, southeast Asia, and Indonesia, Ekholm points to similarities in Maya, Mexican, or other native American art, where parallels seem to exist in such things as a trefoil arch, a sacred tree or cross, tiger thrones, conch-shell-and-plant, Atlantean figures, monster doorways, serpent columns and balustrades, and others.[22] The comparisons are provocative, to say the least. In the Maya area, where most of the suspected influence of Asia occurs, many forms of art steadily deteriorated during the period when, theoretically, Asiatic stimulation would have been most pronounced.

Can we logically assume that the Maya would borrow a lotus motif or a serpent column from southeast Asia, but not the dome or true arch? Is it likely that sailors from Asia or Oceania succeeded in introducing useful plants but not sails or boats that could tack against the wind? If transoceanic diffusion is to be considered seriously, should there be no evidence for even a few practical seagoing inventions shared between the Old World and the New? Surely this would be more acceptable to the Americanists than forcing the assumption of transoceanic diffusion upon the presence of cultivated plants of secondary importance, or theological concepts expressed so vaguely as to be subject to alternative interpretations.



SUGGESTIVE COMMENTS

The Project Gutenberg EBook of *The Golden Rule Cook Book*, by Maud Russell Lorraine Sharpe

SEASONING

The subject of seasoning is indeed holy ground in culinary matters, and after much thought and experiment I have decided that the phrase so deplored by young housekeepers, "season to taste," is after all not the worst one to use. No such inaccurate directions were to appear

in this cook-book when planned, but I have finally decided with the army of wiser cooks who have preceded me that accurate measurements in seasoning are dangerous to success. Not only do tastes vary, but much depends on the time the seasoning is added, on the rapidity with which the food is cooking, etc. With this in mind, and very long prejudice against the old phrase above mentioned, I have compromised and frequently been tempted to state quantities of salt and pepper, usually regretting when I have. The truth is, unless one can "season to taste" one cannot cook palatable dishes, and my final word on the subject is that it is well to always use a little more salt and pepper than seems advisable, and then just before serving add a little more!

MEASURING

Weights as a means of measuring quantities have been avoided in these recipes, as I can see no advantage to the system which uses them, and I have been able to show even English cooks that the scales are not the most necessary part of the kitchen furnishing, and they have become devoted to our simple method of using the kitchen cup as the standard. It holds 1/2 pint, and 2 cups, therefore, hold 1 pint; 4 cups hold 1 quart; and I find no fault with the old couplet,--

"A pint's a pound
The world around."

It usually is, and one cannot go far wrong in acting as if it always were.

THICKENING

In thickening sauces and soups, ordinary flour can always be used and cornstarch also, and as a rule I have said "flour" only in these recipes, but have only refrained from always advising potato-flour because it would have confused many who cannot obtain it in America. In Germany it is always used, and when it can be had is far nicer for thickening all vegetable sauces and soups than any other sort of flour.

AN HERB GARDEN

No one thing pays better for the little trouble expended than a small herb garden. Buy two or three tarragon plants, cover them in the winter, and in the autumn pick the leaves to make vinegar and to dry. Plant chervil, parsley, thyme, chives, and a plant of rosemary.

A window-box will keep parsley and chives on hand, and a clump of chives from the market will grow for weeks if set in a bowl and watered occasionally.

GELATINE

Instead of the usual gelatine use must be made of arrowroot or a gelatine advertised to be purely vegetable. One tablespoon is usually allowed to 1 pint of liquid, but experiments must be made and there will usually be directions found with the package.

FAT FOR FRYING

The Vegetarian can well afford to do away with that doubtful economy, cooking butter. For ordinary frying use good butter; for deep fat use a good brand of cooking-oil, or cocoanut butter.

CANNED GOODS

It seems to be a habit with many people to decry the use of canned vegetables, although I believe there are few households which subsist without them. My experience is that the best grades of canned vegetables are often far sweeter and better, fresher in fact, than vegetables that can be bought in city markets. The housekeeper should make it a point to know which brands she prefers and to trade where she can get them; and where no retailer carries them she can usually obtain cases containing two dozen each from the preservers themselves. A little trouble taken in the autumn to stock the store-room, instead of ordering "a can of peas" now and then at random, saves time and trouble in the end. Among the canned vegetables which are put up and sealed the day they are picked by the best firms are beets, peas, corn, spinach, hard-shelled beans, tomatoes, stringless beans, wax beans, mushrooms, pimentos, okra, okra-tomato, asparagus, etc.; and the saving of time and labour in the preparation of beans, spinach, and beets especially, is worth consideration. People make the mistake of merely warming up canned goods and then serving them, whereas when the can is opened the vegetables are only ready to be seasoned and finished as they would be had they been boiled at home. Good canned vegetables are not easy to improve upon, and I serve them constantly to people who will not easily credit my statement that they are not so-called "fresh" vegetables.

*I will not kill or hurt any living creature needlessly,
nor destroy any beautiful thing, but will strive to save
and comfort all gentle life and guard and perfect all
natural beauty upon the earth.*

John Ruskin.



THE LAW OF JUDICIAL POWER

The Project Gutenberg EBook of *The Essentials of American Constitutional Law*, by Francis Newton Thorpe

96. The people of the United States, like other sovereignties, possess not only legislative and executive functions, but also judicial. The possession of these three powers by sovereignty is essential to its existence and a condition of any conception of it. The judicial power of the United States is vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as Congress from time to time may ordain and establish. This is a delegation of judicial power.[243] The inferior courts are established by Congress but the power of these courts is delegated to them by the people of the United States through the Constitution. Thus it may be said that these inferior courts exist by act of Congress but their authority is delegated to them by the same sovereignty that empowers Congress to create them. The power of the Supreme Court is defined in the word *supreme*, and that of the inferior courts in the word *inferior*. Congress can neither increase nor decrease this power; the sovereign alone, the people of the United States can modify the grant. This it has done by the Eleventh Amendment, ratified in 1798:

The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign State.[244]

This Amendment was added in compliance with the idea,—at the time dominant in America,—that a State, a member of the Union, is a sovereign, and being sovereign, cannot be made defendant (that is, cannot be sued) at the suit of a citizen or subject of another State, or of a foreign country. The idea was,—and is,—that an American Commonwealth may be petitioned, like any other sovereign, but can be sued only in its own courts and with its own consent.[245] In conformity to this idea the Constitution was so amended as to deny to the courts of the United States any jurisdiction whatever in any case in which an American Commonwealth is made a defendant.

97. This Amendment is a limitation of the judicial power delegated to the government of the United States and save in some particulars of applied judicial jurisdiction as original or appellate, is the only limitation. On the principle that the government of the United States “must possess all the means and have a right to resort to all

the methods of executing the powers with which it is intrusted that are possessed and exercised by the governments of the particular States,”[246] the judicial power vested in the federal courts must be sufficient for all the functions and purposes of the federal government. The judicial power of the United States extends to all cases, in law and equity, arising under the Constitution, the laws of the United States, and the treaties made under its authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States is a party; to controversies between two or more States; between citizens of different States; between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants from different States, and between a State, or its citizens, and foreign states, citizens, or subjects, save and except as jurisdiction is limited by the Eleventh Amendment.[247]

98. It will be observed that the judicial power thus delegated to the United States includes jurisdiction over cases arising outside the domain strictly included (as popularly understood) within the government of the United States. That government is, of necessity and by its nature, a distinct government, possessing powers and functions and purposes of its own, delegated and set forth in the Constitution. Fundamentally there is a government of the United States distinct from the government of the States. The judicial power of the United States includes jurisdiction over controversies to which States are a party,—that is, to controversies to which the United States is not a party. The jurisdiction here has no reference to the controversy but to the status of the parties to the controversy.

99. _The Federalist_ sets forth the principle here involved:

If there are such things as political axioms, the propriety of the judicial power of a government being co-extensive with its legislative, may be ranked among the number. The mere necessity of uniformity in the interpretation of the national laws decides the question. Thirteen (1787; forty-eight, 1917) independent courts of final jurisdiction over the same causes, is a hydra in government, from which nothing but contradiction and confusion can proceed.[248]

This aspect of the judicial power of the United States concerns the interpretation of the supreme law. One purpose of that law is “to insure domestic tranquillity,”—that is, the peace of the Union.[249]

The Constitution imposes restrictions on the States, which of course means restrictions on their legislatures, their governors, and their courts. Upon principles of good government the States are prohibited from doing many things. How shall infractions of the supreme law be determined? Either by a congressional negative, or by the authority of the federal courts overruling whatsoever act of the State contravenes the Constitution.[250]

100. But the judicial power of the United States extends yet further,—to controversies “in which the State tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial and unbiased.”[251] The principle here is that the whole is greater than a part;

that the peace of the whole ought not to be left at the disposal of a part. “No man ought to be a judge in his own cause, or in any cause in respect to which he has the least interest or bias.”[252] On the principle that every government ought to possess the means of executing its own provisions by its own authority,

it follows that it is necessary that the construction of the Constitution,—the supreme law,—

should be committed to that tribunal which, having no local attachments, will be likely to be impartial between different States and their citizens, and which, owing its official existence to the Union, will never be likely to feel any bias inauspicious to the principles on which it is founded.[253]

101. The exercise of judicial power by the Supreme Court is provided for, in part, by the Constitution, but Congress is authorized to ordain and establish inferior courts,—which means to define their respective jurisdictions; to bestow upon a court so much judicial power, and to make such restrictions, rules, and regulations as Congress itself may deem proper. Thus Congress establishes such courts and defines their several jurisdictions, but whatsoever judicial power a court possesses, by act of Congress, the court derives from the Constitution in its grant of such power. The jurisdiction of any inferior court of the United States, thus defined by Congress, may vary, from time to time, by act of Congress, but every case arising in the court must be shown, by the record of the court, to be within its jurisdiction.[254] The reason for this important rule (and seeming restriction) conforms to the essential principle in all judicial proceeding: the principle of authority. No court acts without authority and, as judicial examination has for its ultimate purpose the settlement of controversy in a legal manner, the jurisdiction of the court is of primary importance. One of the purposes of the Union is “to establish justice,” and precision in the whole matter of exercise of judicial power is essential.

102. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States is both original and appellate. Its original jurisdiction is defined in the Constitution as “in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a State is a party.”[255] The Court can have original jurisdiction in no other cases, nor can Congress extend or diminish the Court’s jurisdiction. Thus to the words in the Constitution conferring original jurisdiction on the Court “a negative or exclusive sense must be given, or they have no operation at all.”[256] The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was conferred because of the dignity and rank of the Court, and the rank of the parties thus privileged to appear before it at first instance.

Ambassadors, public ministers, and consuls represent sovereignties, and a State in the Union is “for some purposes sovereign, for some purposes subordinate.”[257] On this delegation of original jurisdiction Chief Justice Marshall remarks: “There is, perhaps, no part of the article under consideration so much required by national policy as this.”[258] The rank of the parties is the reason for giving them the right to begin their case in the Supreme Court. They are not excluded from beginning it in some other court. But Congress, in establishing an inferior court, may deny to it any jurisdiction in cases to which foreign representatives are a party.[259] The right of ambassadors, public ministers, and consuls to begin their suits in the Supreme Court is a privilege accorded them because of their governments, and not because of themselves. As they are accredited to the Government of the United States and not to any State government, it is proper that the United States courts, and of these the Supreme Court, should have original jurisdiction in their cases.[260] In all the other cases mentioned in the Constitution the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction; that is, cases come before the Court on appeal from the decision of some inferior federal court, or from some State court, as provided by law. The entire procedure in an appeal to the Supreme Court is regulated by Congress. If a party, whether private person, private corporation, or public corporation, citizen, or State is within the jurisdiction of the United States, then that person or corporation, if a party to a case or controversy at law, is within the jurisdiction of a federal court. The Constitution is the supreme law of the land and this Constitution, the acts of Congress and the treaties made by its authority are the law of federal jurisdiction. Thus it is commonly and truly said, that whensoever the Constitution, or a treaty, or an act of Congress is involved in the controversy, the federal courts (as their several jurisdictions are determined by law) have jurisdiction in the case. The principle is one of sovereignty.

103. The State for some purposes retains its sovereignty,[261] as in the exercise of its police power.[262] By the Constitution, the judicial power of the United States extends “to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,” but the State has jurisdiction to punish crimes committed within its territory; to regulate fisheries within that territory, and to punish those who violate its regulations. The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States extends to the high seas, to the navigable waters of the United States, to the Great Lakes, and to rivers and lakes wholly within a State. Over its own territory the State has jurisdiction; thus the territory which is the scene, or area, or location of the act may be subject to both State and federal jurisdiction, and is always within one or the other.

104. In creating inferior courts, Congress determines the jurisdiction but not the judicial power exercisable within the jurisdiction. Congress does not control the judges in their execution of their office. Judicial power, of whatever extent, is conferred by the Constitution; it is power of a judicial nature delegated by the people of the United States. The inferior courts of the United States sit

in the several States, but the right to determine the jurisdiction of these courts is placed not in the State Legislatures (though these Legislatures have by delegated authority, jurisdiction of this territory), but in the supreme judicial tribunal of the nation,—that is, in the Supreme Court of the United States.[263] This means that the Supreme Court “says what the law is.” This is the peculiar office of courts of law. This is another way of saying that the sovereign, the people of the United States, has delegated to the Supreme Court and to inferior courts of the United States not legislative or executive but judicial powers. The courts of law exercise judicial powers as the President exercises executive and the Congress exercises legislative powers,—in order to accomplish the purposes set forth in the Preamble of the Constitution. The courts are empowered to accomplish this purpose only in a judicial way.

105. The inferior courts, established by Congress, have such jurisdiction as Congress in its wisdom sees fit to give them save that the jurisdiction belonging to the Supreme Court cannot be given to an inferior court; there can be but one Supreme Court. The relation of the State courts to the courts of the United States is partly determined by the Constitution, partly by act of Congress. The circumstances under which a case in or from a State court may be transferred, or appealed, to a federal court are various, but the essential reason for such transfer is that the jurisdiction of the United States as defined by the Constitution, a treaty, or an act of Congress, is involved. A case or controversy not involving that jurisdiction cannot arise in any federal court. The possible relations of the Constitution, treaties, and acts of Congress to individuals (persons natural), to corporations (persons artificial, as private corporations), and to States (public corporations), are beyond calculation. The line of demarcation between the jurisdiction of State courts and that of federal courts cannot be fixed by any brief definition or survey. In some instances the jurisdiction is a matter of choice by parties, the court that first takes jurisdiction having it, as it were, by first instance, but in such cases there exists by law a concurrent jurisdiction, judicial procedure being open to parties in either the State or the federal court. In practice, a court restricts itself to its own jurisdiction.

106. It has been said that one test of demarcation between the two jurisdictions is the common law; that each State has the common law but the United States has statute law only. This difference (if true) would restrict federal courts to an exercise of judicial power delegated by the Constitution and set forth in laws made by its authority, while the State courts would administer justice in accord with the law of the States which are both common law and statutory. It must be remembered, however, that federal courts sit in the several States and administer whatsoever law is the local (State) law, taking judicial notice of State statutes, of decisions of State courts, of usages, of the common law as existing in the State, and, therefore, exercising a jurisdiction essentially the same as the State courts. Emphasis may well be placed on the custom of federal courts to follow closely the decisions of

State courts,—the result being that State decisions become final in federal courts as do federal decisions in State courts. But the States cannot increase or diminish the jurisdiction of federal courts, nor can Congress increase or diminish the jurisdiction of State courts. Although both courts may have jurisdiction in certain cases, collisions of authority are prevented by good sense and comity among State and federal judges.

107. The essential power of any federal court is to exercise federal judicial jurisdiction. This means, practically, that a federal court does not and cannot exercise State powers. The converse also is true: no State court can exercise federal powers, unless granted those powers by the Constitution, a treaty, or an act of Congress; but a State court exercising any federal powers, is thereby a federal court. The Constitution provides that the judges in every State shall be bound by the supreme law of the land, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. This solemn oath of State judges to support the Constitution as the supreme law gives them jurisdiction “to say what the law is,”[264] and howsoever rarely they may exercise the power vested in them to do so, State judges may take judicial notice of any law, State or federal, as harmonizing or conflicting with the Constitution; this means that a State court may pronounce an act of Congress unconstitutional, but the decision of that court is not final: there is but one Supreme Court of the United States.[265]

108. Territorial courts are to be distinguished from courts of the United States. They are not federal courts as are the Supreme Court and the inferior courts, namely, the Circuit Courts, the District Courts, or the Court of Claims. Neither are they State courts.

The Constitution being made only for the people of the United States,—that is, for the people of the United States inhabiting States,[266] does not apply or extend to the territories unless extended by act of Congress. The courts in a territory are created by Congress and have such powers (or jurisdiction) as the act creating them provides. But in creating them, Congress is limited by the Constitution.[267] Congress also creates courts martial, but the jurisdiction of these courts is always subject to inquiry by civil courts. Fundamentally, the reason here is the supremacy of the civil over the military authority in the American system of government.

109. A problem not infrequently arising in courts of law is the solution of some political question involved. All political questions are questions for the political department of the government to settle; they lie wholly outside of the jurisdiction of the courts. Thus the courts never decide as to the wisdom or folly of an executive or legislative act,—and in one form or another, every act of Congress or President is politically wise or unwise according to the political belief of the critic. Nor do the debates over an act fix the meaning of the act, with the court. Where the court was asked to refer to the

debates in Congress to determine the meaning of the act, it was said:

All that can be determined from the debates and reports is that various members had various views, and we are left to determine the meaning of this act, as we determine the meaning of other acts, from the language used therein. There is, too, a general acquiescence in the doctrine that debates in Congress are not appropriate sources of information from which to discover the meaning of the language of a statute passed by that body.[268]

The reason, [continues the court], is that it is impossible to determine with certainty what construction was put upon an act by the members of a legislative body that passed it by resorting to the speeches of individual members thereof. Those who did not speak may not have agreed with those who did, and those who spoke might differ from each other, the result being that the only proper way to construe a legislative act is from the language used in the act, and, upon occasion, by a resort to the history of the times when it passed.

110. In 1828 the Supreme Court sustained as a constitutional exercise of the war power the right of the United States to acquire territory by conquest or treaty.[269] The issue in the case was “the relation in which Florida (at the time a Territory) stands to the United States.” It was an issue in law, not in politics. Whether A or B is the lawful governor of a State is an issue, when legally drawn, for the State courts; but whether a community calling itself a State, is a member of the Union, or should be admitted into it, under the Fourth Article of the Constitution is a political question and is for Congress to decide.

It rests with Congress to decide what government is the established one in a State. For as the United States guarantees to each State a republican form of government, Congress must necessarily decide what government is established in the State before it can determine whether it is republican or not. And when the senators and representatives of a State are admitted into the councils of the Union, the authority of the government under which they are appointed, as well as its republican character, is recognized by the proper constitutional authority. And its decision is binding on every other department of the government, and could not be questioned in a judicial tribunal.[270]

The right to decide such a political question is in Congress and not in the courts.[271]

111. The final authority of American courts of law to construe statutes and constitutions is distinctive. The court pronounces a law unconstitutional and thus expounds the constitution. “This results,” says Cooley, “from the nature of its jurisdiction.” Chief Justice Marshall, in 1803, first applied this principle in a Federal court:

The Government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws and not of men.

The Constitution is the supreme law of the land.

It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.[272]

In these words is stated the essential doctrine of judicial supremacy. As the doctrine is fundamental, the reason for it is essential to a proper understanding of its vast import:

That the people have an original right to establish for their future government such principles as in their opinion shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis on which the whole American fabric has been erected. The exercise of this original right is a very great exertion; nor can it, nor ought it to be frequently repeated. The principles, therefore, so established are deemed fundamental. And as the authority from which they proceed is supreme, and can seldom act, they are designed to be permanent. This original and supreme will organizes the government, and assigns to different departments their respective powers. It may either stop here or establish certain limits not to be transcended by those departments.... It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the Constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it; or that the Legislature may alter the Constitution by an ordinary act. Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The Constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts and, like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it. If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the Constitution is not law; if the latter part be true, then written constitutions are absurd attempts on the part of the people to limit a power in its own nature illimitable. Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming a fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the Legislature repugnant to the constitution is void.... It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each. So, if a law be in opposition to the Constitution, if both the law and the Constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide the case conformably to the law disregarding the Constitution, or conformably to the Constitution disregarding the law, the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.... Those, then, who controvert the principle that the Constitution is to be considered in court as a paramount law,

are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the Constitution, and see only the law. This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions. It would declare that an act, which according to the principles and theory of our government is entirely void, is yet in practice completely obligatory.... It would be giving the Legislature a practical and real omnipotence with the same breath which professes to restrict their powers within narrow limits. That it thus reduces to nothing what we have deemed the greatest improvement on political institutions,—a written constitution,—would of itself be sufficient, in America, where written constitutions have been viewed with so much reverence, for rejecting the construction. But the peculiar expressions of the Constitution of the United States furnish additional arguments in favor of its rejection.[273]

The conclusion of the whole matter is:

Thus the particular phraseology of the Constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.[274]

112. The federal (or the State) judiciary, while final judge of what the law is, is not the judge of what the law should be: such action would be a violation of judicial functions and an assumption of legislative functions.[275] The court in saying what the law is, that is, what it means, does not attempt to say what the law should be, that is, to make the law. Therefore it is perilous, as likely to embarrass the court, for the court to be subject to the call of the executive, or the legislative, to give an opinion “upon important questions of law, and upon solemn occasions.”[276] The peril lies in possible confusion of governmental functions, or, to use the constitutional term, “offices.” The American people have delegated judicial power to the courts: the people of the several States to their State courts; the people of the United States, to the federal courts; and “it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”

113. This province the American judiciary occupies, this duty it performs, with the result that it holds a unique place in political history. At no other time, among no other people, in no other form of government has the judiciary executed the office it executes in the American system of government.

It is the consciousness of the American people that law must rest upon justice and reason, that the constitution is a more ultimate formulation of the fundamental principles of justice and reason than mere legislative acts, and that the judiciary is a better interpreter of these fundamental principles than the Legislature,—it is this consciousness which has given such

authority to the interpretation of the Constitution by the Supreme Court.[277]

Yet,—so remarks the Supreme Court itself,—

The slightest consideration of the nature, the character, the organization, and the powers of (federal) courts will dispel any fear of serious injury to the government at their hands. While by the Constitution the judicial department is recognized as one of the three great branches among which all the powers and functions of the government are distributed, it is inherently the weakest of them all. Dependent as its courts are for the enforcement of their judgments upon officers appointed by the executive and removable at pleasure, with no patronage and no control of the purse or the sword, their power and influence rest solely upon the public sense of the necessity for the existence of a tribunal to which all may appeal for the assertion and protection of rights guaranteed by the Constitution and by the laws of the land, and on the confidence reposed in the soundness of their decisions and the purity of their motives.[278]

114. To the question, “What is constitutional law in the United States?” the answer is, “Law as interpreted by the Supreme Court.” In other countries, and, generally speaking, in all countries at all times, until the institution of the political system of the United States,—the American system of government,—the supreme law of the land was the will of the executive (as in absolute monarchies), or the supreme will of the legislative (as in Great Britain). So long as the Supreme Court of the United States retains the confidence of the American people, the decisions of that Court will remain the authoritative exposition of American constitutional law.

It follows that the normal execution of the judicial office in America determines the meaning of American constitutional law; or stated in other words, in the decisions of the Supreme Court there are found the formulation of the principles on which law in America is founded, and the application of these principles in testing, as issues arise, the acts of the legislative and the services of the administrative. Therefore it is to the interpretation thus given by the judiciary that we turn for an understanding of the exercise of offices,—legislative, executive, or judicial, delegated as powers by the sovereign, the people of the United States. Whatsoever is done, by either (so-called) department of government in conformity with this delegation of powers is constitutional; and whatsoever is done by either department in conflict with this delegation of powers is unconstitutional. Whether constitutional or unconstitutional it is the exalted and unique office of the Supreme Court to determine. This Court therefore touches American life at every point. Exhaustive examination of its interpretation principles, laws, judicial decisions, arguments of counsel, opinions of experts, writings of jurists, and the history of society,—and such examination alone, answers the question, “What is

constitutional law in America?”

In attempting, then, to summarize, the essentials of American constitutional law, it is from the decisions of the Supreme Court, as from no other source, one must derive any authoritative interpretation.

115. The three departments of government are distinct.

The legislative shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative or judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the executive or legislative powers, or either of them; to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.[279]

This principle of separation of powers, or offices, of government, is, for many purposes, not merely fundamental, but primary, in American constitutional law. A department of government can execute only the offices, or powers, delegated to it,[280] but the Legislature cannot impose other than judicial duties upon courts of law, or judicial duties upon other than the judiciary.[281]

It follows from this principle that acts done by the legislative, or the judiciary, or the executive, in due course,—that is, according to rules of procedure and in the mode required by law, are official acts and are to be accredited as such.[282] Thus laws which appear on the face of them to be attested by the proper officials of the two Houses, duly signed by the Executive (or, passed over his vote as provided by the Constitution), and published by the official authorized to publish them are legislative acts, (laws) in a constitutional sense. So the records of courts of law made and kept in due procedure, and officially authenticated, are judicial records in a constitutional sense.

116. The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is co-extensive with the judicial power delegated by the Constitution.[283] Congress has power to give the inferior courts of the United States “original jurisdiction in any case to which the appellate jurisdiction extends.”[284]

In all cases in which the Constitution, or a treaty, or an act of Congress is involved, the United States through some one of its courts has jurisdiction.[285]

The exemption of an ambassador, public minister, or consul from suits in particular courts “is the privilege, not of the person who happens to fill the office, but of the State or government he represents.”[286] Consuls are oftentimes citizens, not aliens; any exemptions or privileges claimed by such a person accrue to him as consul being an alien, not as consul being also a citizen, of the United States.

The admiralty jurisdiction of the United States extends over all

water on which commerce is carried on between different States, or nations.[287] The principle of national commercial jurisdiction is essentially that of national political jurisdiction, a jurisdiction thus declared:

We hold it to be an incontrovertible principle that the Government of the United States may, by means of physical force, exercised through its official agents, execute on every foot of American soil the powers and functions that belong to it. This necessarily involves the power to command obedience to its laws....[288]

It is a fundamental of our constitutional law that no suit can be maintained against the United States, in any court, without express authority of Congress; and the United States cannot be sued in the courts of any State in any case.[289] It is the sovereign right of the United States not to be sued. To the extent that a State is sovereign it has the same right, and "These States are constituent parts of the United States. They are members of one great empire—for some purposes sovereign, for some purposes subordinate." [290] The physical boundaries of a State, constituting a political, not a judicial question, must be determined by legislative authority, yet if the United States is a party to a case involving the issue of territorial boundary, the case falls within the judicial power,—that is, within the jurisdiction of the courts of the Union.

The States of the Union have agreed in the Constitution that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to all cases arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, without regard to the character of the parties (excluding of course, suits against a State by its own citizens, or by citizens or subjects of foreign states), and equally to controversies to which the United States shall be a party, without regard to the subject of such controversies, and that (the Supreme Court) may exercise original jurisdiction in all such cases [in which a State shall be a party] without excluding those in which the United States may be the opposite party.[291]

In other words, the United States possesses adequate governmental authority and jurisdiction to secure the large purposes outlined in the Preamble to the Constitution. The United States has judicial jurisdiction in all cases arising under the Constitution, the laws and the treaties of the United States "whoever may be the parties." [292] This principle is of far-reaching effect; no party can be exempt.

117. A corporation created by a State is a citizen of that State for many purposes, but cannot be a citizen of another State because created by the former State. Outside of the State of its creation it is a foreign corporation and possesses only such privileges as are granted to it. This means that rights, privileges, judgments accruing to or possessed by a corporation, say created by Pennsylvania and in Pennsylvania, do not accrue to and are not possessed by that

corporation, say in Ohio, unless conferred by Ohio and possessed by the corporation within Ohio, under laws of Ohio, and by decision of Ohio courts. The principle here is the familiar one of jurisdiction. No State has power beyond its own jurisdiction and “the courts of no country execute the penal laws of another.”[293]

The suability of a State involves its sovereignty and its honor and good faith. The constitutional law of America is that a State in the Union cannot be compelled to perform its contracts, although attempts on its part to avoid them may be judicially resisted, and State laws impairing the obligation of contracts are void. Yet the legislative department of a State represents its polity and its will and by every principle of justice is called upon to hold public obligations inviolate.

Any departure from this rule, except for reasons most cogent (of which the Legislature and not the courts, is the judge) never fails in the end to incur the odium of the world, and to bring lasting injury upon the State itself. But to deprive the Legislature of the power of judging what the honor and safety of the State may require, even at the expense of a temporary failure to discharge the public debts, would be attended with greater evils than such failure can cause.[294]

118. The judicial power of the United States extends, under the Constitution to controversies between _citizens of different States_ and the Judiciary Act confers jurisdiction strictly within the meaning of the term.[295]

States, as the word is used in the Constitution, means only members of the Union; a Territory is not a State; the citizen of a Territory is not a citizen of a State and any controversy at law which he may have with another person is not “a controversy between citizens of different States,” and therefore does not come within the judicial jurisdiction of the United States. Of course the limitation applies to artificial persons,—corporations created by a State.

A corporation is not a citizen of the State and it cannot maintain a suit in a court of the United States against the citizen of a different State from that by which it was chartered, unless the persons who compose the corporate body are all citizens of that State.[296]

The jurisdiction of American courts is co-extensive with the power that creates them. Thus the jurisdiction of federal courts depends in no way upon the State, and State judges “possess an absolute independence of the United States.”

The Constitution has proceeded upon a theory of its own, and given or withheld powers according to the judgment of the American people, by whom it was adopted. We (_i. e._ the Supreme Court)

can only construe its powers, and cannot inquire into the policy or principles which induced the grant of them. The Constitution has presumed (whether rightly or wrongly we do not inquire) that State attachments, State prejudices, State jealousies, and State interests, might sometimes obstruct, or control, or be supposed to obstruct or control, the regular administration of justice. Hence, in controversies between States; between citizens of different States; between citizens claiming grants under different States; between a State and its citizens, or foreigners, and between citizens and foreigners, it enables the parties, under the authority of Congress, to have the controversies heard, tried, and determined before the national tribunals. No other reason than that which has been stated can be assigned, why some, at least, of these cases should not have been left to the cognizance of the State courts. In respect to the other enumerated cases—the cases arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, cases affecting ambassadors and other public ministers, and cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction—reasons of a higher and more extensive nature, touching the safety, peace, and sovereignty of the nation, might well justify a grant of exclusive legislation.[297]

From the principle here given it may be deduced that cases or controversies in State courts are removable from them into federal courts if the case or controversy involves the Constitution, a treaty or an act of Congress.[298]

But a prisoner in custody under the authority of a State should not, except in a case of peculiar urgency, be discharged by a court or judge of the United States upon a writ of *_habeas corpus_*, in advance of any proceedings in the courts of the State to test the validity of his arrest or detention.[299]

119. A federal court sitting within a State is a court of that State within the meaning of the Constitution and laws of the Union, “and as such, has an equal right with the State courts to fix the construction of the local law.”[300] A State tribunal’s decision must conform to that of the Supreme Court of the United States, but a federal court sitting within a State follows the highest State tribunal unless the decision of that tribunal has been set aside by the Supreme Court. Such procedure “tends to preserve harmony in the exercise of the judicial power, in the State and federal tribunals.” This means that the statute law of a State,—and a fixed and received construction by a State in its own courts, makes a part of the statute law,—is accepted by the federal courts sitting in the State. But the federal court there is not bound to follow such State precedents and authorities; the court possesses a jurisdiction independent of that conferred by State authority.[301] Thus it may be stated as accepted American constitutional law that where there are two co-ordinate jurisdictions, and especially “with regard to the law of real estate and the construction of State constitutions and statutes” and where are concerned “the doctrines of

commercial law and general jurisprudence” the federal courts sitting in a State exercise their own judgment, “but even in such cases, for the sake of harmony and to avoid confusion, the federal courts will lean towards an agreement of views with the State courts, if the question seems to them balanced with doubt.”[302]

To the extent that a federal court sitting within a State follows State laws and decisions, to that extent is there a common law of the United States. There is, however, no national common or customary law of the United States; its law is statutory. But the interpretation of the Constitution by the judicial power of the United States

is necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions are framed in the language of the English common law, and are to be read in the light of its history. The code of constitutional and statutory construction which, therefore, is gradually formed by the judgments of (the Supreme) Court, in the application of the Constitution and the laws and treaties made in pursuance thereof, has for its basis so much of the common law as may be implied in the subject, and constitutes a common law resting on national authority.[303]

NOTE: For an account of acts of Congress declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court see *_The Supreme Court and Unconstitutional Legislation_*, B. F. Moore, Columbia University Studies, vol. liv., No. 2, 1913.

FOOTNOTES:

[243] Art. iii., 1: 1.

[244] For the history of this amendment see the author's *_Constitutional History of the United States_*, ii., 264–290.

[245] See Iredell's dissenting opinion in *Chisholm v. Georgia*, 2 Dallas 419 (1793).

[246] *_The Federalist_*, No. xvi.

[247] Art. iii., 2: 1; Amendment XI.

[248] No. lxxx.

[249] *_In re Neagle_*, 135 U.S., 1 (1889).

[250] *_The Federalist_*, No. lxxx.

[251] *_Id._* For example, were the Vice-President to preside over the Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment.

[252] *The Federalist*, *id.*

[253] *The Federalist*, *id.*

[254] *Robertson v. Cease*, 97 U. S., 646.

[255] Art. iii., 2: 2.

[256] *Marbury v. Madison*, 1 Cranch, 174.

[257] *Cohens v. Virginia*, 6 Wheaton, 414 (1821).

[258] *Idem.*

[259] So Congress has denied such jurisdiction to State courts,—Revised Statutes, U. S., Sec. 687.

[260] *Davis v. Packard*, 7 Peters, 276; *Börs v. Preston*, in U. S., 252 (1884).

[261] *Cohens v. Virginia*, *supra*.

[262] This power has been discussed in the preceding Chapters on Sovereignty, Legislation, Commerce, Taxation, Contracts, etc. See index.

[263] *Bank of Commerce v. New York City*, 2 Black, 620 (1862).

[264] *Marbury v. Madison*, 1 Cranch, 137 (1803).

[265] The relation of the United States to the State judiciary; the subject of concurrent (State and federal) judicial jurisdiction, is examined by Hamilton in *The Federalist*, Nos. lxxviii-lxxxiii. See also *Martin v. Hunter's Lessee*, 1 Wheaton, 304 (1816).

[266] *Hepburn v. Ellzey*, 2 Cranch, 445 (1805).

[267] Art. iii.

[268] *United States v. Freight Association*, 166 U. S., 290, citing many cases.

[269] *American Insurance Company v. Cantor*, 1 Peters, 542.

[270] *Luther v. Borden*, 7 Howard, 1 (1848).

[271] The whole subject of the American judiciary is largely technical and can be known only through intimate knowledge of the *Reports*, of the *Statutes at Large*, and familiarity with *practice*. In the present chapter the *essentials* of the law of judicial procedure are the immediate subject.

[272] *Marbury, _v._ Madison*, 1 Cranch, 163.

[273] *Marbury _v._ Madison*, 1 Cranch, 176–180.

[274] All of Marshall's decisions rest on the principle, thus set forth, and it remains fundamental in America, applying alike in the States and in the United States.

[275] The principle is examined in *State _ex rel._ _v._ Stone*, 120 Missouri, 428 (1894). Also in *Luther _v._ Borden*, 7 Howard, 1 (1848).

[276] See Constitution of Massachusetts, Judiciary, III.

[277] *_Political Science and Constitutional Law_*, J. W. Burgess, ii., 365; “I do not hesitate to call the governmental system of the United States the aristocracy of the robe; and I do not hesitate to pronounce this the truest aristocracy for the purposes of government which the world has yet produced.” *_Id._*

[278] *United States _v._ Lee*, 106 U. S., 196 (1882).

[279] *Case of Supervisors of Elections*, 114 Mass., 247 (1873); the quotation (in the decision) is from the Constitution of Massachusetts, 1780, Part I, xxx. “The Government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men.” *Marbury _v._ Madison*, 1 Cranch, 163.

[280] *State _ex rel._ _v._ Simons*, 32 Minn., 540 (1884). *_Ex parte_ Griffiths*, 118 Indiana, 83 (1889).

[281] *_Idem._*

[282] *Harwood _v._ Wentforth*, 162 U. S., 547 (1896).

[283] *Osborn _v._ Bank of the United States*, 9 Wheaton, 738 (1824).

[284] *Osborn _v._ Bank of the United States*, 9 Wheaton, 738 (1824).

[285] Many cases; see *Southern Pacific Railroad Co. _v._ California*, 118 U. S., 109 (1866); *Beck _v._ Perkins*, 139 U. S., 628 (1891).

[286] *Börs _v._ Preston*, 111 U. S., 252. (1884).

[287] *The steamboat _Magnolia_*, 20 Howard, 296 (1857).

[288] *_Ex parte_ Siebold*, 100 U. S., 37 (1879). Thus canals are highways of commerce and subject to “regulation” by Congress. *The Robert W. Parsons*, 191 U. S., 17 (1903); *_Ex parte_ Boyer*, 109 U. S., 629 (1884).

[289] *Stanley _v._ Schwalby*, 162 U. S., 255 (1896), where the cases are

cited.

[290] *Cohens v. Virginia*, 6 Wheaton, 414 (1821).

[291] *United States v. Texas*, 143 U. S., 621 (1892). The doctrine also in *South Dakota v. North Dakota*, 192 U. S., 286 (1904).

[292] *Ames v. Kansas*, 111 U. S., 449 (1884); the “party” may be a State (including its corporate subdivisions), or a natural person (or persons), or an artificial person (a corporation).

[293] *Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co.*, 127 U. S., 265 (1888).

[294] *Hans v. Louisiana*, 134 U. S., 1 (1890). The history of the Eleventh Amendment includes the entire record as to suits against States. The principles involved may be found as discussed by Hamilton in *The Federalist*, No. lxxxix; by Marshall, Madison, Mason, and Henry, in the Virginia Ratifying Convention, 3 Elliott’s Debates; in Mr. Justice Iredell’s dissenting opinion in *Chisholm v. Georgia*, 2 Dallas, 419; and a special history of the Amendment in the author’s *Constitutional History of the United States*, ii., 264–293. The Eleventh Amendment overruled the decision in the *Chisholm* case. As to suits against a State by its own citizens see *Railroad Co. v. Tennessee*, 101 U. S., 337 (1879). The principle here is that the sovereign may assent to being sued by its own citizens,—an assent declared by the State constitution, but available by the citizen only according to acts of the Legislature. The privilege (if it exists) is statutory. But suit against an officer, or agent of the State,—or of the United States, is not barred if that officer exercises a ministerial function; such suit is not a suit against the sovereign (United States, or State). See *U. S. v. Lee*, 106 U. S., 196 (1882); *Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R. R. Co.*, 109 U. S., 446 (1883).

[295] Judiciary Act, 1789, 1888 (and so amended.)

[296] *The Ohio and Mississippi R. R. Co. v. Wheeler*, 1 Black, 286 (1861). *Hooe v. Jamieson*, 166 U. S., 395 (1897).

[297] *Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee*, 1 Wheaton, 304 (1816); opinion by Mr. Justice Story; this case remains the leading case on the appellate jurisdiction of federal courts. The appellate jurisdiction of the courts is discussed by Marshall in *Marbury v. Madison*: “The essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction is that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that cause,” *Ex parte*, *Watkins*, 7 Peters, 568 (1833).

[298] *Gaines v. Fuentes*, 92 U. S., 10 (1875). *Security Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Prewitt*, 202 U. S., 246 (1906).

[299] *Whitten v. Tomlinson*, 160 U. S., 231 (1895). But as to conflicting jurisdiction of State and federal courts see *Riggs v.*

Johnson County, 6 Wallace, 166 (1867).

[300] Green _v._ Neal's Lessee, 6 Peters, 291 (1832).

[301] _Idem._ The question is examined in Pana _v._ Bowler, 107 U. S., 529 (1882). Gelpoke _v._ City of Dubuque, 1 Wallace, 175 (1863).

[302] Burgess _v._ Seligman, 107 U. S., 20 (1883). Bucher _v._ Cheshire R. R. Co., 125 U. S., 555 (1888).

[303] Smith _v._ Alabama, 124 U. S., 465 (1888). Western Union Telegraph Company _v._ Call Publishing Company, 181 U. S., 92 (1901).



HOW TO REMEMBER FIGURES

The Project Gutenberg EBook of *Miller's Mind Training for Children, Book 2 of 3*, by William Emer Miller

A child soon comes to the necessity of remembering numbers. With some this is not difficult for they possess unusual powers of visualization and can see the numbers clearly in their mind's eye and thus recall them with ease. There are many examples of men and women who have this visual memory for figures. On the other hand only a very small proportion can do this.

It is a common failing among children, as well as adults, to be unable to remember numbers easily. The reason is simple. Numbers have no meaning, they convey no impression to the mind which can be retained.

Words convey the picture of objects, thoughts and actions which you can visualize. Numbers are cold, inanimate things which have no life nor interest, they do not present a picture and are not easily retained.

=Things that have no meaning are difficult to remember.=

The simple transference of the meaningless number into something of interest and within the child's knowledge and experience will be helpful. He will remember 15 apples easier than just the number 15. Numbers are easily dealt with when they become objects. You teach the child to add and subtract by the counting board, or by using a group of objects. Fractions are most easily explained by cutting an apple, or something which we can see.

A man had received a new auto license number and wondered how he could remember it, 218515. He knew the easiest way was to make it mean something. He thought that 21 was the age when a young man reaches his majority. If he lives to be 85 he will be an old man, and he might be

entirely destitute but for the 15c. So he had the figures 21-85-15.
After that he had no difficulty in recalling this number at any time.

Be original and make the figures mean something.

Familiar Numbers Helpful

Any number which has come to mean something to you is easily recalled and may be helpful in remembering other numbers. As 1492, the date of the discovery of America by Columbus. 57 immediately recalls "Heinz 57 varieties" and if you wish to remember 59 you can easily associate it as being two more than the 57. 1775 means something to you, it conveys a definite thought, but it is more likely that 1947 does not and will be quickly forgotten.

If you have lived in a house with the number 1947 for a good while you will remember it as easily as the number 1775.

Analyze Numbers

There are many helpful ideas which can be used to aid in remembering numbers. To divide the number into pairs of digits, keeping them below one hundred, is helpful. It is easier to remember 14-67 than 1,467.

Even numbers which are familiar to us are easily remembered as 10, 20, 30, 40, or 100, 200, 300, or 1000, 5000, 10,000. To compare other numbers with these familiar groups will help, as 29 is one less than 30, 996 is just four less than 1000.

Numbers having sequence of digits if noted carefully will be recalled accurately, as 1357 or 2468.

The telephone number 2430 is easily remembered because of the even numbers, 24 and 30. Also $2+4=6$ and $24+6=30$.

Sometimes the first digits added together make the other, as the license number 1247, the first three added make the fourth.

All these ideas are at times helpful, but we need a method which can be used any time, by any one, for any figures. This need is adequately met by the Number Code following. It is not new, but supposed to have originated among the Romans and has been used by almost every generation since that time. You find it easy to impress upon the brain any thing which has a meaning and which can be visualized.

Figures carry with them no associations, no images. It becomes necessary, therefore, to devise some means by which they may be photographed upon the brain in such a manner that they will mean something, as definitely as a word represents an object.

The Number Code

The simplest and most practical basis which can be selected is the idea of choosing a SOUND to represent each one of the ten digits. These sounds can in turn be indicated by various consonants of the alphabet. By combining the ten digits we are able to make all figures, and by similarly combining the SOUNDS we can easily convert the figures which we wish to remember into words. The words will represent objects and can easily be impressed upon the brain. Your use of this idea is based upon your becoming thoroughly familiar with the ten SOUNDS representing the ten digits.

By combining these sounds corresponding to the arrangement of the digits, words can be formed to represent the figure. The word can be remembered. It has a meaning. It can be visualized and recalled, then easily translated into the corresponding digits.

Here are the ten digits and their corresponding SOUNDS. The sounds are indicated by the letters. Use the sound as spoken in the word, as "T" in "Ten." The sound used is always the same as in the spoken word, but not as a single letter. Not the sound "en" as a letter, but the sound of "N" in "Nell." Note this difference; it is important. Following is the Number Code:

[Illustration: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
T N M R L J K F P C]

Note carefully this cut in which the digit and letter used to represent the sound is made into a combined figure. This places the digit and the corresponding sound into your mind together. The picture of the combination should be impressed by concentration. Look at the digit letter and then close your eyes and see the same picture in your mind's eye. Exaggerate them. Take a pencil and paper and draw them for yourself. Note that the second letter N if stood on its side is 2, in the picture it is half way, which will suggest both to your mind. The M and 3 are the same. Become familiar with these so that there is no possibility of hesitation in recalling the SOUND for each digit.

The T and 1 are simple. The 2 and N and the 3 and M have been explained. The 6 turned to the left makes a J. The K for 7 is made of two 7s back to back, one leaning against the other. The P for 9 is turned as the 6 and J. Dwell a moment on this picture and you will know the Code.

There are other associations which will help to fix the digits and their corresponding sounds in mind.

T is selected for 1 because both are made with one down stroke. One down stroke with a short cross stroke makes the T.

N, for 2 is the same, two down strokes make the N.

M represents the 3 and there are three down strokes in the written M.

R is the last letter and principal sound in the word four, which has four letters.

L is the Roman numeral representing 50, similar to 5.

F selected for 8 has the two loops, when written.

C is the first letter and sound of the word Cipher.

Acquaint Yourself With the Code

Work entirely by SOUND, remember it is the sound M in the word Make that has the value of 3, and if not =sounded= would have no value.

Become familiar with these ten digit sounds so that when you see a digit you can immediately recall the sound. Then practice sounding words and telling the number value of each SOUND in the word. Pay no attention to the letters; only the sounds have value.

The ten sounds alone will not form words, but will by adding the vowels A, E, I, O, U. The vowels have no figure value and can be used at any time and in any manner desired without altering the number value of the word. In the same manner we use the consonants W, H and Y. These have no figure value and with the vowels may be used to bind the digit sounds into words.

A, E, I, O, U and W, H, Y Are Valueless

For practice translate the following numerals into their corresponding sounds.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 3 6 5 8 3 2 8 0 5 3 6 8 7 4 2 8 5 1 7.

In the same manner translate the following letters into their corresponding digit value. Remember the vowels and W, H, Y have no figure value.

T N M R L J F P C E F H R K Y F R N L Y F W K N R T E O K L A Y E R P M
U N P L T H F Y E R O M I N K O U N L P T R N W M F.

Keep up this practice with both digits and letters until you can translate each without hesitation.

Forming Number Words

It is a simple matter to form a word for a figure by selecting the sounds which represent the digits and fill in vowels until the word is found.

14 is represented by the sounds T-R. Between the consonants T and R run the vowels a, e, i, o, u. Do this by sound and the result is TaR, TeaR, TiRe, ToR (tore), TuR (tour). In this way you have three or four words which will represent the number 14.

15 can be converted into TaiL, TiLe, TeLl, or TooL.

41 into the words RaT, RaTe, wRiTe, RooT, RuT.

91 into the words PaT, PeT, PiT, PoT, PuT.

Make yourself thoroughly familiar with the Number Code. Master the ten digit sounds and you have the foundation with which to work. This is not a difficult problem. Children learn without difficulty the 26 letters of the alphabet and their many combinations. In this case there are but ten to be mastered and many combinations to choose from. A little practice will work wonders in the ability to use this Code. Change the following words into their figure value:

PaN..... JaR..... NoTe.....
RaiN..... CoaL..... TaN.....
KiTe..... PiLe..... MoP.....
RaKe..... PoP..... JaiL.....
LaP..... TaNK..... PaiL.....
LeTTeR..... PiNK..... PeaR.....

Note the following translation of numbers into words. Do the last sets yourself, make others for practice in this idea:

38 M F MuFf.
92 P N PaN.
63 J M JaM.
142 T R N TuRN.
315 M T L
415
912
951
421

Add the necessary vowels to make these into words:

82 F N 921 P N T 327 M N K
21 N T 627 J N K 9521 P L N T
48 R F 295 N P P L 91420 P T R N S

Make complete words for the following:

29..... 97..... 57.....
 470..... 742..... 515.....

Additional Letters

The simplicity and ease with which you will be able to use this idea can be increased by noting that there are certain letters which have practically the same sound as those selected to represent the digits. Yet these sounds are entirely different from any other digit sound. You can greatly increase the list of words which you can make for certain numbers by taking advantage of this idea. This is a very helpful suggestion; note it carefully.

All letters having the same sound stand for the same digit value:

D and T are similar in sound and therefore either can be used to represent the digit 1.

G as in George (known as soft G) has the same sound as J, therefore soft G also represents 6.

Sh as in Shot, and Ch as in Chain are similar to J in sound so Sh or Ch represent 6.

C as in Can, hard C, has the sound of K and is 7.

G as in Gag, is the same as K and also is valued as 7. K, hard C or hard G are all used for 7.

V has the sound of F, and either may be used for 8.

B has the sound of P and is 9.

S as in Sauce, and Z are sounded as C (soft) so that either C, S or Z can be used for 0.

The Complete Code

[Illustration:

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
 T N M R L J K F P C
 D G G V B S
 CH C Z
 SH
]

Letters and Sounds Seldom Used

The following are sometimes used and from their SOUND have digit value and should be noted for completeness:

Q sounds similar to K and is 7.

X is pronounced EKS, has the KS sound and is 70.

Hard Ch as in ACHE has the K sound and is 7.

Gh and Ph as in Cough and Phone have the F sound and are 8.

By using the suffix ING to represent 7, which is an arbitrary exception to fill a need, you can get a great deal of help in forming words for difficult numbers which end in 7, as 447 RoaRING, 117 DoTING, 577 LackING, 397 MoPING.

Silent Letters Have No Figure Value

In addition to a, e, i, o, u, and w, h, and y, which have no figure value, all silent letters have none, because they are not SOUNDED. SOUND is the one and only indicator of digit value.

NIGHT is 21 for the GH is silent.

KNIFE is 28 for the K is silent.

MADGE is 36 for the D is silent.

Double Letters Are Sounded as One

Because they have but the one letter SOUND they have but the single digit value. This is merely another fact which is unalterable, because the basis of the Code is sound.

HUMMER has the sound of HUMER and is 34.

BITTER has the sound of BITER and is 914.

SPARROW has the sound of SPARO and is 094.

BILL has the sound of BIL and is 95.

The important thing to keep in mind in the use of this Code is the fact that all is based upon SOUND. Silent letters and double letters are treated as they are, simply because of the SOUND basis. There are many exceptions to the number value of the letters but none to the number value of the sounds of the word.

The word NATION is a good example. NATION is 262. In this case the T as a letter would represent 1, but as a SOUND it is "SH" and is 6. C is 6 in OCEAN.

Number Value of Code Words

You now need to have a series of words, the figure value of which you are thoroughly familiar with, to use as a basis for quickly forming word pictures for numbers which are given you to remember. A list of words representing the number 1 to 100 would be of the greatest value to you. These words you would be familiar with and as soon as any number of two digits was mentioned a word-picture of this value would come into your mind. The word-picture you could easily retain in mind, the number you could not.

Take for example the number 1. This is represented by either T or D. For this illustration we select the T. Now in order to make a word which you can visualize you use the vowels or the extra consonants W, H or Y. From these we can make a word for 1.

Let us take the T and the vowels I, E, which have no value, and we have the word TIE, which has the value of 1. Many other words could have been made which would have the same number value as Hut, Hat, Head, Hood, Weed, Wheat, Tea, Toe, Dew, Dye.

SNOW is 2; the S, O and W have no value, leaving the N for 2.

HOME is 3; H, O and E have no value, leaving the M for 3.

WIRE is 4; W, I and E have no value, leaving the R for 4.

WHEEL is 5; W, H, EE have no value, leaving the L for 5.

SASH is 6; S, A have no value, leaving the Sh for 6.

EGG is 7; E has no value, GG has but one sound and is 7.

IVY is 8; I and Y have no value and V is 8.

WHIP is 9; W, H and I have no value, leaving P for 9.

TOES is 10; O and E have no value and T and S are 1-0.

By the use of the Number Code each of the words selected for the Child's Code List has a number value running consecutively from Tie which is 1 to Daisies, which is 100. Each word stands for its corresponding number always; by sound they are interchangeable with the number at any time for any purpose.

Figure out, by the Number Code, the value of each word of the Code List as given here, in disorganized form, and write it opposite the word.

Tie..... Lair..... Nail..... Veil.....
Dime..... Judge..... Roach..... Bomb.....
Sash..... Lap..... Movie..... Cook.....
Taffy..... Meat..... Mouse..... Beehive....
Lady..... Enemy..... Bath..... Puss.....
Jam..... Rower..... Foam..... Home.....
Ledge..... Mush..... Glue..... Towel.....
Chief..... Knife..... Beach..... Ivy.....
Dot..... Robe..... Fife..... Nose.....
Horn..... Foot..... Office..... Limb.....

Hammer..... Gum..... Town..... Jail.....
 Hinge..... Pear..... Wheel..... Wolf.....
 Rock..... Fish..... Duck..... Goose.....
 Mop..... Coffee..... Toes..... Moon.....
 Kite..... Papa..... Ocean..... Nero.....
 Pony..... Snow..... Lily..... Roll.....
 Fur..... Deer..... Chalk..... Mike.....
 Cage..... Egg..... Ashes..... Knob.....
 Book..... Tub..... Nun..... Lasso.....
 Fob..... Lion..... Army..... Vine.....
 Net..... Chair..... Mail..... Car.....
 Wire..... Log..... Ink..... Pail.....
 Dish..... Ship..... Roof..... Fig.....
 Whip..... Heart..... Rose..... Cap.....
 Shed..... Mama..... Cane..... Daisies....

After you have worked out the number value of each of the Code Words, turn back to them on page 80 and check them there, noting how each follows in proper sequence by number value.

The Game of Number Code

After becoming familiar with the values of the number Code, the Game Code, given on page 42, can be very much improved in its complexity, and consequently, in its resulting mental development.

[Illustration: Front]

[Illustration: Back]

Have the one hundred words on one side of the card and the corresponding numbers from one to one hundred on the reverse side as illustrated. Deal all the cards, have no draw pile. All cards in the hand and in reserve piles on the table are to be with the words up and the numbers down. Start by playing the cards into the middle of the table with the numbers up, beginning with cards which bear numbers ending in 1. The next card is played word up upon the pile; then, if no one calls "Code," turn the card over and if it should be that this card does not bear the following consecutive number the card must be replaced in the player's hand and the player ceases with no penalty. If, when the word is played, some other player, who knows by the number value of the word that it is an error, calls "Code" before the card is turned over, then, if correct, he is entitled to give the player a card from his hand. The game is played and scored as in Code, but has the added value of requiring the players to know the number value of all the words.

The Number Game

This game will assist in learning the number value of the words and the word for each number. Shuffle the cards from the Code Games, have one person hold these cards out of sight of the players. The reader turns all cards with the words up and reads the word on the top card. The first one to tell the proper number value of the word gets the card. In this way go through the entire pack, each person retaining the cards which he obtains by first speaking the number. The one holding the most cards at the end of the game is the reader for the next game.

The same game may be played by reading the numbers and seeing who can first speak the Code Word.

The Game of Solitaire

If you wish to practice alone, take the Code cards and shuffle with the words up, noting the time when you begin. See how quickly you can go through the entire set, naming the numbers for the words. Then reverse the process and name the words for the numbers.

Now try it again and see if you can cut a few seconds off the time. Keep a record of the time required to go each way and strive continuously to reduce it. Keep at this until you can go through the 100 cards in two and a half minutes or less.

Another Game of Solitaire

Take the Code cards and shuffle them thoroughly then arrange them in their consecutive order, beginning with Tie and following with each word in its proper place. For another test start ten rows of cards upon the table, each starting with a Code word ending in one, as Tie, Dot, Net, Meat, Heart, etc. Now follow each card with the next word in its list, placing the cards in their proper lists as you come to them. This will help you to become acquainted with the words in their proper order and to become familiar with them.

The above exercises will increase in interest if you consider them from the number value. Shuffle the set and arrange them in consecutive order, thinking of the number value of the word, but not referring to the number on the back of the card unless forced to do so. The second test will be arranging them in sets of ten, beginning with 1, 11, 21, 31, 41, etc.

Shuffle the cards again and arrange them in the following order, always using the words but figuring their number value for your guide in the arrangement. Arrange them in horizontal lines thus:

1-11-21-31-41-51-61-71-81-91
2-12-22-32-42-52-62-72-82-92
3-13-23-33-43-53-63-73-83-93

4-14-24-34-44-54-64-74-84-94
5-15-25-35-45-55-65-75-85-95
6-16-26-36-46-56-66-76-86-96
7-17-27-37-47-57-67-77-87-97

Follow through the set in the same manner. After you have completed any of these tests, reverse it and do the same, beginning with the larger numbers and working back to the smaller ones.

Vary these exercises in as many ways as you can and keep track of how long it takes you to do a certain test, then do it again and see how much you can reduce the time required. For a guide in these tests the Code List is printed here with each corresponding number value.

Code Words and Number Values

1-Tie 11-Dot 21-Net 31-Meat 41-Heart
2-Snow 12-Town 22-Nun 32-Moon 42-Horn
3-Home 13-Dime 23-Enemy 33-Mama 43-Army
4-Wire 14-Deer 24-Nero 34-Hammer 44-Rower
5-Wheel 15-Towel 25-Nail 35-Mail 45-Roll
6-Sash 16-Dish 26-Hinge 36-Mush 46-Roach
7-Egg 17-Duck 27-Ink 37-Mike 47-Rock
8-Ivy 18-Taffy 28-Knife 38-Movie 48-Roof
9-Whip 19-Tub 29-Knob 39-Mop 49-Rope
10-Toes 20-Nose 30-Mouse 40-Rose 50-Lasso

51-Lady 61-Shed 71-Kite 81-Foot 91-Bath
52-Lion 62-Ocean 72-Cane 82-Vine 92-Pony
53-Limb 63-Jam 73-Gum 83-Foam 93-Bomb
54-Lair 64-Chair 74-Car 84-Fur 94-Bear
55-Lily 65-Jail 75-Glue 85-Veil 95-Pail
56-Ledge 66-Judge 76-Cage 86-Fish 96-Beach
57-Log 67-Chalk 77-Cook 87-Fig 97-Book
58-Wolf 68-Chief 78-Coffee 88-Fife 98-Beehive
59-Lap 69-Ship 79-Cap 89-Fob 99-Papa
60-Ashes 70-Goose 80-Office 90-Puss 100-Daisies

After you have become familiar with the number values of the Code words it will guide you in case of any doubt as to the sequence of any words. If you should be in doubt as to whether Chief or Ship comes first you can prove the point by referring to the number value; Chief is 68 and Ship is 69, therefore the sequence is correct.

All Hitching Posts Numbered

Note that when you have the Number Code to work with that each Hitching Post has a corresponding number so that each item in your list is numbered. For purposes of filing information this is very helpful. You

think of the Hitching Posts now as 1-2-3-4-5-etc. The word is simply an interchangeable object with a fixed value and 1 automatically becomes Tie in the picture. And when it appears in the picture it means 1. So on with all other numbers and words under one hundred. For use as Hitching Posts each list of ten in the list can be used as having the 1 to 10 value by dropping the first digit, as Net (2)1, Nun (2)2, Enemy (2)3, Nero (2)4, etc.

In working with the Code bear in mind every moment that the word is synonymous with the number. The number stands for the word and the word for the number, they never change. They mean now and always the same thing. Each stands for the other. This statement can not be made too strong. Neither can you be urged too strongly to practice with your children in the use of it. Become so familiar with it that when you hear the sound T it immediately means 1 and so on through the entire list. Words now have an added significance; for this purpose they have become and from this time they will be NUMBERS, as well as WORDS.

Always keep in mind that SOUND determines the number value of the word regardless of how it is spelled.

Forming Larger Number Words

In order to form words for larger numbers first become familiar with the figure value of the one hundred code words. These will often combine to form the larger number pictures. For example:

695 Sash--Pail
1291 Town--Bat
2499 Nero--Papa
8240 Vine--Rose

A combination picture of Nero and Papa would represent 2499. The danger of transposing the figures by recalling the picture as Papa--Nero 9924 instead of 2499, can be avoided by having the first object much larger than the second. In the case of 2499 picture Nero larger than Papa, or see Nero above Papa, or in front or preceding Papa. Adopt one of these methods and use it.

After a little practice you will often form one word for a number instead of combining the Code words. The beginner would represent 1210 by the Code words Town--Toes. Later he will recognize 1210 as the sounds T-N-T-S. Combining these sounds the word TENTS will suggest itself.

If 1210 were a phone number and you made a clear picture association of Tents with the Person or Place you would have no difficulty in recalling the number.

Already you have an object representing the figures from 1 to 100,

but very often you will wish to use figures far in excess of this. Any number in excess of 100 and below 10,000, or any number of three or four digits will be most easily handled by translating it into two words of the Number Code, or if you choose can be later worked into a single word. In the beginning you will find help by working in the following manner. Take the number 347. A combination of the Code words would be Home Rock, you could also use My Rock or Some Rock. Or you can make the numbers into a single word. Put down the figures thus:

3 4 7
M R K

Combining these letters with vowels you have the word MARK. Now take the number 994, the code combination for this number is Whip-Pear, or you could make the single word Paper.

The number 315 can be made into a single word. 315 is MoDeL. Translate the following into single words; refer to the Number Code, on page 72, when in doubt or in need of a suggestion. First, always sound the digits then let the sounds form into a word.

101.....	510.....	121.....
415.....	195.....	745.....
941.....	994.....	426.....
624.....	140.....	925.....
315.....	147.....	015.....
410.....	412.....	649.....
953.....	150.....	539.....
300.....	074.....	751.....
741.....	942.....	642.....
211.....	210.....	951.....

Further Practice in Word Forming

It is not always necessary to put a vowel between the code sounds. Some letters combine into words without vowels between, as--

CuRTaiN--7412 CLuTTeR--7514 FaRMING--8437
BRaND--9421 PReaCHeR--9464 SPeNT--0921
PLaNT--9521 BuRGLaR--94754 SiLKs--0570

Also note that some words begin with vowels: Envelope for 2859; Amber for 394.

If at first you cannot easily form words for all numbers, do not be discouraged. Practice will give you most words instantaneously. Soon you will instantly recognize numbers like 285 as Novel; 741 as Cart; 101 as Toast. This ability will come quickly if you practice and in no other way will you acquire it.

Adjectives as Helps

You have already found that some numbers of three digits cannot be made into a single word. Others that can be translated into words are sometimes difficult of visualization. To overcome these difficulties and to add greatly to the rapidity with which you can form large numbers, use adjectives for the first digits and the words of the Code list for the others. The combination is quickly made and easily recalled. You will find that in larger figures of six digits the idea works equally well.

1 Hot, Wet, White	6 Huge, Shy, Ashy
2 New or No	7 Sick, Gay, Weak
3 My or May	8 Heavy, Few, Wavy
4 Sour, Raw, Hairy	9 Happy or Webby
5 Low, Oily, Yellow	10 Dizzy

Select one of the adjectives for each digit and become familiar with it and use it continuously, unless another improves the sense materially.

165 Hot Jail	666 Shy Judge
263 New Jam	776 Weak Cage
333 My Mama	829 Heavy Knob
498 Hairy Beehive	993 Happy Bomb
568 Yellow Chief	1035 Dizzy Mail

The adjectives will be of great assistance as well in forming words for four digit numbers:

1149 Hot Trap	7195 Weak Table
2262 New Engine	8941 Heavy Bird

A few additional examples of adjectives will show how helpful this idea can be made:

12--Thin	21--Neat	72--Keen
13--Dim	32--Mean	77--Quick
14--Dear	46--Rich	82--Fine
15--Tall	58--Live	65--Jolly
16--Dutch	62--Shiny	97--Big

For practice translate the following by use of adjectives and Code words, where possible, or adjectives and three digit words.

127.....	1147.....	21147.....
932.....	1932.....	29595.....
478.....	2746.....	32649.....
531.....	9127.....	61492.....
397.....	1392.....	45921.....
729.....	7146.....	72952.....

635..... 6592..... 15864.....

Telephone Numbers

Remembering telephone numbers is a practical application of the Number Code which can be helpful to all. There is probably no combination of figures you are more often called upon to remember than these. When you need them you need them at once. Master the Number Code and you will find that it has paid you many times in this application alone.

Translate the phone number into words and associate them with person, office, place of business, or in any way that will make a good picture which will be easily recalled. The illustrations which follow are instances taken from actual practice.

Hotel--phone number 1740, THE CARS may be used to represent 1740. This hotel, the Brown Palace, in Denver, is a triangular building with cars running on every side, suggesting "THE CARS."

Fire Department--phone number 3084. MISS FIRE stands for 3084. An easy association is that the fire men miss the fire.

Bank--phone number 9795. Here we substitute BIG BILL for 9795, a bank which has many a BIG BILL.

Railroad--phone 1784. TAKE FARE association. The railroad always takes your fare.

Laundry--phone 7540 COLLARS. Association. Collars are in the laundry.

Butcher--phone 531. ALL MEAT. The butcher sells ALL MEAT.

Telephone Exchanges

Knowing the district in which the phone is located will often suggest the exchange, but when necessary make a Reminder Picture for the exchange. Following are some examples which have been used by students:

Main--The Battle Ship	Harrison--Hair or Hare
East--Yeast	Randolph--Ran off
Beacon--Lighthouse	Champa--Champion
Wabash--Wash	Proctor--Doctor

These are suggestions only, much depends upon the individual; make your own reminders. The same exchange may be more easily remembered by different visual images for each of us. Use the means that suits you best. If the exchange is represented by a reminder make the double visual impression, as--

An Abstract Co., Champa 1208
They have the Champion TIN SAFE
A Restaurant, Main 8518
They have Main(ly), VEAL TOUGH

Remembering Addresses

A student was asked to call upon a party at 2214 Third Street, and was cautioned by the man giving the address that he had better write it down. The student remarked, "It isn't necessary, I can easily remember it." Which remark, needless to say, created a favorable impression. 22 is NUN, 14 is DEER. The student made a mental picture of a NUN leading a DEER HOME (Third Street).

Another address was 1939, which is quickly transferred to a picture of a TUB and a MOP.

Remembering Fractions

Fractions can be converted into words and thus carried in the mind with exactness. A great many are illustrated in the following list. These words all begin with the letter S for uniformity and to make it easy to remember that the word represents a fraction:

1/2--Stone 1/5--Steel 9/10--Spats
4/5--Sorrel 1/8--Stave 1/6--Stage
1/4--Steer 5/6--Sledge 3/5--Sawmill
3/4--Summer 1/3--Stem 7/8--Skiff

Other words can be made for the other fractions. 1/7 would be Stock and 2/7 Sneak, and 3/7 Smack. A combination of these words with the Code list will help with fractions. 9-1/4 would be WHIP STEER. 12-2/5 is TOWN SNAIL. 54-1/2 is LAIR STONE. 35-1/6 is MAIL STAGE.

Remembering Department Numbers

In learning the department numbers in a large department store it is simply necessary to associate the goods sold in the particular department with the Code word, and if desirable, the name of the buyer can be associated also.

Remembering Color Numbers

The color numbers in a wholesale house, some sixty of them, were learned by one student while reading them over slowly. Color Number 1 is Black, BLACK TIE. Color 12 is Gold, a GOLD TOWN. A little more difficult is 51, Gettysburg gray. Here a man is wandering over the

fields of Gettysburg in the Gray dawn with a LADY (51).

The Game of Memory Demonstration

Excellent practice and a great deal of pleasure can be had by letting some one give the child a series of ten words to be remembered in connection with the numbers which are written opposite them. They can be given out of order and this will make a stronger impression and be as easy for the child.

The numbers 1 to 10 will be represented in his mind by the Code words TIE to TOES. Each will be pictured in turn with the word given for the number. Let the one giving the words write the numbers 1 to 10 in a vertical line, and as he writes the word opposite tell them to the child taking the demonstration. For example--5 is Window. This immediately becomes a picture of the WHEEL (5) and a Window. Throw the Wheel through the Window. Next he might be given 10, BOOK. A picture of TOES and Book. 3 is FIRE, a picture of a HOME (3) on Fire. 1 is CANDY, sticks of Candy bound up in a TIE (1).

Each word and number are to be visualized together. When the ten have all been given, the child begins with 1 (TIE) and recalls the object he pictured with it; next 2 (SNOW) and recalls the word pictured with it, and so on to the end of the ten. Recall each one in sequence even though given out of order.

A practice demonstration:

5--Window 1--Candy 4--Bank
10--Book 9--Fish 6--Apple
3--Fire 8--Auto 2--Stone
7--Horse

Begin with 1 and recall them in sequence.

A Number Demonstration

Instead of the words, as used in the preceding game, follow the same plan as with two digit numbers, as--

1 is 29 4 is 100 7 is 35
2 is 93 5 is 61 8 is 12
3 is 57 6 is 44 9 is 98
10 is 86

This is simply a combination picture of two Code words. One is TIE and 29 is KNOB, a picture of a huge red TIE hanging on a KNOB will answer the purpose.

2 is SNOW and 93 is BOMB, a big, black, sizzling BOMB in the SNOW bank. Picture each pair as given and recall them by first recalling the Code word for the position in the list and it will be associated with another object in the picture, the number value of which is the number as given.

Accuracy in this game is dependent upon being familiar with the Code, know the sounds, and if the Code word for 57 does not come to mind easily use any word with the two sounds L and K and it will represent 57. You could use the word Lake, Elk, or Leg, any one of which will enable you to remember the number.

Other uses of the Number Code will be given in the next book, and there will be found many applications of it to the needs of the child in his school work. It is helpful in many ways and should be mastered both for its usefulness and for the value in mental development which will come from practicing with it.



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by Carl Van Doren

Edgar Lee Masters

The newest style in American fiction dates from the appearance, in 1915, of *Spoon River Anthology*, though it required five years for the influence of that book to pass thoroughly over from poetry to prose. For nearly half a century native literature had been faithful to the cult of the village, celebrating its delicate merits with sentimental affection and with unwearied interest digging into odd corners of the country for persons and incidents illustrative of the essential goodness and heroism which, so the doctrine ran, lie beneath unexciting surfaces. Certain critical dispositions, aware of agrarian discontent or given to a preference for cities, might now and then lay disrespectful hands upon the life of the farm; but even these generally hesitated to touch the village, sacred since Goldsmith in spite of Crabbe, sacred since

Washington Irving in spite of E.W. Howe.

The village seemed too cosy a microcosm to be disturbed. There it lay in the mind's eye, neat, compact, organized, traditional: the white church with tapering spire, the sober schoolhouse, the smithy of the ringing anvil, the corner grocery, the cluster of friendly houses; the venerable parson, the wise physician, the canny squire, the grasping landlord softened or outwitted in the end; the village belle, gossip, atheist, idiot; jovial fathers, gentle mothers, merry children; cool parlors, shining kitchens, spacious barns, lavish gardens, fragrant summer dawns, and comfortable winter evenings. These were elements not to be discarded lightly, even by those who perceived that time was discarding many of them as the industrial revolution went on planting ugly factories alongside the prettiest brooks, bringing in droves of aliens who used unfamiliar tongues and customs, and fouling the atmosphere with smoke and gasoline. Mr. Howe in The Story of a Country Town had long ago made it cynically clear--to the few who read him--that villages which prided themselves upon their pioneer energy might in fact be stagnant backwaters or dusty centers of futility, where existence went round and round while elsewhere the broad current moved away from them. Mark Twain in The Man That Corrupted Hadleyburg had more recently put it bitterly on record that villages which prided themselves upon their simple virtues might from lack of temptation have become a hospitable soil for meanness and falsehood, merely waiting for the proper seed. And Clarence Darrow in his elegiac Farmington had insisted that one village at least had been the seat of as much restless longing as of simple bliss. Spoon River Anthology in its different dialect did little more than to confirm these mordant, neglected testimonies.

That Mr. Masters was not neglected must be explained in part, of course, by his different dialect. The Greek anthology had suggested to him something which was, he said, "if less than verse, yet more than prose"; and he went, with the step of genius, beyond any "formal resuscitation of the Greek epigrams, ironical and tender, satirical and sympathetic, as casual experiments in unrelated themes," to an "epic rendition of modern life" which suggests the novel in its largest aspects. An admirable scheme occurred to him: he would imagine a graveyard such as every American village has and would equip it with epitaphs of a ruthless veracity such as no village ever saw put into words. The effect was as if all the few honest epitaphs in the world had suddenly come together in one place and sent up a shout of revelation.

Conventional readers had the thrill of being shocked and of finding an opportunity to defend the customary reticences; ironical readers had the delight of coming upon a host of witnesses to the contrast which irony perpetually observes between appearance and reality; readers militant for the "truth" discovered an occasion to demand that pious fictions should be done away with and the naked facts exposed to the sanative glare of noon. And all these readers, most of them unconsciously no doubt, shared the fearful joy of sitting down at an almost incomparably abundant feast of scandal. Where now were the mild decencies of

Tiverton, of Old Chester, of Friendship Village? The roofs and walls of Spoon River were gone and the passers-by saw into every bedroom; the closets were open and all the skeletons rattled undenied; brains and breasts had unlocked themselves and set their most private treasures out for the most public gaze.

It was the scandal and not the poetry of _Spoon River_, criticism may suspect, which particularly spread its fame. Mr. Masters used an especial candor in affairs of sex, an instinct which, secretive everywhere, has rarely ever been so much so as in the American villages of fiction, where love ordinarily exhibited itself in none but the chastest phases, as if it knew no savage vagaries, transgressed no ordinances, shook no souls out of the approved routines. Reaction from too much sweet drove Mr. Masters naturally to too much sour; sex in Spoon River slinks and festers, as if it were an instinct which had not been schooled--however imperfectly--by thousands of years of human society to some modification of its rages and some civil direction of its restless power. But here, as with the other aspects of behavior in his village, he showed himself impatient, indeed violent, toward all subterfuges. There is filth, he said in effect, behind whited sepulchers; drag it into the light and such illusions will no longer trick the uninstructed into paying honor where no honor appertains and will no longer beckon the deluded to an imitation of careers which are actually unworthy.

Spoon River has not even the outward comeliness which the village of tradition should possess: it is slack and shabby. Nor is its decay chronicled in any mood of tender pathos. What strikes its chronicler most is the general demoralization of the town. Except for a few saints and poets, whom he acclaims with a lyric ardor, the population is sunk in greed and hypocrisy and--as if this were actually the worst of all--complacent apathy. Spiritually it dwindles and rots; externally it clings to a pitiless decorum which veils its faults and almost makes it overlook them, so great has the breach come to be between its practices and its professions. Again and again its poet goes back to the heroic founders of Spoon River, back to the days which nurtured Lincoln, whose shadow lies mighty, beneficent, too often unheeded, over the degenerate sons and daughters of a smaller day; and from an older, robust integrity Mr. Masters takes a standard by which he morosely measures the purposelessness and furtiveness and supineness and dulness of the village which has forgotten its true ancestors.

Anger like his springs from a poetic elevation of spirit; toward the end _Spoon River Anthology_ rises to a mystical vision of human life by comparison with which the scavenging epitaphs of the first half seem, though witty, yet insolent and trivial. It is perhaps not necessary to point out that the numerous poets and novelists who have learned a lesson from the book have learned it less powerfully from the difficult later pages than from those in which the text is easiest.

Mr. Masters himself has not always remembered the harder and better

lesson. During a half dozen years he has published more than a half dozen books which have all inherited the credit of the Anthology but which all betray the turbulent, nervous habit of experimentation which makes up a large share of his literary character. There comes to mind the figure of a blind-folded Apollo, eager and lusty, who continually runs forward on the trail of poetry and truth but who, because of his blindfoldedness, only now and then strikes the central track. Five of Mr. Masters's later books are collections of miscellaneous verse; during the fruitful year 1920 he undertook two longer flights of fiction. In Mitch Miller he attempted in prose to write a new Tom Sawyer for the Spoon River district; in Domesday Book he applied the method of The Ring and the Book to the material of Starved Rock. The impulse of the first must have been much the same as Mark Twain's: a desire to catch in a stouter net than memory itself the recollections of boyhood which haunt disillusioned men. But as Mr. Masters is immensely less boylike than Mark Twain, elegy and argument thrust themselves into the chronicle of Mitch and Skeet, with an occasional tincture of a fierce hatred felt toward the politics and theology of Spoon River. A story of boyhood, that lithe, muscular age, cannot carry such a burden of doctrine. The narrative is tangled in a snarl of moods. Its movement is often thick, its wings often gummed and heavy.

The same qualities may be noted in Domesday Book. Its scheme and machinery are promising: a philosophical coroner, holding his inquest over the body of a girl found mysteriously dead, undertakes to trace the mystery not only to its immediate cause but up to its primary source and out to its remotest consequences. At times the tale means to be an allegory of America during the troubled, roiled, destroying years of the war; at times it means to be a "census spiritual" of American society. Elenor Murray, in her birth and love and sufferings and desperate end, is represented as pure nature, "essential genius," acting out its fated processes in a world of futile or corrupting inhibitions. But Mr. Masters has less skill at portraying the sheer genius of an individual than at arraigning the inhibitions of the individual's society. When he steps down from his watch-tower of irony he can hate as no other American poet does. His hates, however, do not always pass into poetry; they too frequently remain hard, sullen masses of animosity not fused with his narrative but standing out from it and adding an unmistakable personal rhythm to the rough beat of his verse. So, too, do his heaps of turgid learning and his scientific speculations often remain undigested. A good many of his characters are cut to fit the narrative plan, not chosen from reality to make up the narrative. The total effect is often crude and heavy; and yet beneath these uncompleted surfaces are the sinews of enormous power: a greedy gusto for life, a wide imaginative experience, tumultuous uprushes; of emotion and expression, an acute if undisciplined intelligence, great masses of the veritable stuff of existence out of which great novels are made.

Sherwood Anderson

Spoon River Anthology has called forth a smaller number of deliberate imitations than might have been expected, and even they have utilized its method with a difference. Sherwood Anderson, for example, in Winesburg, Ohio speaks in accents and rhythms obstinately his own, though his book is, in effect, the Anthology "transposed." Instead of inventing Winesburg immediately after Spoon River became famous he began his career more regularly, with the novels Windy McPherson's Son and Marching Men, in which he employed what has become the formula of revolt for recent naturalism. In both stories a superior youth, of rebellious energy and somewhat inarticulate ambition, detaches himself in disgust from his native village and makes his way to the city in search of that wealth which is the only thing the village has ever taught him to desire though it is unable to gratify his desires itself; and in both the youth, turned man, finds himself sickening with his prize in his hands and looks about him for some clue to the meaning of the mad world in which he has succeeded without satisfaction. Sam McPherson, after a futile excursion through the proletariat in search of the peace which he has heard accompanies honest toil, settles down to the task of bringing up some children he has adopted and thus of forcing himself "back into the ranks of life." Beaut McGregor, refusing a handsome future at the bar, sets out to organize the workers of Chicago into marching men who drill in the streets and squares at night that they may be prepared for action if only they can find some sort of goal to march upon.

These novels ache with the sense of a dumb confusion in America; with a consciousness "of how men, coming out of Europe and given millions of square miles of black fertile land mines and forests, have failed in the challenge given them by fate and have produced out of the stately order of nature only the sordid disorder of man." Out of this ache of confusion comes no lucidity. Sam McPherson is not sure but that he will find parenthood as petty as business was brutal; Beaut McGregor sets his men to marching and their orderly step resounds through the final chapters of his career as here recorded, but no one knows what will come of it--they advance and wheel and retreat as blindly as any horde of peasants bound for a war about which they do not know the causes, in a distant country of which they have never heard the name. Mr. Anderson worked in his first books as if he were assembling documents on the eve of revolution. Village peace and stability have departed; ancient customs break or fade; the leaven of change stirs the lump.

From such arguments he turned aside to follow Mr. Masters into verse with Mid-American Chants and into scandal with Winesburg, Ohio. But touching scandal with beauty as his predecessor touched it with irony, Mr. Anderson constantly transmutes it. The young man who here sets out to make his fortune has not greatly hated Winesburg, and the imminence of his departure throws a vaguely golden mist over the village, which is seen in considerable measure through his generous if inexperienced eyes. A newspaper reporter, he directs his principal curiosity towards items of life outside the commonplace and thus offers Mr. Anderson the occasion to explore the moral and spiritual hinterlands of men and women

who outwardly walk paths strict enough.

If the life of the tribe is unadventurous, he seems to say, there is still the individual, who, perhaps all the more because of the rigid decorums forced upon him, may adventure with secret desires through pathless space. Only, the pressure of too many inhibitions can distort human spirits into grotesque forms. The inhabitants of Winesburg tend toward the grotesque, now this organ of the soul enlarged beyond all symmetry, now that wasted away in a desperate disuse. They see visions which in some wider world might become wholesome realities or might be dispelled by the light but which in Winesburg must lurk about till they master and madden with the strength which the darkness gives them. Religion, deprived in Winesburg of poetry, fritters its time away over Pharisaic ordinances or evaporates in cloudy dreams; sex, deprived of spontaneity, settles into fleshly habit or tortures its victim with the malice of a thwarted devil; heroism of deed or thought either withers into melancholy inaction or else protects itself with a sullen or ridiculous bravado.

Yet even among such pitiful surroundings Mr. Anderson walks tenderly. He honors youth, he feels beauty, he understands virtue, he trusts wisdom, when he comes upon them. He broods over his creatures with affection, though he makes no luxury of illusions. Much as he has detached himself from the cult of the village, he still cherishes the memories of some specific Winesburg. Much as he has detached himself from the hazy national optimism of an elder style in American thinking, he still cherishes a confidence in particular persons. *Winesburg, Ohio* springs from the more intimate regions of his mind and is consequently more humane and less doctrinaire than his earlier novels. It has a similar superiority over the book he wrote for 1920, *Poor White*, which returns to the device of a bewildered strong man rising from a dull obscurity, successful but unsatisfied. At the same time *Poor White* proceeds from an imagination which had been warmed with the creation of Winesburg and its people and is richer, fuller, deeper than the angular sagas of McPherson and McGregor. It does not yet show that Mr. Anderson can construct a large plot or that his vision comes with a steady gleam; it shows, rather, that he is still fumbling in the confusion of current life to get hold of something true and simple and to make it clear.

Perhaps he tried in *Poor White* to manipulate a larger bulk than he is yet ready for. Perhaps because he was aware of that he has worked in his latest book, *The Triumph of the Egg*, with a variety of brief themes and has excelled even *Winesburg* in both poetry and truth. At least it is certain that he keeps on advancing in his art. Although life has not hardened for him, and he sees it still flowing or whirling, he steadily sharpens his outlines and perfects the fierce intensity of his style. Will his wisdom ever catch up with his passion and his observation? In each successive book he has revealed himself as still hot with the fever of his day's experiences. He has yet to show that he can go through the confusion of new spiritual adventures and then set them down, remembering, in tranquillity.

E.W. Howe

With The Anthology of Another Town E.W. Howe, obviously on the suggestion of Spoon River, returned to the caustic analysis of American village life which he may be said to have inaugurated in The Story of a Country Town almost forty years before. Then he had been young enough to feel it necessary to invent romantic embroideries for his grim tale, somewhat as Emily Brontë under somewhat similar circumstances has done for Wuthering Heights--the novel which Mr. Howe's story most resembles. But all his inventions were stern, full of a powerful dissatisfaction, merciless toward the idyllic versions of country life which sweetened the decade of the eighties. Even among the pioneers whom Mr. Masters idealizes there were, according to the older man, slackness and shabbiness, and at the first opportunity to take their ease in the new world they had won from nature they sank down, too nerveless for passion or violence, into the easy vices: idleness, whining, gossip, drunkenness, sodden inutility. Against such qualities Mr. Howe has from the first proceeded with the doctrines of another Franklin, but of a Franklin without whimsical persuasions or elegant graces. Having apparently come to the conclusion that he was a failure as a novelist because he made no great stir with his experiments in that trade, he confined himself to more or less orthodox journalism for a generation, and then, retiring, founded his organ of "indignation and information"--E.W. Howe's Monthly--and began to pour forth the stream of aphoristic honesty which makes him easily first among the rural sages.

In no sense, of course, does he assume the cosmopolitan and international attitude which most of the naturalists assume: "Provincialism," he curtly says, "is the best thing in the world." Nor is he in any of the casual senses a radical: "In everything in which man is interested, the world knows what is best for him.... Millions of men have lived millions of years, and tried everything." Neither has he any patience with speculation for its own sake: "There are no mysteries. Where does the wind come from? It doesn't matter: we know the habits of wind after it arrives." As to politics: "The people are always worsted in an election." As to altruism: "The long and the short of it is, whoever catches the fool first is entitled to shear him." As to love: "We cannot permit love to run riot; we must build fences around it, as we do around pigs." As to money: "In theory, it is not respectable to be rich. In fact, poverty is a disgrace." As to literature: "Poets are prophets whose prophesying never comes true." As to prudence: "Trying to live a spiritual life in a material world is the greatest folly I know anything about." As to persistent hopefulness: "Pessimism is always nearer the truth than optimism."

When the author of such aphorisms undertook to write another anthology about another town he naturally avoided the mystical elevation of Spoon River as well as its verse; he used the irony of a disillusioned man and

the directness of a bullet. His scheme was not to assemble epitaphs for the dead of the village but to tell crisp anecdotes of the living. He had no iniquities in the human order to assail, since he believes that the order is just and that it rarely hurts any one who does not deserve to be hurt by reason of some avoidable imbecility. He made no specialty of scandal; he did not inquire curiously into the byways of sex; he let pathology alone. He appears in the book to be--as he is in the flesh--a wise old man letting his memory run through the town and recalling bits of decent, illuminating gossip. He is willing to tell a fantastic yarn with a dry face or to tuck a tragedy in a sentence; to repeat some village legend in his own low tones or to puncture some village bubble with a cynical inquiry.

Yet for all his acceptance and tolerance of the village he is far from helping to continue the sentimental traditions concerning it. The common sense which he considers the basis of all philosophy--"If it isn't common sense, it isn't philosophy"--he has the gift of expounding in a language which is piercingly individual. It strips his village of trivial local color and reduces it to the simplest terms--making it out a more or less fortuitous congregation of human beings of whom some work and some play, some behave themselves and some do not, some consequently prosper and some fail, some are happy and some are miserable. His village is not dainty, like a poem, for the reason that he believes no village ever was; at least he has never seen one like that. Downrightness like his is death to mere pretty notions about tribes and towns quite as truly as are the positive indictments brought against them by Mr. Masters and Mr. Anderson. If Mr. Howe is less vivid than those two, because he distrusts passion and poetry, he is also quieter and surer. "I am not an Agnostic; I _know_.... I have lived a long time, and my real problems have always been simple."

Sinclair Lewis

Spoon River Anthology was a collection of poems, Winesburg, Ohio was a collection of short stories, The Anthology of Another Town was a collection of anecdotes. It remained for a novel in the customary form, Sinclair Lewis's Main Street, to bring to hundreds of thousands the protest against the village which these books brought to thousands.

Mr. Lewis, like Mr. Masters, clearly has revenges to take upon the narrow community in which he grew up, nourished, no doubt, on the complacency native to such neighborhoods and yet increasingly resentful. Less poetical than his predecessor, the younger novelist went further in both his specifications and his generalizations. Instead of brooding closely, ironically, profoundly, under the black wings of the thought of death, Mr. Lewis satisfies himself with a slashing portrait of Gopher Prairie done to the life with the fingers of ridicule. He has photographic gifts of accuracy; he has all the arts of mimicry; he has a tireless gusto in his pursuit of the tedious commonplace. Each item of his evidence is convincing, and the accumulation is irresistible. No

other American small town has been drawn with such exactness of detail in any other American novel. Various elements of scandal crop out here and there, but the principal accusation which Mr. Lewis brings against his village--and indeed against all villages--is that of being dull. "It is contentment ... the contentment of the quiet dead, who are scornful of the living for their restless walking. It is negation canonized as the one positive virtue. It is the prohibition of happiness. It is slavery self-sought and self-defended. It is dulness made God."

Not dulness itself so much as dulness militant and prospering arouses this satirist. The whole world, he believes, is being leveled by the march of machines into one monotonous uniformity, before which all the individual colors and graces and prides and habits flee--or would flee if there were any asylum still uninvaded. Thus Mr. Lewis's voice continues the opposition which Wordsworth raised to the coming of a railroad into his paradise among the Lakes and which Ruskin and Matthew Arnold and William Morris raised to the standardization of life which went on during their century. The American voice, however, speaks of American conditions. The villages of the Middle West, it asseverates, have been conquered and converted by the legions of mediocrity, and now, grown rich and vain, are setting out to carry the dingy banner, led by the booster's calliope and the evangelist's bass drum, farther than it has ever gone before--to make provincialism imperialistic; so that all the native and instinctive virtues, freedoms, powers must rally in their own defense.

Mr. Lewis hates such dulness--the village virus--as the saints hate sin. Indeed it is with a sort of new Puritanism that he and his contemporaries wage against the dull a war something like that which certain of their elders once waged against the bad. Only a satiric anger helped out by the sense of being on crusade could have sustained the author of *Main Street* through the laborious compilation of those brilliant details which illustrate the complacency of Gopher Prairie and which seem less brilliant than laborious to bystanders not particularly concerned in his crusade. The question, of course, arises whether the ancient war upon stupidity is a better literary cause to fight in than the equally ancient war upon sin. Both narrow themselves to doctrinal contentions, apparently forgetting for the moment that either being virtuous or being intelligent is but a half--or thereabouts--of existence, and that the two qualities are hopelessly intertwined. There are thoughtful novelists who, as they do not condemn lapses of virtue too harshly, so also do not too harshly condemn deficiencies of intelligence, feeling that the common humanity of men and women is enough to make them fit for fiction. Mr. Lewis must be thought of as sitting in the seat of the scornful, with the satirists rather than with the poets, must be seen to recall the earlier, vexed, sardonic *Spoon River* rather than the later, calmer, loftier.

Satire and moralism, however, have large rights in the domain of literature. Had Mr. Lewis lacked remarkable gifts he could never have written a book which got its vast popularity by assailing the populace.

The reception of Main Street is a memorable episode in literary history. Thousands doubtless read it merely to quarrel with it; other thousands to find out what all the world was talking about; still other thousands to rejoice in a satire which they thought to be at the expense of stupid people never once identified with themselves; but that thousands and hundreds of thousands read it is proof enough that complacency was not absolutely victorious and that the war was on.

Zona Gale

Before Main Street Sinclair Lewis, though the author of such promising novels as Our Mr. Wrenn and The Job, had been forced by the neglect of his more serious work to earn a living with the smarter set among American novelists, writing bright, colloquial, amusing chatter for popular magazines. If it seems a notable achievement for a temper like Mr. Masters's to have helped pave the way to popularity for Mr. Lewis, it seems yet more notable to have performed a similar service for Zona Gale, who for something like a decade before Spoon River Anthology had had a comfortable standing among the sweeter set. She was the inventor of Friendship Village, one of the sweetest of all the villages from Miss Mitford and Mrs. Gaskell down. Friendship lay ostensibly in the Middle West, but it actually stood--if one may be pardoned an appropriate metaphor--upon the confectionery shelf of the fiction shop, preserved in a thick syrup and set up where a tender light could strike across it at all hours. In story after story Miss Gale varied the same device: that of showing how childlike children are, how sisterly are sisters, how brotherly are brothers, how motherly are mothers, how fatherly are fathers, how grandmotherly and grandfatherly are grandmothers and grandfathers, and how loverly are all true lovers of whatever age, sex, color, or condition. But beneath the human kindness which had permitted Miss Gale to fall into this technique lay the sinews of a very subtle intelligence; and she needed only the encouragement of a changing public taste to be able to escape from her sugary preoccupations. Though the action of Miss Lulu Bett takes place in a different village, called Warbleton, it might as well have been in Friendship--in Friendship seen during a mood when its creator had grown weary of the eternal saccharine. Now and then, she realized, some spirit even in Friendship must come to hate all those idyllic posturings; now and then in some narrow bosom there must flash up the fires of youth and revolution. It is so with Lulu Bett, dim drudge in the house of her silly sister and of her sister's pompous husband: a breath of life catches at her and she follows it on a pitiful adventure which is all she has enough vitality to achieve but which is nevertheless real and vivid in a waste of dulness.

Here was an occasion to arraign Warbleton as Mr. Lewis was then arraigning Gopher Prairie; Miss Gale, instead of heaping up a multitude of indictments, categorized and docketed, followed the path of indirection which--by a paradoxical axiom of art--is a shorter cut than the highway of exposition or anathema. Her story is as spare as the

virgin frame of Lulu Bett; her style is staccato in its lucid brevity, like Lulu's infrequent speeches; her eloquence is not that of a torrent of words and images but that of comic or ironic or tragic meaning packed in a syllable, a gesture, a dumb silence. Miss Gale riddles the tedious affectations of the Deacon household almost without a word of comment; none the less she exhibits them under a withering light. The daughter, she says, "was as primitive as pollen"--and biology rushes in to explain Di's blind philanderings. "In the conversations of Dwight and Ina," it is said of the husband and wife, "you saw the historical home forming in clots in the fluid wash of the community"--and anthropology holds the candle. Grandma Bett is, for the moment, the symbol of decrepit age, as Lulu is the symbol of bullied spinsterhood. Yet in the midst of applications so universal the American village is not forgotten, little as it is alluded to. If the Friendships are sweet and dainty, so are they--whether called Warbleton or something less satiric--dull and petty, and they fashion their Deacons no less than their Pelleases and Ettares. Thus hinting, Miss Gale, in her clear, flutelike way, joins the chorus in which others play upon noisier instruments.

Floyd Dell

The year which saw the appearance of Main Street and Miss Lulu Bett saw also that of The Age of Innocence, Edith Wharton's acid delineation of the village of Manhattan in the genteel seventies, given over to the "innocence that seals the mind against imagination and the heart against experience"; saw Mary Borden's The Romantic Woman, with its cosmopolitan amusement at the village of Iroquois, otherwise Chicago; and saw Floyd Dell's Moon-Calf, which, standing on the other side of controversy, lacks not only the disposition to sentimentalize the village but even the disposition to ridicule it.

Mr. Dell's emancipation is the fruit of a revolutionary detachment from village standards which is too complete to have left traces of any such rupture as is implied in almost every paragraph of Main Street. Moon-Calf, recounting the adventures of a young poet in certain river counties and towns and villages of Illinois, touches without heat upon the spiritual and intellectual limitations of those neighborhoods. It settles no old scores. It relates an unconventional career without conventional reproaches and also without conventional heroics. Felix Fay dreams and blunders and suffers but he goes on growing like a tree, pushing his head up through one level of development after another until he stands above the minor annoyances of his immaturity and looks out over a broader world. He has a soul which is naturally socialist and yet he never loses himself in proclamations or statistics. He can be fresh and hopeful and yet learn from the remarkable old men he encounters. He lives and loves with an instinctive freedom and yet he holds himself equally secure from devastating extravagances and devastating repressions. Mr. Dell writes as if he had steadier nerves than most of the naturalists; as if he regarded their war upon the village as an ancient brawl which may now be assumed to have been as much settled as

it ever will be. At least, it seems scarcely worth wrangling over. The spirit seeking to release itself from trivial conditions behaves most intelligently when it discreetly takes them into account and concerns itself with them only enough to escape entanglements. Mr. Dell leaves it to the moralists and the satirists to whip offenders, while he himself goes on to construct some monument of beauty upon the ground which moralism and satire are laboring to clear.

Moon-Calf is very beautiful. Felix has a poetic gift sufficient to warm the record with fine verses and delicate susceptibilities upon which his adventures leave exquisite impressions. Even when his rebellion is at its highest pitch he wastes little energy in hating and so avoids the astringency and perturbation of a state of mind which is always perilous. To say Felix Fay is more or less to mean Floyd Dell, for the narrative is obviously autobiographic at many points. But were it entirely invention it would testify none the less to the affection with which this novelist feels his world and the lucidity with which he represents it. He has a genuine zest for human life, enjoying it, even when it invites mirth or anger, because of the form and color and movement which he perceives everywhere and particularly because of the solid texture of reality of which he is admirably aware. Hatred closes the eyes to a multitude of charms. If Mr. Dell suffered from it he could never have enriched his fabric as he has with so many circumstances chosen with an unargumentative hand; he could never have extracted so much drama out of dusty people. Had he been a sentimentalist he might have fallen into the soft processes of the local color school when it came to portraying the various communities through which Felix takes his way. Instead, the story is everywhere stiffened with intelligence. Felix has no adventures more exciting than his successive discoveries of new ideas. Even the women he loves fit into the pattern of his career as a thinking being, and he emerges, however moved, with a surer grasp of his expanding universe. That grasp would lack much of its confidence if Mr. Dell employed a style less masterly. As it is, he writes with a candid lucidity which everywhere lets in the light and with a grace which rounds off the edges that mark the pamphlet but not the work of art. He can be at once downright and graceful, at once sincere and impersonal, at once revolutionary and restrained, at once impassioned and reflective, at once enamored of truth and scrupulous for beauty.

When Felix Fay had escaped his original villages and had taken to the wider pursuit of freedom in Chicago there was another chapter of his career to be recorded; and that Mr. Dell sets down in _The Briary-Bush_, wherein Felix finds that the trail of freedom ends, for him, in madness and loneliness. From the first, though this moon-calf has steadily blundered toward detachment from the common order, some aching instinct has left him hungry for solid ground to stand on. The conflict troubles him. He can succeed in his immediate occupations but he cannot understand his powers or feel confident in his future. His world whirls round and round, menaces, eludes, threatens to vanish altogether. Thrown by dim forces into the arms of Rose-Ann, who seeks freedom no less

restlessly than he, he is married, and the two begin their passionate experiment at a union which shall have no bonds but their common determination to be free. Charming slaves of liberty! Felix is at heart a Puritan and cannot take the world lightly, as it comes. His blunders bruise and wound him. He punishes himself for all his vagaries. Rose-Ann is not a Puritan, but she too has instincts that will not surrender, any more than Felix's, to the doctrines which they both profess: jealousy sleeps within her, and potential motherhood. She and Felix come to feel that they have shirked life by their deliberate childlessness and that life has deserted them. Yet separation proves unendurable. So they resume marriage, vowing "not to be afraid of life or of any of the beautiful things life may bring." Among these, of course, are to be children and a house.

Is this merely a return to their villages, merely domestic sentimentalism in a lovely guise? Mr. Dell has gone a little too deep to incur the full suspicion. He has got very near to the biological foundations of two lives, where, for the moment, he rests his case. There is more to come, however, in this spiritual history, whether Felix Fay knows it or not. Let the house be built and the children be born, and Felix and Rose-Ann, though citizens and parents, will still be individuals and will still have to find out whether these complicated threads of loyalty last better than the simple threads which broke. Felix, in discovering the lure of stability, has not necessarily completed the circle of his life. Freedom may allure him again.

The Briary-Bush, less varied than Moon-Calf, is decidedly profounder. It hovers over the dark waters of the unconscious on perhaps the surest wings an American novel has ever used. Though it has probed difficult natures and knows them thoroughly it does not flaunt its knowledge but brings it in only when it can throw some revealing light upon the outward perplexities of the lovers. Thus it gives depth and timbre to the story, and yet allows the characters to seem actual persons actually walking the world. At the same time, Mr. Dell does not possess a too vivid sense of externality. In both his novels all facts come through the mist of Felix's habitual confusion, and in that mist they lose dramatic emphasis; muted, they are not able to break up the agreeable monotone in which the narrative is delivered. But underneath these surfaces, seen so poetically, there is a substantial bulk of human life, immemorial folkways powerfully contending with the new rebellion of reason.

F. Scott Fitzgerald

Domesday Book, Poor White, The Anthology of Another Town, Main Street, Miss Lulu Bett, The Age of Innocence, The Romantic Woman, and Moon-Calf would make 1920 remarkable even if that year had not brought forth other novels of equal rank; if it had not brought forth James Branch Cabell's richly symbolical romance Figures of Earth and Upton Sinclair's bitter indictment 100%. And though most of these seem

somber, there came along with them another novel in which were gaiety and high spirits and the fires of youth.

F. Scott Fitzgerald in *_This Side of Paradise_* also had broken with the village. He wrote of his gilded boys and girls as if average decorum existed only to be shocked. But he made the curious discovery that undergraduates could have brains and still be interesting; that they need not give their lives entirely to games and adolescent politics; that they may have heard of Oscar Wilde as well as of Rudyard Kipling and of Rupert Brooke no less than of Alfred Noyes. Mr. Fitzgerald had indeed his element of scandal to tantalize the majority, who debated whether or not the rising generation could be as promiscuous in its behavior as he made out. It is the brains in the book, however, not the scandal, which finally count. His restless generation sparkles with inquiry and challenge. When its elders have let the world fall into chaos, why, youth questions, should it trust their counsels any longer? Mirth and wine and love are more pleasant than that hollow wisdom, and they may be quite as solid.

This Side of Paradise comes to no conclusion; it ends in weariness and smoke, though at last Amory believes he has found himself in the midst of a wilderness of uncertainties. Yet how vivid a document the book is upon a whirling time, and how beguiling an entertainment! The narrative flares up now into delightful verse and now into glittering comic dialogue. It shifts from passion to farce, from satire to lustrous beauty, from impudent knowingness to pathetic youthful humility. It is both alive and lively. Few things more significantly illustrate the moving tide of which the revolt from the village is a symptom than the presence of such unrest as this among these bright barbarians. The traditions which once might have governed them no longer hold. They break the patterns one by one and follow their wild desires. And as they play among the ruins of the old, they reason randomly about the new, laughing.

Dorothy Canfield

If Floyd Dell seems in *_The Briary-Bush_* to hint at the human necessity to turn back by and by from freedom, Dorothy Canfield in *_The Brimming Cup_* pretty clearly argues for that necessity. Doubtless it is to go too far to claim, as certain of her critics do, that she had made a counter-attack upon the assailants of the village and the established order, but it is sure that she gave comfort to many spirits disturbed by the radical outbursts of 1920. Already in *_The Squirrel Cage_* and *_The Bent Twig_* she had shown an affectionate knowledge of the ways of households in small communities; and in *_Hillsboro People_* she had added another hardy, kindly neighborhood to the American array of villages in fiction. *_The Brimming Cup_* sounded a deeper note than any she had yet struck. Suppose, the novel says, there were a woman who had been trained in the wide world but was now living in a distant village; suppose she had heard and felt the tumult of the age and had begun to question the

reality of her contentment; suppose, to make the conflict as dramatic as possible, she should find herself tempted by a new love to give up the settled companionship of her husband and the heavy burden of her children to seek joy in a thrilling passion.

Here Dorothy Canfield had an admirable theme and she rose to it with power, but she permitted herself so easy a solution that her argument stumbles lamentably. The lover who disrupts the warm circle of Marise's life is after all only a selfish bounder, a mere villain; stirred as she is by the promises he holds out of rapture and of luxury, she would be simply foolish not to comprehend, as in the end she does, that she must lose far more than she could gain by the exchange she contemplates. Surely this is no argument in favor of loyalty as against love: it is only a defense of loyalty, which does not need it, as against a fleeting instability; and so it is hardly half as significant as it might have been had the conflict been squarely met, great love contending with great loyalty. Yet while the novel thus falls short of what it might have undertaken it has numerous excellences. It is eloquent and passionate and, very often, wise. Rarely have a mother's relations with her children been so subtly represented; rarely have the manners of a New England township been more convincingly portrayed. The setting glows among its green hills and valleys, its snow and flowers. There are minor characters that stand up vividly in the memory, like persons known face to face. The atmosphere is at once tense with desire and spacious with understanding. Though the materials come from an old tradition they have been heated with the fires of the scrutinizing mind which burn beneath the newer novelists.

1921

That memorable year of fiction which saw so many superior books produced saw them successful beyond any reasonable expectation; and it is scarcely to be wondered at that the year following--with which this chronicle does not undertake to deal--should have responded to such encouragement. If Dorothy Canfield challenged the tendency, Booth Tarkington saw it and ventured Alice Adams. Sherwood Anderson in The Triumph of the Egg and Floyd Dell in The Briary-Bush proceeded to other triumphs. Half a dozen competent novelists followed naturalism into the "exposure" of small towns or cramped lives: particularly C. Kay Scott with the hard, crisp Blind Mice and Charles G. Norris, rival of his brother Frank Norris in veracity if not in fire, with Brass. John Dos Passos in Three Soldiers, the most controverted novel of the year, dealt brilliantly with the unheroic aspects of the American Expeditionary Force. Evelyn Scott in The Narrow House and Ben Hecht in Erik Dorn attempted, as Waldo Frank had already done in The Dark Mother and as some others now did less notably, to find a more elastic, a more impressionistic technique, breaking up the "gray paragraph" and quickening the tempo of their narratives. At the same time romance once more showed its perennial face, suggesting that the future does not belong to naturalism entirely. Donn Byrne in Messer Marco Polo played

in a bright Gaelic way with the story of Marco Polo and his quest for Golden Bells, the daughter of Kubla Khan. Robert Nathan wrote, in *_Autumn_*, an all but perfect native idyl, grounded well enough in local color, as suggestive of the soil as an old farmers' almanac, and yet touched with the universal fingers of the pastoral. If American fiction cannot long escape the village, at least here is a village of a sort hardly thinkable before the revolt began. No matter what a flood of angry truth *_Spoon River Anthology_* let in, beauty survives. Many waters cannot quench beauty. What truth extinguishes is the weaker flames.



A CHAPTER OF THINGS TO SEE THIS FALL

The Project Gutenberg EBook of *The Fall of the Year*, by Dallas Lore Sharp

I

You ought to see the sky--every day. You ought to see, as often as possible, the breaking of dawn, the sunset, the moonrise, and the stars. Go up to your roof, if you live in the city, or out into the middle of the Park, or take a street-car ride into the edge of the country--just to see the moon come up over the woods or over a rounded hill against the sky.

II

You ought to see the light of the October moon, as it falls through a roof of leafless limbs in some silent piece of woods. You have seen the woods by daylight; you have seen the moon from many places; but to be in the middle of the moonlit woods after the silence of the October frost has fallen is to have one of the most beautiful experiences possible out of doors.

III

You ought to see a wooded hillside in the glorious colors of the fall--the glowing hickories, the deep flaming oaks, the cool, dark pines, the blazing gums and sumacs! Take some single, particular woodland scene and look at it until you can see it in memory forever.

IV

You ought to see the spiders in their airships, sailing over the autumn meadows. Take an Indian Summer day, lazy, hazy, sunny, and lie down on your back in some small meadow where woods or old rail fences hedge it around. Lie so that you do not face the sun. The sleepy air

is heavy with balm and barely moves. Soon shimmering, billowing, through the light, a silky skein of cobweb will come floating over. Look sharply, and you will see the little aëronaut swinging in his basket at the bottom of the balloon, sailing, sailing--

Away in the air air--
Far are the shores of Anywhere,
Over the woods and the heather.

V

You ought to see (only _see_, mind you,) on one of these autumn nights, when you have _not_ on your party clothes--you ought to see a "wood pussy." A wood pussy is not a house pussy; a wood pussy is a wood pussy; that is to say, a wood pussy is a--_skunk_! Yes, you ought to see a skunk walking calmly along a moonlit path and not caring a fig for you. You will perhaps never meet a wild buffalo or a grizzly bear or a jaguar in the woods nearest your house; but you may meet a wild skunk there, and have the biggest adventure of your life. Yes, you ought to see a skunk some night, just for the thrill of meeting a wild creature that won't get out of your way.

VI

You ought to see the witch-hazel bush in blossom late in November. It is the only bush or tree in the woods that is in full bloom after the first snow may have fallen. Many persons who live within a few minutes' walk of the woods where it grows have never seen it. But then, many persons who live with the sky right over their heads, with the dawn breaking right into their bedroom windows, have never seen the sky or the dawn to think about them, and wonder at them! There are many persons who have never seen anything at all that is worth seeing. The witch-hazel bush, all yellow with its strange blossoms in November, is worth seeing, worth taking a great deal of trouble to see.

There is a little flower in southern New Jersey called pyxie, or flowering moss, a very rare and hidden little thing; and I know an old botanist who traveled five hundred miles just to have the joy of seeing that little flower growing in the sandy swamp along Silver Run. If you have never seen the witch-hazel in bloom, it will pay you to travel five hundred and five miles to see it. But you won't need to go so far,--unless you live beyond the prairies,--for the witch-hazel grows from Nova Scotia to Florida and west to Minnesota and Alabama.

There is one flower that, according to Mr. John Muir (and he surely knows!), it will pay one to travel away up into the highest Sierra to see. It is the fragrant Washington lily, "the finest of all the Sierra lilies," he says. "Its bulbs are buried in shaggy chaparral tangles, I

suppose for safety from pawing bears; and its magnificent panicles sway and rock over the top of the rough snow-pressed bushes, while big, bold, blunt-nosed bees drone and mumble in its polleny bells. A lovely flower worth going hungry and footsore endless miles to see. The whole world seems richer now that I have found this plant in so noble a landscape.”

And so it seemed to the old botanist who came five hundred miles to find the tiny pyxie in the sandy swamps of southern New Jersey. So it will seem to you--the whole world will not only seem richer, but will be richer for you--when you have found the witch-hazel bush all covered with summer's gold in the bleak woods of November.

VII

You ought to see a big pile of golden pumpkins in some farmhouse shed or beside the great barn door. You ought to see a field of corn in the shock; hay in a barn mow; the jars of fruit, the potatoes, apples, and great chunks of wood in the farmhouse cellar. You ought to see how a farmer gets ready for the winter--the comfort, the plenty, the sufficiency of it all!

VIII

You ought to see how the muskrats, too, get ready for the winter, and the bees and the flowers and the trees and the frogs--everything. Winter is coming. The cold will kill--if it has a chance. But see how it has no chance. How is it that the bees will buzz, the flowers open, the birds sing, the frogs croak again next spring as if there had been no freezing, killing weather? Go out and see why for yourselves.

IX

You ought to see the tiny seed “birds” from the gray birches, scattering on the autumn winds; the thistledown, too; and a dozen other of the winged, and plumed, and ballooned, seeds that sail on the wings of the winds. You should see the burdock burs in the cows' tails when they come home from the pasture, and the stick-tights and beggar-needles in your own coat-tails when you come home from the pastures. And seeing that, you should think--for that is what real seeing means. Think what? Why, that you are just as good as a cow's tail to scatter Nature's seeds for her, and not a bit better, as she sees you.

X

You ought to see the migrating birds as they begin to flock on the

telegraph wires, in the chimneys, and among the reeds of the river. You ought to see the swallows, blackbirds, robins, and bluebirds, as they flock together for the long southern flight. There are days in late September and in early October when the very air seems to be half of birds, especially toward nightfall, if the sun sets full and clear: birds going over; birds diving and darting about you; birds along the rails and ridge-poles; birds in the grass under your feet--birds everywhere. You should be out among them where you can see them. And especially you should see--without fail, this autumn and every autumn--the wedge of wild geese cleaving the dull gray sky in their thrilling journey down from the far-off frozen North.



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